U.S. Department of State

• As of September 2005, the Department of State and Germany have trained more than 45,000 police and expect to complete basic training for all 62,000 national, border and highway police by mid-2006.
• State and the Department of Defense (DOD) will also work together to provide critically need equipment and infrastructure support as many police stations need extensive reconstruction or renovation; and police often lack weapons, vehicles, communications, and other basic equipment, all of which create a difficult working environment for trainees.
• The basic police training has been enhanced to include a Field Training Officer initiative as well as a major local police mentoring initiative that will be implemented by 34 mobile police advisory teams deploying in September 2005. These teams will provide invaluable on-the-job training and guidance to local police officers.
• Though our basic training goals will be accomplished by mid 2006, the Afghan police will require support from the U.S. Government for many years as we continue to help with reform initiatives as well as follow-on mentoring and equipment and infrastructure support. The State Department and Defense Department have closely coordinated all plans for existing funding including equipment, infrastructure, training, mentoring and reform plans and contracting vehicles are in place.
• Overall progress toward providing nationwide security and ensuring stability of the Afghan Government will be hindered if more progress is not made in resolving other Afghan security problems, including the following: lack of an effective judiciary system; the substantial illicit narcotics industry; and the continued presence of armed militias.

• State, along with Department of Defense, should develop more detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police forces, including clearly defined objectives and performance measures, milestones, funding requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved.
• Work with other lead nations to ensure that progress in other security pillars, including justice, combating drugs, disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration, is congruous with the army and police programs.
• State and Defense should report to Congress on their progress.

• FY 2005 supplemental funds have allowed us to increase assistance in these vital efforts. State will continue to coordinate closely on future funding request to support this critical program.
• State disagrees with the recommendation to report to Congress, noting that currently mandated reports to Congress on Afghanistan are comprehensive and believe they can address these issues in that report.

• Track quarterly progress of the Afghan National Army (ANA) via OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART).
• 100% of authorized Afghan police will be trained by mid-2006.
• The Afghan National Army has 25,782 troops assigned for duty (14,684 are combat troops), assisted by U.S. embedded trainers, with increasing presence, influence and capability. There are 1,700 troops in training and recruitment is on target.
• The Government of Afghanistan is in the final phase of its plan to restructure the Ministry of Defense, ensuring proportional ethnic representation all levels, improved accountability capable planning, command and control.
• The influence of warlords has been reduced as the national government secures greater control over customs, deploys the national army and police and the legitimacy proffered by parliamentary and presidential elections.
• More than 63,000 former militia members have been disarmed, 11,004 heavy weapons have been cantoned and more than 260 military units have been decommissioned. The disarmament and demobilization phase of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program was completed in June 2005 and the Afghanistan New Beginnings Program continues to process former combatants who submitted their lists before the June deadline. Reintegration of all soldiers is expected to be completed by June 2006.
• Implement a five pillar counternarcotics strategy.

• Contractors replaced their security providers on five of the eight Iraq reconstruction contracts awarded in 2003 that the GAO reviewed. This turnover rate is attributable to the following factors: contractors' need to acquire security services quickly, contractors' lack of knowledge of the security market and potential security providers available to provide the type of security required in Iraq, and the absence of useful agency guidance.
• The Department's quarterly report to Congress, which describes the status of projects, initiatives, and funding dedicated to Iraq reconstruction, does not provide information on the costs associated with using private security providers.

• State, with Department of Defense (DOD) and USAID, should explore options that would enable contractors to obtain security services quickly and efficiently, including the possibility of identifying minimum standards, establishing qualified vendor lists, and/or establishing contracting vehicles that contractors could be authorized to use.
• State, with Department of Defense and USAID, should establish a means to track and account for security costs to develop more accurate budget estimates.

• State met with the Department of Defense and USAID to prepare formal responses to these recommendations. The Department expects to send this letter to GAO in November.
• DOD, USAID and the Department determined we can best assist contractors, without assuming substantial additional contract performance risk, by providing access to open-source information related to Industry best practices, methodology and material for coordinating security planning and implementation of security programs. This would be for information purposes only to assist contractors in the acquisition of their own security services.
• All three agencies agree to include a line item in all future contracts that will require contractors to report all costs for private security services (as defined by the GAO in Appendix I, page 52 of the GAO report) that the contractors may have to acquire to successfully perform their contracts.

• The Department, along with DoD and USAID, will include a line item in all future contracts that will require contractors to report all costs for private security services (as defined by the GAO in Appendix I, page 52 of the GAO report) that the contractors may need to acquire to successfully perform their contracts.
• The Department, along with DoD and USAID, will in the future have more information on contractor security costs in Iraq.

