Subnational Engagement as a 21st Century Foreign Policy Tool

Reta Jo Lewis
Special Representative for Global Intergovernmental Affairs 

Transitioning from Conflict & Disaster to Stability & Security 7th Annual Peacekeeping, Reconstruction, & Stabilization Conference

Westin Alexandria, Alexandria, VA

February 7, 2012

Good morning. Thank you, President Doug Brooks, for that kind introduction and for the work you are doing to champion the role of the private sector in international stabilization through the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA).

I am delighted to have the opportunity to participate in the 7th Annual Peacekeeping, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Conference and to meet with this group of talented and dynamic individuals who are committed to stability and security in post conflict nations.

I would like to commend the “whole of government” approach to this event, and to recognize my colleagues from the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) here with us today.

I look forward to discussing with you the logical partnership of the development community and the U.S. Department of State to foster and leverage connections at the state and local level to assist nations making the transition from conflict to stability.

Today, the world faces a unique set of challenges—economic, environmental, social, and political—that will require collaborative innovation and determination of our world’s best minds.

A lot has happened in the last 15 months, from revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa, to renewed fears over economic default in Europe. These changes have only reinforced the Obama Administration’s conviction for the need to seize this moment, to meet these challenges, and to lay the foundation for sustained global leadership.

Global partnerships which put aside individual philosophies and focus on solutions are essential to solving these global challenges and to building a more stable and secure world.

As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has said, and as the United States has long maintained, our foreign policy relationships will always be nation-to-nation. But the scope of what defines nation-to-nation conversations are shifting in the modern, more global, and more flattened economy—deeming city-to-city, and state-to-state dialogues just as critical to the larger context of executing, implementing, and achieving a nation’s overarching diplomatic goals.

Building peer-to-peer relationships between state and local elected officials has a tremendous effect on foreign policy that often goes unrecognized. Still, building these relationships and encouraging this engagement at the subnational level has limitless potential.

Peer-to-peer relationships provide state and local leaders around the globe with an intimate glance into the American way of life, and more importantly, into our democratic institutions and system of governance. Even at a more basic but equally important level, these interactions develop trust—an attribute essential to developing strong bilateral ties.

Secretary Clinton has made it a priority to engage our subnational leaders and utilize them as an extraordinary source of innovation, talent, resources, and knowledge. After all, it is the states and cities that are the engines of growth at the ground level where the transition from policy to practice becomes most visible.

Secretary Clinton has stated time and time again that 21st century global challenges require us to work with new partners to collaborate and innovate globally. At the Department of State, this has meant making a transition to 21st Century Statecraft and engaging all the elements of our national power and leveraging all forms of our strength.

Two years ago, Secretary Clinton created the Office of Global Intergovernmental Affairs (S/SRGIA) emphasizing the need to utilize local leaders as a key component in the much needed widespread and deep-rooted efforts to take on our world’s greatest challenges—a key part of that charge is empowering subnational leaders to lead their states and communities to a stable and secure future.

So, just as Secretary Clinton engages in a conversation with the Foreign Minister of South Africa on issues of greenhouse pollutions, so too does our office host pivotal conversations on the matter, with the Mayor of Durban and the Premier of KwaZulu-Natal.

My job is to realize Secretary Clinton’s vision by connecting what the federal government does best with what state and local governments are doing and can do, and what our successful private sector is doing and can do.

The federal government has a number of existing programs and initiatives to support this work.

As state fragility and its impact spread, the State Department recognized the need to be more agile and focused in its approach to conflict.

Released by Secretary Clinton in 2010, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) is a sweeping assessment of how the Department of State and USAID can be more efficient, accountable, and effective in a world of rising powers, growing instability, and technological transformation. At its core, the QDDR provides a blueprint for elevating American “civilian power” to better advance our national interests and to be a better partner to the U.S. military.

In November 2011, the QDDR elevated the former Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization into the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations in order to help make conflict prevention and response a core mission of the State Department.

The CSO Bureau promotes conflict prevention and response across the State Department. One of its key pillars is partnerships with a wide range of groups, from U.S. agencies to foreign governments to local NGOs and multilateral institutions in countries where we work. Its expeditionary diplomats work at the subnational level to prevent conflict and lay the groundwork for long-term peace.

The CSO Bureau aims to bring coherent, high-impact engagements to places of strategic significance with a focus less on reconstruction and more on prevention, as well as analysis, collaboration, and evaluation.