• State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the efficiency of the human rights vetting process.
• State announced that it had established a new human rights database, the Abuse Case Evaluation System, to be a clearinghouse for information on alleged human rights abuse.
• The strategy did not identify how programs would be combined at the country level to achieve objectives or be coordinated with other U.S. Government agencies.
• Agencies do not have controls in place to help ensure compliance with human rights funding restrictions.
• Vetting process lacks clearly defined roles and responsibilities.
• Monitoring system not established to assess overseas posts' compliance with State policies.

• The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Justice should establish:
  1. The roles and responsibilities of posts and headquarters units for vetting foreign candidates for human rights consideration;
  2. Written policies and procedures covering all entities involved in the vetting process at posts, including documentation and record retention policies specifying what documentation is needed and where and how long vetting files should be maintained;
  3. Monitoring mechanisms and a central focal point to verify that these procedures are being carried out properly.
• State should develop a multi-year security assistance plan coordinated with the Departments of Defense and Justice and any other agencies providing assistance to foreign security forces. This plan should:
  1. Identify all federal agency programs providing assistance to foreign security forces, regardless of their source;
  2. Describe all related resource allocations used to support program goals;
  3. Incorporate quantitative and qualitative performance measures designed to determine the extent to which country programs contribute to broader U.S. foreign policy and security objectives.

• The Department is reviewing procedures to determine how best to improve vetting and address GAO recommendations.
• State is committed to executing its security assistance programs in a coherent, efficient manner that complies with the law and helps the U.S. Government achieve its foreign policy goals.
• State has articulated Department vetting policies to overseas posts.
• State established the Abuse Case Evaluation System (ACES) database as one mechanism to enhance documentation of human rights abusers and which can be used in the vetting processes.
• State has trained more than 100 Department and embassy officials on use of ACES.
• State developed an ACES training manual and made it available to employees of State, Defense, Justice and Homeland Security.
• State is developing Leahy vetting and ACES training for the Foreign Service Institute.

• Encourage continued intra-departmental and inter-agency cooperation to develop an integrated strategic plan for all U.S. Government programs that provide training.
• Encourage increased use of ACES to enhance the identification of human rights abusers and improve vetting.

• A cooperative relationship exists between the Bureau of Counterterrorism (S/CT) and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), regarding the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, but the program's effectiveness could be improved through stronger involvement by S/CT.
• S/CT's limited input to DS/ATA may affect the program's budget priorities and certain ATA program requirements may fail to be considered as a direct result.

• S/CT and DS should reassess the delineation of ATA program management responsibilities, originally approved in 1991.
• ATA's program evaluation function should be located within S/CT and should have a more formal structure and greater autonomy.
• DS/ATA need to improve its control over contact personnel and address the staffing requirements needed, as the scope of the program continues to expand.
• DS/ATA should confirm complete accountability for the total number of weapons that have been acquired for use at its in-country training programs.

• DS/ATA has developed a reorganization proposal that is currently in the approval process, which would move the function of assessments and program reviews/evaluations to a non-training delivery division within DS/ATA.
• DS/ATA and S/CT are continuing to develop an update of the 1991 Memorandum of Agreement to improve program management and measurement of program effectiveness.

• After expected HR bureau concurrence is received and the evaluation function is relocated to a non-training division of DS/ATA, the assurance of objectivity of the measures, data, and results of the evaluation function will be satisfactorily enhanced, thereby successfully resolving the finding of the OIG recommendation.
• Once the update of the 1991 Memorandum of Agreement has been completed, DS/ATA and S/CT will have a more integrated relationship, which will allow for more effective program management and will improve program performance.

• Since September 11th, the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) has strengthened the visa process in a number of ways. CA has eliminated waivers of personal interviews for nearly all New Immigrant Visa (NIV) applicants, first initiated by Department instruction, then codified by statute in 2004; increased and lengthened training of new consular officers to include counterterrorism training and interviewing techniques; increased CA oversight and guidance by issuing standard operating procedures (more than 80 to date); dispatched teams to review operations and ensure standard operating procedures are being complied with at select posts; updated the visa foreign affairs manual; improved mission front office oversight by requiring deputy chiefs of mission to review certain visa adjudications; strengthened the referral system; upgraded consular positions to eliminate situations where visa sections are headed by first tour officers; and added 515 additional consular positions since 2002.
• Amending section 214(b) to remove H, L and V visas from its scope created an anomaly in the law that has led to confusion among consular officers in the application of that section. In addition, converting the R visa to a petition-based visa would make it less susceptible to persons intending to harm the U.S. by allowing concerned U.S.G. agencies to conduct domestic investigations prior to petition approval.
• Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and standard operating procedures guidance on 214(b) are too widely scattered among different sources. Consular officers need refresher 214(b) and other visa adjudication training at FSI, including counterterrorism training, especially if they have been in non-consular assignments or in long-term training. They also need training from all agencies at post, in situ.
• It is important for the consular officer to have broad discretion, looking at the totality of the applicant's circumstances, in adjudicating visas. Codifying guidance would severely limit that discretion and would limit an officer's freedom to adjudicate the eligibility of an applicant in unforeseen and unintended ways, which would weaken rather than strengthen U.S. border security.
• Creating minimum evidentiary standards for visa eligibility would serve to narrow the focus of a consular officer's review of a case, promote worldwide markets in fraudulent documents and make it easier for potentially ineligible applicants to circumvent the law. Current practice and regulations provide the best basis for visa adjudication.
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department have made great progress in developing and sharing information, but more needs to be done, especially the electronic transfer by DHS of all USVISIT exit data, "turnarounds" and the status of adjustments.

• The Department should submit to Congress a technical amendment to section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, restoring the H, L, and V visa categories to that section's purview but without an immigrant intent requirement.
• CA should consolidate its guidance on applying 214(b) into one chapter in the FAM.
• CA should issue more expansive guidance in the FAM on denying visas under 214(b) when an applicant does not meet the individual Section 101(a)(15) requirements of one of the NIV categories.
• The Bureau of Human Resources, with the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), should require refresher visa adjudication training if consular officers have had extended training or an intervening non-consular assignment since receiving basic consular training.
• FSI should develop training materials to make the new 214(b) guidance (04 State 274068) part of its training module on refusals.

• Congress changed Section 214 (b). CA has drafted proposed language for an amendment to section 214(b) to restore the H, L, and V NIV categories. CA is coordinating with the Bureau of Legislative Affairs to present this proposed amendment to Congress.
• CA will add a section to the FAM to consolidate and give additional guidance to consular officers on refusals. CA has already sent two cables on 214 (b) that speak to this guidance.
• CA has recently amplified 9 FAM 41.11 on refusals.
• CA and FSI will work together to make 04 State 274068 a regular part of NIV training.

• More uniform application of section 214(b) and other grounds for refusals worldwide.

• Recent changes to the visa referral process have made it more codified, more transparent, and more accountable since the events of September 11th.
• A log of all referral cases must be kept in the NIV system with the application and accompanying documents including the referral form scanned into the consolidated consular database.

• Consular sections overseas should conduct at least one study annually to ensure compliance by referred applicants with the conditions of their visas.
• Chiefs of mission and principal officers must assume responsibility for the implementation and supervision of visa referral systems at posts and should reissue the referral policy annually and certify to CA this has been done.
• Every mission should be required to submit a copy of its post referral policy to CA.
• The Department should continue to exert its principal control over the visa referral system to ensure chiefs of missions understand the importance of following referral procedures, and the consequences of undue influence.
• The Department should designate a senior-level officer to serve as an ombudsman for visa officers who feel they may be subject to undue influence at post to issue NIVs.
• Consular officers, especially those in the beginning of their careers, need further training on referral systems and dealing with possible undue influence by senior officers.

• CA has consolidated all guidance on referrals into Appendix K of the FAM and is instructing posts to conducting an annual "validation" study.
• CA has instructed Chiefs of Mission to reissue the referral policy memo annually, certify this has been done and submit a copy of its referral policy to CA.
• In an annual cable to all posts, CA reminds Chiefs of Mission of their primary responsibility for the implementation and supervision of the mission referral policy, in accordance with Department guidance and Appendix K of the FAM.
• The Assistant Secretary for CA is the ombudsman, and has designated the Managing Director of the Visa Office as an alternative contact for visa officers overseas.
• In addition to the ethics training required in the Basic Consular Course, FSI has incorporated a role-playing management module to train officers how to differentiate undue influence from appropriate actions by mission officers and to teach them how to deal with a situation of undue influence, should it arise.

• Nonimmigrant visa adjudicating officers will be better protected against undue influence in the referral system.

• In the post-September 11, 2001, environment, the Department has cited fraud deterrence and prevention as key elements of its border security policy.
• Through responses from questionnaires, OIG found that too many adjudicators remain overworked and lack the time to absorb fraud prevention intelligence, indicative of the need for greater resources in this area.
• Post specific training for consular fraud detection and prevention is not well defined and OIG found there was a lack of uniformity in the training programs across posts.
• There is insufficient communication between posts, even regionally, to share intelligence or combat fraud rings operating across national borders.