The CSO Bureau strives to make the U.S. effort more focused, analytically rigorous, and operationally flexible.

Rather than ask: What can the United States do?” we will ask: “What is most needed?” And then: “How can the United States be most helpful and direct its resources at those priorities?”

The CSO Bureau can answer these questions by developing and driving a coherent four-step engagement process, which my office is working to support.

• We must start with an inclusive, joint, independent analysis, driven by local voices.
• Second, that analysis should lead to a strategy that identifies two or three priorities.
• Third, resources – funding and personnel – should be applied to these priorities, consistent with U.S. interests and capacity.
• And finally, the process must include ongoing, transparent measurement, evaluation, and adaptation.

We must partner with those who will make us most effective from across the U.S. Government, host countries, multilateral institutions, and local organizations. That includes the private sector, particularly those who can engage local voices.

CSO is adapting our Civilian Response Corps to become a more agile and flexible team of conflict-focused, expeditionary diplomats that can deploy quickly to provide analysis and expertise that informs and organizesconflict prevention and stabilization efforts. Wewill continue to also draw on experts from U.S. partner agencies and collaboration with NGOs, IOs and private sector organizations.

CSO works on the principle that local voices must drive U.S. responses to conflict. In many countries, they work at the subnational level to build governance and mitigate conflict.

• In South Sudan, teams of CSO expeditionary diplomats deployed across the country both before and after its vote for independence from Sudan, reporting on and mediating conflict and building U.S. ties to subnational governments, tribal authorities, and others.
• In the Kyrgyz Republic, CSO worked to establish an outpost that helped the United States engage with ethnic groups in the country’s isolated southern region after a coup and ethnic violence.
• CSO has conducted bottom-up conflict assessments in more than two dozen countries, interviewing hundreds of individuals from all walks of life in each place.

As you can see, the work of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations echoes exactly what we are trying to accomplish with state and local officials and the organizations that represent them around the world.

Organizations such as the National Democratic and International Republican Institutes have a robust history of engaging local actors in order to build strong and responsive democratic institutions.

The National Democratic Institute works with legislators, council members and attorney generals in over 125 countries and territories to promote openness and accountability in government by building political and civic organizations, safeguarding elections, and promoting citizen participation. For example, NDI is managing outstanding citizen programs to aid in the reconstruction and development of Haiti; to aid aspiring women leaders in Ukraine to meet the challenges they face; and to assist political and civic leaders work to restore democracy in Honduras.

Similarly, recognizing that democracy greatly lessens the likelihood of conflict between nations, the International Republican Institute advances freedom and democracy worldwide by developing political parties, civic institutions, open elections, democratic governance, and the rule of law. In Africa, IRI continues to support the consolidation of democratic gains in transitioning African states and focuses on promoting democratic governance with government, civil society and citizens to find common solutions to problems facing municipalities. IRI assists countries throughout Asia that have undergone transition to democracy, as well as those taking steps toward democracy by providing expertise to locally elected officials, political parties and civil society.

The work of USAID has also become increasingly focused on subnational engagement—particularly in nations experiencing decentralization.

Key to its work is partnering with local leaders and elected officials to ensure successful strategies for community development whether it be for delivery of essential services in South Sudan or for responsive and effective local governance in Haiti.

For USAID, this means working in partnership with all key actors—the state, local elected authorities, civil society, and the private sector—to find solutions to local development issues.

The work of these bodies illustrates the power and effectiveness of engaging local elected officials and empowering marginalized groups, particularly women.

These organizations are making investments in the future power brokers and policy innovators of the developing world and post-conflict nations.

They are planting the seeds of democracy, transparency, accountability, and rule of law.

They are exposing these state and local leaders to the tools they will need to build a strong, stable, and secure future for their respective communities.

Again, it is my mission to connect these federal approaches to Secretary Clinton’s state and local engagement strategy.

Since the creation of the Office of the Special Representative for Global Intergovernmental Affairs two years ago, we have been working on these very same issues with state and local officials, and the organizations that represent them, in order to promote partnerships between U.S. state and local officials and their foreign counterparts to share best practices, and find common solutions to global challenges.

These engagements serve as invaluable dialogues that promote capacity building of state and local officials around the world while also broadening and deepening U.S. bilateral relationships.