• The Department's leadership can improve the border security strategy by placing greater emphasis on the importance of the antifraud responsibilities and programs, and securing adequate resources and funding for related programs.
• Fraud prevention managers at post should continue to undergo rigorous training to enable them to better prioritize and carry out their responsibilities and the Department should standardized training.
• The Bureau of Consular Affairs should require regular and rigorous fraud reporting from posts and passport agencies, using a standard format, and establish a mandatory quarterly reporting schedule.
• CA should develop a way to work with Homeland Security and other pertinent Departments that would facilitate two-way sharing of all databases pertaining to visa and passport issuance.

• Together with CA, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has developed training programs that include lessons learned from previous years.
• CA has emphasized the importance of fraud prevention programs and implemented new initiatives, including an excellent and useful fraud prevention website and a new e-room to serve as a forum to exchange fraud prevention information and document information.
• In May, the Office of Fraud Prevention Programs held a regional fraud prevention conference in Abu Dhabi. The next regional conference is planned for Panama in February 2006, with others to follow.
• CA, in concert with the Foreign Service Institute, has increased the offerings of the Fraud Prevention Manager's course from two times per year to ten times per year.
• The Office of Fraud Prevention Programs has just finished reassigning geographical areas of responsibility to its analysts and is now establishing the new reporting requirements and format.
• CA is now negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Homeland Security to allow for mutual access to all databases.
• FSI, in conjunction with CA, has posted on its website training for post-arrival, post-specific training. CA's Assistant Secretary and the FSI Director sent a joint cable advising posts of this new training tool.

• Improved communication between posts, CA, DS and other agencies.
• Advanced fraud prevention training for all Fraud Prevention Managers at overseas posts.
• Increased support of Fraud Prevention Managers to identify fraud trends and techniques.

• Based on analysis of denied passport applications at certain Embassies, OIG found that significant portions of these cases were not entered into the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) between at least 1994 and 2003. The Department has not yet identified the names of those applicants.
• The current CLASS system has adequate controls and all names that posts submitted after November 2003 seem to have been entered into the system.
• The Department has not yet reviewed the system for entering domestic passport cases into CLASS.

• The Bureau of Consular Affairs should develop and implement a plan to identify all persons denied U.S. passports overseas since 1995 whose names do not appear in the Consular Lookout and Support System and enter them.
• CA should determine whether any persons denied U.S passports overseas since 1995 whose names do not appear in the CLASS have been issued passports in error and take action to revoke them.
• CA should evaluate the system for entering names of applicants denied U.S. passports domestically and make any changes necessary to ensure that it is operating properly.

• As of 2003, the Office of Overseas Citizens Services can enter persons directly into the CLASS system. Plans are underway to provide access and lookout privileges to the Passport Lookout Tracking System (PLOTS) to posts overseas.
• CA reviewed a year's worth of lookout requests, and based upon this review, has found the requests for lookout entries and deletions to have been handled appropriately. No cases have been identified requiring passport revocation action. CA informed posts of the results of this review, and has queried posts as to whether there are any cases for which passport issuance was denied, but the cases were not, or have not yet been entered into CLASS. Significant results of this query will be provided to OIG as soon as they are obtained and compiled.
• All domestic passport agencies can now enter information into CLASS directly through PLOTS. Furthermore, CA checked a random selection of cases, ranging from several years to several months old, at four passport agencies to verify that cases in which electronic requests had been made from the field agencies were indeed in Passport CLASS. The results were positive. The same type of test was conducted at our Passport Records Division, which does manual entries of Headquarters-generated refusals. Again, the results were positive.

• All efforts undertaken to ensure complete and accurate records pertaining to U.S. passport issuance denials help strengthen our country's security by upholding the integrity of the U.S. passport. In response to the OIG recommendations, CA has improved the functioning of the lookout system. In addition, CA has now further streamlined the process so that appropriate offices can enter information directly into the relevant databases.

• At present, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) lacks sufficient permanent staff to adequately manage its major programs.
• INL is strained by pressing demands and responsibilities of high priority Iraq and Afghanistan programs.
• INL's plans to reorganize and restructure have stalled under delays in funding for new staff positions.
• INL needs to strengthen mechanisms for oversight of procurement and contract compliance, particularly regarding Iraq and Afghanistan programs.

• INL should review and implement its long delayed reorganization plan, including personnel increases, to relieve evident strains within the bureau caused by long term staffing shortages and growing demands of Iraq and Afghanistan programs.
• INL should establish working groups to manage Iraq and Afghanistan programs.
• INL should provide the Bureau of Resource Management (RM) with information on the type of financial data the Department should include in its core financial systems for INL to meet its financial recording requirements.
• INL should update its property records, followed by an annual inventory and reconciliation as required by Department regulations.

• Implementation of reorganization plan was delayed by funding shortfalls and the desire to have a new Assistant Secretary in place to concur with several aspects of the plan that will have a significant bearing on INL's future organizations. Open positions that are still pending will be filled within sixty days after the new Assistant Secretary assumes duties.
• Working groups were established in March 2005 for Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iraq Group meets weekly and the Afghan Group meets twice-weekly. Working Group heads meet with the Acting Assistant Secretary on a weekly basis.
• INL/RM is working with RM to address shortcoming in the current core financial management systems with the goal of incorporating key aspects of INL's unique financial management requirements and its local management tools into the Department's forthcoming Joint Financial Management System (JFMS).
• INL/RM has updated its property records. The annual reconciliation was completed and submitted to the Bureau of Administration on August 24, 2005.

• Implementation of the reorganization plan will allow INL to meet the growing demands of the Iraq and Afghanistan programs and relieve some of the staffing strains on the rest of the bureau.
• The establishment of the Iraq and Afghanistan working groups allows INL to effectively manage the growing programs in those countries.
• Including INL financial requirements in the forthcoming JFMS will allow the bureau to bring INL's unique financial management practices in line with the Department's official accounting records.

• State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside of the embassy.
• State has not fully implemented counterterrorism training; officials lack hands-on training course to help counter attacks.
• Fully implement State's personal security accountability system for embassy officials.
• The Residential Security Program in place provides effective deterrence against crime, though only limited deterrence against terrorist attack.

• State, in conjunction with Overseas Security Policy Board, should develop a comprehensive "soft targets" strategy that determines the extent of State's responsibilities to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy.
• Mandate counterterrorism training, track attendance to determine compliance with training requirements, and add "soft target protection" training module to ambassadorial, deputy chief of mission, and Regional Security Officer (RSO) training.
• Fully implement personal security accountability system for all embassy officials, including developing related personal security standards for the Foreign Affairs Manual.

• A comprehensive Soft Target Strategy was submitted to Congress July 1, 2005.
• State mandated personal security training for all employees transferring overseas under the Chief of Mission June 1, 2004. The Department's Student Training Management System tracks enrollment and attendance for all Foreign Service Institute and DS Training Center courses. A "soft target protection" training module is included in both the Ambassadorial and Deputy Chief of Mission/Principal Officer seminars. This module has been part of the basic RSO training since July 2004 and was added to In-Service RSO training October 2005.
• A Department cable (STATE 120220) reiterated Chief of Mission responsibility for the security of personnel at post. Information summarized in the cable was released in various forms over the last two years. Based on existing Department authority, as mandated by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, additional guidance and Foreign Affairs Manuals modifications to monitor compliance with personnel and security regulations are being examined by a Department-wide working group.

Inherent in the Department's overall strategy for the protection of soft targets is the understanding and acceptance of the principle of personal responsibility, both for individuals and institutions overseas. The Department will lead by example, serve as coordinator and facilitator for threat and security information exchanges, and develop specific programs and regulations where our responsibility lies.

The Department is moving forward with initiatives to enhance our overall strategy in protecting U.S. Officials and their families by:

• Expanding post-specific briefings programs tailored to potential soft target areas, which are mandatory for all staff and family members.
• Enhancing liaison with host government security, intelligence and police services on soft target awareness and potential countermeasures.
• Creating an interagency Soft Targets Coordinating Committee through the Overseas Security Policy Board to review soft target issues and vulnerabilities with regards to employees and family members of all U.S. Government agencies abroad. Through this interagency process security standards will be revised as required to address potential threats across a host of security programs.
• Continuing our close working relationship with overseas schools on physical security projects and emergency plans, procedures, and security.