While our work to date has focused primarily on emerging economies in Africa, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere, we plan to broaden the scope of our work to post conflict nations and communities.

These communities could see tremendous benefit from the leadership development, training, and perspectives on governance from their U.S. state and local leaders as they restructure their institutions, rebuild their communities, and revitalize their societies.

Through our past and existing engagements with state and local level officials and organizations, a variety of exchanges, programming, and partnerships have emerged which could serve as easily transferable models for similar activities in post-conflict nations. On ad day-to-basis, we work closely with state treasurers, secretaries of states, and city mangers, as well as the International City/County Management Association and the National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program.

I would like to share with you several examples of our most successful models:

• In South Africa, the National League of Cities (NLC) has been developing partnerships to support capacity building of local officials. I traveled to Durban to participate in the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) National Conference and to witness the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between SALGA and the National League of Cities, the oldest and largest U.S. organization dedicated to strengthening and promoting cities. The MOU promotes subnational collaboration between the two municipal organizations and is geared around governance, sustainability, social housing, municipal finance, and economic and community development. SALGA representatives are scheduled to visit Washington, D.C. this spring to participate in capacity building activities at the NLC’s Congress of Cities Conference.
• As a part of the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, and in cooperation with the Department of State Bureau of African Affairs, my office arranged meetings for two Niger Delta governors and their delegations, culminating in avisit with Pennsylvania Governor Edward Rendell in Harrisburg. The discussions resulted in a 2011 summer visitors exchange partnership between Pennsylvania’s PennDOT and Rivers State to assist them in improving transportation and infrastructure capacity building.
• During President Obama’s March 2011 state visit to Brazil, President Obama and President Dilma Rousseff noted the recent signing of a Memorandum of Understanding to foster enhanced cooperation and exchange of best practices in advance of Brazil’s hosting a series of major international sporting events, including the 2014 FIFA Soccer World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. In furtherance of the MOU, my office has hosted several visits to the United States by Brazilian state and local leaders. We are also working with our Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs to promote the U.S.-Brazil Joint Action Plan to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and Promote Equality. As a result, John Eaves, Chairman, Fulton County, GA Board of Commissioners, partnered with Brazilian leaders to share best practices, resources and information to promote equality of all racial and ethnic groups in advance of the 2016 Olympic Games. I just returned from a ten-day visit to Brazil where I met with state and local leaders throughout the county to discuss these issues.

American leadership must be as dynamic as the challenges we face. We must be ready to adapt and innovate, and that means leveraging new partners, as done in the models I have described to you today, to work on specific issues such as sustainability, governance, and the economic and political empowerment of underprivileged groups.

In furtherance of President Obama’s and Secretary Clinton’s emphasis on the importance of subnational engagement, we have been catalyzing our states and our cities to engage with governors and mayors all over the world—advancing the probability and potency of public-private partnerships.

Not only does this offer stronger, and more personalized cultural exchanges—a new contour of 21st century statecraft and diplomacy of the Obama Administration—but it also allows those civic leaders around the world to share ideas about local governance and learn from each other. The greater understanding among localities about how cities are managed, or how business is done, creates new relationships between civic leaders and their citizens, while encouraging new linkages among the private sector in a way never seen before on the world stage.

Conversations that end up pointing how to best deliver goods and services in the new global environment, how to manage housing challenges, how best to battle crime, and how to evenly distribute social benefits—not only give smaller cities motivation to adapt and improve their processes, but they simultaneously give thought to which private entities are best equipped to help in the delivery of these social efforts. Which means that subnational engagements, while on its surface may seem to be a facet of political partnering, also help spur business growth.

But let me be clear. These efforts, while principal pillars of 21st century American diplomacy—are not just about imposing the will of one country onto another; nor is it about boasting particular nations and their cities, as the pioneers of global best practices in urban management.

It is about initiating subnational conversations that will establish a dialogue to transfer knowledge among parts of the world already well versed in managing rapidly expanding demands for services in post conflict societies. Moreover, this peer-to-peer engagement on a city level will offer inclusive growth for nations recovering from conflict, because cities will actively pursue other areas of the world whose resources and demographics mirror theirs, in order to apply best practices in a way that most effectively meets the nuanced cultural demands of a particular region of the world.

Moreover, these points of communication aid private businesses to better compete for bids and contracts in new markets, from the very point of inception, because if we are increasing dialogue about the regional needs of communities, we are also boosting the dialogue about what financial institutions, building contractors, agricultural providers, and other required private entities, are best suited to meet regional public needs.