Specific Results:

• 500 RSOs now serve at nearly 200 missions worldwide.
• Approximately 175 agents will be trained for overseas assignment this fiscal year.
• Commenced a worldwide surveillance detection program, primarily focused on our official facilities, but which is available to be adjusted to non-official facilities depending on threat information and the local security environment.
• Delivered over 1,500 armored vehicles to our posts overseas, to provide the ability to transport our people safely serving in heightened threat conditions.
• Instituted a comprehensive chemical/biological/radiological protection program. Provided escape masks, equipment for our personnel overseas, and the necessary training.
• Provide local guards, roving patrols, and react teams at our residences based on threat ratings, costing in excess of $100,000,000 in FY 2005.
• Provided residential security upgrades to over 13,000 residences overseas, including window grilles, security doors, alarms, safehavens and lighting based upon post specific threat. These traditional countermeasures are not only viewed as a deterrent to crime, but serve a dual purpose in hardening our residences against terrorist threats.
• Under the guidance of the Department-wide Soft Target Working Group chaired by the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations (OBO), funded grants of over $34 million to overseas schools for security enhancements.
• Expended over $10,000,000 on long-term residential security improvements since 2003 through OBO's residential security facilities program.
• Enhanced the Department's Foreign Service Institute's Crisis Management Exercise Program which includes a soft target module. In the past year alone, FSI has provided training in crisis management to 115 posts and nearly 10,200 staff.
• Made available on-line a series of training scenarios that Foreign Service posts can use to conduct post specific crisis management exercises.
• From fiscal year 1999 to March 31, 2005, more than 15,000 persons have completed FSI's Security Overseas Seminars.
• The Department Executive Secretary mandates that all agencies and organizations with personnel under COM Authority must send individuals to FSI's Security Abroad for Employees, or certify similar training for their employees being assigned abroad.
• Conducted 28 mobile training visits to 68 posts since 2003. This training, provided to all members of the Embassy community, addresses a wide range of defensive measures that employees can use to counter and respond to incidents of crime and terrorism, and also covers emergency medical response.

• MEPI provides funding for projects aimed at political, economic, and educational reform and women's empowerment in the Middle East.
• Through MEPI, the Department of State and USAID have worked together with other U.S. Government agencies to ensure that U.S. bilateral assistance to this region is aligned with the new focus on promoting democratic reform and empowering women in the Middle East.
• MEPI allows for targeting of reform goals not otherwise addressed by U.S. bilateral assistance in this region.
• Despite its emphasis on monitoring the results of its specific projects and on holding project implementers accountable, GAO concluded that MEPI project monitoring was limited by unclear delineation of roles and responsibilities between MEPI, USAID, Embassies and Missions.
• GAO also concluded that MEPI project performance was not always monitored consistently, and that access to project performance information was not readily available to managers.

• Clearly delineate, document, and communicate monitoring roles and responsibilities.
• Systematically obtain, maintain, and communicate complete information on all MEPI projects.
• Regularly assess progress in these areas.

• State and USAID have signed coordination guidelines for MEPI projects, and have begun joint monitoring trips to monitor and evaluate USAID-implemented MEPI programs.
• MEPI organized all records of its projects and produced a monitoring and evaluation plan for the next year.
• MEPI has solicited proposals for contract monitoring and evaluation support to systematize and prioritize oversight and evaluation tasks.
• State and USAID created a joint task force to select and implement an integrated grants and program management database system.
• This database will standardize the grant making and post award monitoring processes. The information will be simultaneously available electronically to State and USAID managers and grantees or implementing partners worldwide.
• MEPI is in the process of putting together a performance report on all active programs.

• Improved coordination and a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities between State, USAID, Embassies and Missions in setting standards and monitoring MEPI project performance.
• Systematic, timely, and verifiable performance data on MEPI projects that will allow the Department to evaluate effectiveness and measure results against MEPI strategic goals.
• Easier, faster and more complete access to information on MEPI project performance for both State and USAID project managers and grantees or implementing partners.

• The Global Fund's documentation of its grant disbursements and management did not always explain its decisions, for example to disburse funds to some recipients who reported meeting few of their targets.
• The Global Fund does not track or publicly document disbursement requests that it has denied.
• The Global Fund is taking steps to improve grants management, including strengthening of its staff and recipients' capacity, and clarifying and streamlining guidance, reporting and funding procedures, but there are still gaps in oversight and guidance to potential recipients.

• GAO recommends that the U.S. Global AIDS coordinator work with the Global Fund's Board Chair and Executive Director to improve the basis for, and documentation of, the Global Fund's funding decisions.
• This guidance should be aimed at completing efforts to 1) ensure that local fund agents have expertise to evaluate performance data; 2) strengthen quality and consistency of grant recipients' data; and 3) continue the Fund's efforts to clearly document its reasons for periodically disbursing funds and renewing grants.

• The U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator agreed to continue to work with the Global Fund's Board and Executive Director to improve performance measurement, documentation, and overall grants management.
  • Representing the U.S. Government at the 11th Global Fund Board of Directors meeting, the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator supported several decisions to strengthen and enhance the grants management process of the Global Fund.
• The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator is also working with the Global Fund to develop harmonized tools for assessing data quality in Global Fund grant programs.

• Improved grants management based upon performance indicators.
• At the April 2006 Global Fund Board meeting, the Portfolio Committee will make proposals on:
  • How to "improve NGO access to the Global Fund resources in Round 6."
  • Revising the Proposal Form and Guidelines for Proposals for future Rounds.
  • Improving the process for screening out and clarifying proposals prior to submission to the TRP.
  • Improving guidelines in future Rounds for proposals dealing with Health Systems Strengthening.
• The first joint tool being developed is a Monitoring and Evaluation Systems Self Assessment Checklist that is designed to be completed at the beginning of the project cycle before contracts/grants are signed. This self assessment will allow for the evaluation of data used in results reporting and the identification of technical assistance needs.

• Following the merger of the United States Information Agency (USIA) with the Department of State, the Department has not completed a consolidated strategy that integrates direct public diplomacy into its overall mission and objectives.
• Lack of funding and attention from senior leadership at the Department has had an adverse affect on the success and effectiveness of public diplomacy programs.
• There is no institutionalized form of coordination between public diplomacy regional bureau staff and public diplomacy functional bureau staff and there is no line authority over both.
• Although the Department has addressed the issue of interagency coordination, it has yet to institutionalize a government wide strategy to better approach long-term problems of public diplomacy.
• An unreasonable constraint on the use of public diplomacy contact management databases has also had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the conduct of public diplomacy programs.

• The Department should request that Congress review the Smith-Mundt Act's continued relevance, particularly its restrictions on domestic dissemination of public diplomacy information, given the ready availability of this information via the Internet.
• The Department should revise the Foreign Affairs Manual to designate authority to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for coordinating policy guidance to the regional and functional bureaus on the conduct of public diplomacy.
• The Department should seek greater representation at the National Security Council in order to ensure better and continuing coordination of interagency public diplomacy activities.

• At her first meeting with State Department public diplomacy employees in September 2005, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs announced her intention to form an informal group to examine the issues arising out of Smith-Mundt. The group will make recommendations to the Under Secretary about the options for Department and Congressional action and the ramifications of different possible courses of action to eliminate or amend this legislation.
• While no steps have been taken as yet to amend the Foreign Affairs Manual to provide the Under Secretary authority for coordinating public diplomacy policy guidance, since her arrival the Under Secretary has taken a number of actions to solidify her authority and improve public diplomacy. Regular "Echo Chamber" messages are sent to the field under her authority to provide ambassadors, public affairs officers and others guidance on important issues (such as UN Reform, America's response to Hurricane Katrina, the Iraq constitution, etc.). Plans are underway to "double hat" one deputy assistant secretary in each regional bureau with responsibility for public diplomacy, reporting both to the regional assistant secretary and the Under Secretary. The Bureau recently established a rapid response unit within the Bureau of Public Affairs to provide agile response, on a 24/7 basis, to misinformation and hateful propaganda appearing in the world press.
• The Under Secretary has been charged by the President and Secretary of State to establish and chair an interagency Strategic Communications committee that will be responsible for identifying and coordinating U.S. Government public diplomacy activities across the interagency, and work is ongoing to implement this directive.

• While it may not prove to be necessary or advisable to ask Congress to eliminate Smith-Mundt restrictions on domestic dissemination of public diplomacy products, it is possible that recommendations may emerge that would allow us to reduce redundancies and duplication and achieve greater economies, particularly in web-based public diplomacy products and activities.
• Over time, efforts to improve our ability to get the U.S. Government point of view before foreign publics will give U.S. policies a fair hearing among key influencers and publics around the world. By designating a Deputy Assistant Secretary in each regional bureau as the lead for public diplomacy, it is expected that public diplomacy will be more effectively integrated into the bureau's policy and management decision-making. At the same time, this gives the Under Secretary a senior-level official with whom to work to make certain that public diplomacy and policy are effectively integrated within and across bureau boundaries.
• By establishing and chairing an interagency strategic communication coordinating group, the Under Secretary will ensure that important coordination of public diplomacy programs and messages will more effectively take place, and economies will be realized by reducing duplicative efforts or tailoring agency public diplomacy activities to conform closely with policy objectives.