So again, codifying subnational relationships not only promotes a deeper cultural exchange among nations – better advancing principals of the openness, freedom, transparency and fairness in economic growth; but also opens the door on new bids for development that your organizations can take advantage.

In a 21st century world, there are no shortages of great partnerships, nor a shortage of great ideas when we shore up our collective will to address the challenges we face.

By combining our strengths, governments and philanthropies, we can more than double our impact, to this subnational end. And the multiplier effect continues if we add businesses, NGOs, universities and entrepreneurs. That’s the power of partnership at its best – allowing us to achieve so much more together than we could apart.

That’s why we can all take a page out of Secretary Clinton’s playbook, and start engaging your state and local officials right away, creating new opportunity. You can make the difference. I look forward to working with you to engage state and local leaders to prevent conflict and lay the groundwork for peace.

• First, you can be a convener, bringing together people from across regions and sectors to work together on issues of common interest. Partner with your state and local officials to take advantage of the opportunities around the world in identifying how your businesses or organization can be of help to community needs.
• Second, you can be a catalyst – launching new projects, actively seeking new solutions, providing vital training and technical assistance to facilitate additional projects to those without training. And asking for and expecting best practices from all your interactions with governments foreign and domestic.
• Third, you can be a collaborator, working closely with partners to plan and implement projects – avoiding duplication, learning from each other, maximizing our impact by looking for best practices.

All of you here today are familiar with proactively finding new ways to collaborate to build a better future for post conflict societies—but today I am specifically here to ask you to collaborate with the State Department on this new generation of partnerships. One that reflects a global economy, a flatter world, and cities on the rise.

I encourage you to work with U.S. state and local leaders and their foreign counterparts to expand current partnerships and to embark on new ones. We are eager to explore your ideas and approaches to strengthening our partnerships with state and local officials in pursuit of stability and security globally.

I thank you for understanding what we must do and how the inclusion of subnational leaders can assist in building stable and secure societies while broadening and deepening U.S. bilateral relationships.

Interview With Vitaliy Haidukevich of TVi Television

Philip H. Gordon
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

Kyiv, Ukraine

February 6, 2012

QUESTION: [Through Interpreter]. Going back to what former U.S. Ambassador Steven Pifer said about the idea of a blacklist of Ukrainian officials, under what conditions would Washington be ready to start freezing assets of businessmen close to the current administration and blacklisting Ukrainian senior officials from traveling to the Western countries, the United States – or is such scenario impossible in principle?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Let me tell you how we’re dealing with this set of challenges. We prefer direct engagement. If we have an issue to discuss with our friends in Ukraine we will bring it up very directly and clearly with the top leadership and we’ll talk about it publicly as well. So on this question of the Tymoshenko case, Secretary Clinton – when she met with President Yanukovych – raised it. She told him it was creating a real problem with the perception out there in the international community of selected prosecution, and that it would be an impediment to the sort of relationship we would like to build. So we’re for engagement and clarity in these relationships.

I know Ambassador Pifer and others have talked about things like sanctions and visa bans. We can be clear about that as well. It is the policy of the United States to deny visas to those who are guilty of grave violations of human rights or who have been responsible for measures like arbitrary detentions.

As you know, in the case of Sergei Magnitsky in Russia - that’s the context in which this often gets discussed - we have said there are people who will not be given a visa to the United States. But these are really two separate issues. That’s not what we’re talking about in Ukraine. We are having a very frank conversation with our Ukrainian interlocutors and we’ve said, as I said both privately and publicly, that there’s a real problem here and to fulfill our relationship we hope that Ukraine is able to deal with that problem.

QUESTION: [Through Interpreter]. What you are trying to appeal to, is to the statesman-hood perception, what is the state officials supposed to do? Your argument that when Ukraine will become more democratic there will be, in the long term, greater economic success for Ukraine. But doesn’t Washington understand, don’t you figure it out - the people who are running the country, they are pursuing their own private agenda? Big business, hit and run, earn more money, invest it. They are not basing their policy on statesman-hood.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: What is clear is that the country as a whole will only develop when it creates a climate that is attractive to foreign investment and foreign trade. And I think we are vastly under-performing and Ukraine is vastly under-performing in that regard.