• The lack of a national communication strategy hampers coordination of interagency public diplomacy activities.
• The White House Office of Global Communications, charged by the President to facilitate strategic public diplomacy planning and coordinate U.S. Government efforts, has not done this effectively and has not developed a national communication strategy.
• The State Department has not developed a specific strategy to engage the private sector in public outreach efforts wherever feasible, though State recognizes the importance of the private sector in this area.

• The Director of the Office of Global Communications should facilitate the development of a U.S. Government national communications strategy.
• The Secretary of State should develop a strategy to guide State Department efforts to engage the private sector in pursuit of common public diplomacy objectives.

• State's Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs responded that an area of early focus for its newly appointed leadership would be to build on its current ties with the private sector and to implement the GAO recommendation.

• Increased interaction between State and the private sector in developing effective public communication/outreach products to communicate U.S. Government policies to overseas audiences.

• The State Department, along with USAID and other agencies, provides a wide range of assistance to independent media in foreign countries with the goal of developing sustainable democracies abroad, reducing corruption and advancing civic education.
• State faces challenges in developing performance indicators that can accurately measure the success of its many and varied programs assisting and developing independent media abroad.
• Country-specific and programmatic challenges can impede implementation of media development, including changes in the political environment, difficulty coordinating donors, and lack of adequate civic or legal institutions in the recipient country.
• Performance indicators for media development were not widely or uniformly established by State at all of its overseas missions, but those embassies that established independent media as a priority and set specific performance goals in its mission-planning documents were most likely to have established specific indicators for measuring this goal.

• [None given]

• State is currently developing a new set of performance indicators for public diplomacy that will include media development and outreach activities.
• State's recently-established Office of Policy, Planning and Resources in the Public Diplomacy bureau plans to begin training in evaluation of media programs in fiscal year 2006, including assessment of performance at the field level.

• Establishment of uniform and specific performance indicators by State for use in Washington and overseas in evaluating the success of its programs to assist independent media abroad.
• Improved ability to determine which programs are most successful at assisting independent media abroad, and increased ability to target funds for maximum effectiveness.

• The Department, under the leadership of the Chief Information Officer (CIO), is currently upgrading its information technology application baseline to strengthen connections among enterprise architecture, e-Authentication, privacy, systems authorization, the Plan of Action and Milestones process, and the capital planning process.
• The Department has taken a proactive approach to improve patch management operations and customer service.
• The Department ensures that all employees receive an annual information security awareness briefing through its web-based training tool and continues to operate a successful and robust cyber incident response program.
• However, OIG found that the Department still does not have a complete inventory of systems that includes major applications, minor applications, and general support systems.
• IT security weaknesses found within a local area network are not included in the plan of action process because the Department does not consistently define the term " system" throughout documentation and guidelines.
• The Department's certification and accreditation process has not been fully implemented.
• Additionally, implementation of information security at overseas posts and domestic bureaus continues to require Department attention. OIG observed problems with the duties of the Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO), patch management, contingency planning, and inappropriate use at many of the 36 sites visited.

• The Chief Information Officer should ensure that the State Automated Federal Information Security Management Act Reporting Environment application is certified and accredited, and that users receive the requisite training on this application.
• A risk assessment should be conducted on all subcomponents or a representative sample prior to reaccrediting the Department's unclassified and classified networks.
• The CIO should provide information security requirements that must be addressed during the regional computer security officers' site evaluation and verification visits.
• The CIO should require that the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) be included in all operational decisions made in Washington that increase the risk to the Department's information security posture, and should establish mandatory minimum requirements for Information Systems Security Officers (ISSOs).
• The CIO should design and implement procedures for ensuring that the privacy impact assessment section in the Department's application inventory system is completed for all applications, and, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Administration and the Office of the Legal Adviser, update guidance on employee Privacy Act responsibilities.

• The Department performed risk assessments on the major components of OpenNet (Unclassified) and ClassNet (Classified) networks, and these components will undergo more rigorous testing in the future.
• The CIO will formally task all operational elements to include the Chief Information Security Officer in all operational and policy decisions that may significantly impact the risk to the Department's information security posture. The CISO's staff is also working with the Bureau of Human Resources to professionalize the ISSO program.
• The Department's new registration process for Information Technology Asset Baseline will incorporate mandatory privacy reporting into the Department's application registration process.
• In addition, numerous efforts are underway that address the need to raise employee awareness of protecting privacy information, including Department-wide training for employees and contractors.

• Improved security for both unclassified and classified information systems and networks at the Department of State. Better training and more consistent standardization of programs aimed to ensure system security and periodic testing for system vulnerabilities and risks. Increased awareness of privacy standards and concerns for employees/system users.