The link between the democracy discussion and the economic discussion is: I think the Ukrainian people want a government that’s going to be responsive to the needs of the entire country and not themselves. So by insisting on free and fair elections and transparent democracy, you give the people a chance to put in office those who will serve the country as a whole. If they don’t, then the people have the right to remove them from power. That’s what a democracy is. In the long run, that’s the way to ensure that leaders are accountable to their people, are transparent, are not corrupt, is to have a functioning democracy. Without a functioning democracy you can have all sorts of things happen by the government with no accountability. That’s why if leaders are seen to be serving their own needs or enriching themselves and not the people, the people deserve the right to choose different leaders.

QUESTION: [Through Interpreter]. Is there an understanding in the West - because there is a concern internally here - that with the very categorical stand of the West, European Union, that Ukraine should follow certain procedures, certain requirements, that Kyiv will slip into the Moscow orbit? And don’t you realize that a reincarnation that may occur that Putin will get his geopolitical victory here and Ukraine will be totally under Russian influence? It will be a kind of Russia-lite here, and it will be lost.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: We don’t want to see Ukraine lose its independence and we don’t want to see Ukraine totally in the Russian orbit, as you describe. But we don’t think Ukraine wants to lose its independence or to be in anybody’s orbit. We want - first of all, we have said we want a stronger relationship with Ukraine, we want it to orient towards Euro-Atlantic institutions, the United States and European Union. We don’t believe that necessitates a bad relationship with Russia. We don’t see our own relationship with Russia in zero sum terms. It’s not a competition for Ukraine.

So we’re not asking Ukraine to reject Russia, but we also don’t want to see Ukraine be overly dependent on Russia. We’re trying to offer Ukraine diversity in its relationships and its economic, geopolitical orientations. Our whole attitude and approach towards European security is to get beyond this notion of zero sum relationships. But at the same time I think Ukrainians shouldn’t misunderstand. We are not so motivated by the specter of a Ukraine under Russian influence that we will sacrifice our own values and principles in dealing with Ukraine. That’s why when we say we need to see certain things happen in Ukraine before that relationship develops, that’s actually the reality. If the result of that - if Ukraine isn’t, for example, able to move forward with its relationship with the European Union and it’s more dependent on Russia, that’s unfortunate from our point of view, but it’s even more unfortunate for Ukraine.

QUESTION: [Through Interpreter]. Imagine the situation that the majority of the Ukrainian public is for a democratic orientation, which by default is pro-West, and a narrow circle of power brokers in Ukraine are orienting toward Russia. Is Washington ready to fight for Ukraine, that it remains oriented toward democratic societies? Or you will give up on Ukraine and then Ukraine will appear in the club of failed states?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Washington, the United States, we’re willing, interested, determined to vigorously support democracy in Ukraine. We think the Ukrainian people want to have free and open democratic institutions, they want to have a prospering market economy, they want a relationship with the European Union and ultimately join it, and they want to have positive relations with the United States. And that’s why we stand for free and transparent democracy in Ukraine because if the Ukrainian people have a say we think that’s going to be the outcome.

Frankly, that’s why I’m here. That’s why Secretary Clinton is engaged on issues. We want Ukrainians to know that we want to develop this relationship and it is in their hands and that’s why we will continue to press vigorously for a fair democracy to develop in this country, because ultimately I think Ukrainians will be better off and we’ll all be better off if that orientation continues.

QUESTION: [Through Interpreter]. The U.S. has a huge influence on the IMF: geopolitically, economically as a contributor. Can’t there be made a connection, in addition to the economic requirements that Ukraine should meet to get another IMF tranche, a requirement that Ukraine abides by democratic requirements? Free and fair elections, free and fair democratic system is in place, will be made a requirement for Ukraine to get another tranche. That the economic requirements are intertwined with these democratic institution requirements?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I think inevitably they are. The willingness of the international community in its different forms to support Ukraine does depend on democracy developments as well as economic ones.

Typically the IMF will focus in on more narrow criteria that are solely in the economic area, as is appropriate. Those conditions are hard enough to meet. But I do think that in reality if a country is seen to be violating its democratic obligations, it becomes more difficult for international institutions to support them, especially in this climate where there’s a lot of pressure on funding and a lot of countries that need support. So even when democracy is not an explicit criterion from the IMF, I think it is fair to say that the international community will be less enthusiastic about supporting a country if it’s not upholding its democratic obligations as well. And certainly those countries outside of the international institutions will do so. The most important example as we speak is the European Union which will have a very explicit democracy criteria for what it has to offer a country like Ukraine and others as well.

QUESTION: [Through Interpreter]. We know you met during your brief visit with representatives of the government. Are there any meetings with the opposition planned, and who, and what kind of message are you going to deliver to the opposition representatives?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I said earlier that our messages in private and public are the same, and they will be the same. I’ve been very frank in private and in public about what we think on energy, democracy, the IMF, Tymoshenko and I will say the same thing. So the short answer is yes, I will meet with civil society representatives. I will later today meet with civil society representatives and members of the opposition just as I met with members of the government and my message to them will be consistent with everything I’ve said in private and public so far in Kyiv.

QUESTION: Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Thank you.

Press Roundtable on U.S.-Ukraine Issues

Philip H. Gordon
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

Kyiv, Ukraine

February 6, 2012

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Hello, everybody. Thanks for coming. Apologies for keeping you waiting. I’ve just come from a long series of meetings. I saw Mr. Lyovochkin this morning, I saw the Prime Minister, and I saw Deputy Foreign Minister Klimkin.

I’m here in Ukraine to talk to counterparts about the wide range of issues that we’re working on with this country and also to follow up on the meeting that Secretary Clinton had with President Yanukovych the other day at the Munich Security Conference. I’ll just give you a sense of what the Secretary had to say to the President and what I’ve been saying in my meetings here about this relationship.

We want to strengthen our partnership with Ukraine in a number of areas, from the economy to energy to security to democracy.

In the area of energy, the Secretary expressed appreciation for Ukraine’s efforts to reform the energy sector and an American willingness to help, particularly in the area of possibly exploring for shale gas.

She also expressed appreciation for Ukraine’s work with us in transferring the highly enriched uranium out of Ukraine that President Yanukovych promised at the Nuclear Security Summit. It’s a big priority for the United States.

We also talked about ways to increase American investment in Ukraine and I expressed, frankly, to my counterparts here today on this issue that there remain some obstacles to that investment in the form of regulations and in the areas of taxes and customs and on the question of corruption.

I met this morning - before seeing Ukrainian counterparts, I met this morning with a group of American business people and heard some of the difficulties they face in trying to expand investment in Ukraine.

American exports to Ukraine are up and I think at an all-time record high, but they’re still only around $2 billion which is much less than it should be. I also pointed out statistics showing that Ukraine ranks very low on a list of countries that are ranked by how easy it is to do business in Ukraine. I think it was ranked 152^nd out of 183 countries, and that’s very unfortunate, because if it’s difficult to do business, then American businesses won’t come and Ukraine won’t develop. So we hope that some of these issues will be tackled on taxes, customs, regulations and corruption, because we want to see more Americans investing in Ukraine.

I also raised with my counterparts, and the Secretary raised with President Yanukovych, the issue of democracy in Ukraine. We stressed the importance of free and fair and transparent elections next October. And we expressed concerns about the perception of selective prosecutions, most notably in the case of former Prime Minister Tymoshenko. What Secretary Clinton said to the President is that this perception interferes with the full development of the relationship we would like to have with Ukraine.

It’s not for us on the outside to prescribe how Ukraine’s judicial system works, but the perception of selective prosecution is an unfortunate one and it stands in the way of full development of our relations, as between the Ukraine and the European Union.

So those are some of the issues that I raised here in Kyiv today, some of the issues the Secretary raised in her meeting. But the basic message was that we want to see increasingly strong U.S.-Ukraine relations. We think Ukraine has enormous potential and we want to see it continue down the course towards Euro-Atlantic integration, stability, prosperity and democracy.

I’ll be happy to take your questions.

QUESTION: [Through Interpreter]. Assistant Secretary, we do witness certainly more energetic meetings, a more energetic relationship: meeting of the Secretary with the President, your visit today here. You said and the Secretary expressed to President Yanukovych what you would like to see in relations with Ukraine.

It would be interesting to know, what is your perception, whether President Yanukovych and your Ukrainian interlocutors took what you told them on board, or whether you have any other secret diplomatic weapons to make sure that what your vision that you express will move forward. And whether we should see as an expression of displeasure of the United States with selected prospection in Ukraine, the fact that Secretary Clinton is not coming to Kyiv for the inauguration of the new embassy compound here.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Thank you. You’ll have to ask the Ukrainian government what their perception of our message is. All we can do is be clear about what we think, and I think we have been. We are very frank and transparent with our friends. We consider Ukraine a friend, and we say the same thing public as in private. I don’t think anything Secretary Clinton said about the Tymoshenko issue, about energy, about the investment climate, about our desire to expand our relations - I don’t think any of that will have come as a surprise to President Yanukovych. I would encourage you not to see the absence of a visit by the Secretary today as any sort of message. She has an enormously busy schedule. She of course visited Ukraine last year, had to get back to Washington, and while she would no doubt like to inaugurate every new embassy the United States has, that’s not always possible.

On the contrary, if there was a message it’s that she wanted to meet with the President when they had the opportunity in [inaudible], and that was the first bilateral meeting she did after her speech.

QUESTION: Can I follow up on what you were referring to about the question of Tymoshenko? There’s been, over the last few months, attempts to persuade or convince Yanukovych about what he should - or [inaudible] the atmosphere he should create. Recently it was suggested by former Ambassador Steven Pifer that it might be time to start thinking about blacklisting - visa bannings of Ukrainian officials. It’s clear that Yanukovych either isn’t getting the message - he’s either ignoring it or not getting it or something along these lines - [inaudible] to do what Ambassador Pifer suggested.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I think as I said, we have decided that the best way for us to convey messages is to speak frankly, both in public and in private, and so the Secretary’s choice was to meet with the President to tell him exactly what she thought, which I think I shared with you here, which I have said to my interlocutors here, and I’m saying publicly now. I think that’s the best way we think we can convey messages on this issue.

QUESTION: [Through Interpreter]. However if your message gets ignored over and over again, do you have any other leverage that you are prepared to employ? And second, a very specific question, is the United States prepared to recognize the results of October elections here if Tymoshenko and her political force is not allowed to participate?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Two separate questions. On October, let’s not get ahead of ourselves. We have said that we want to see a full, fair and transparent election. That would mean that all legitimate opposition groups should be allowed to participate in that election. We have been assured that that is the full intention of the Ukrainian authorities.

Ukraine is going to be the next Chairman in Office of the OSCE next year and I’ve said it would be quite an appropriate symbol, gesture, for that incoming chairmanship to be the model in how you run an election, how you invite in international observers including OSCE observers, to make sure that everything is absolutely transparent, and, again, I was given assurances that that was the intention of Ukraine.

On your first question, I think what I said about the consequences of perceived selective prosecution was that it stood in the way of the kind of relationship that Ukraine could have with the United States and European Union.

In the case of the European Union, I think it’s very clear that includes that the European Union has said that a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement and the association agreement won’t be signed and implemented until political circumstances are appropriate. I think, by that, it’s clear that they mean this issue has to be dealt with.

The United States strongly supports that approach. We were in close contact with our European colleagues as they were proceeding in these areas. I was personally in touch with Commissioner Fuele, so we not only strongly support the EU’s approach, but in our own case, as I’ve said, this issue stands in the way of the development of the relationship and the way we would like it.

If Tymoshenko remains in prison, doesn’t appear to be getting appropriate care, and there are issues with party registrations for October, I think it’s fair to say that would stand in the way of relations with both the United States and the European Union.

QUESTION: Is Tymoshenko receiving appropriate care in your opinion?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I think there are real questions about that and they haven’t fully been answered yet. I haven’t personally seen her nor have representatives of the United States recently been able to, but that’s part of the problem. We’ve gotten some negative reports about her health and her conditions and her access to medical care. We can’t independently verify them, but they are of great concern to us.

QUESTION: [Through Interpreter]. Have you had the intention to visit her and couldn’t for some reason?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Our ambassador expressed an interest in doing so and has not been permitted to do so. On this very short trip I didn’t make a specific request myself.

QUESTION: [Through Interpreter]. Is this true that apart from the frank and friendly conversation the United States administration has no other ways to influence, no other leverage over the behavior of the Ukrainian government like the leverage the European Union has with its association agreement?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: There is no pending specific issue that’s analogous to the pending association agreement and DCFTA. But it remains the reality that there are open questions about how the United States could help Ukraine, invest in Ukraine, assist it in achieving its objectives that we’re not able to do. It’s simply a reality so long as this problem remains.

Markets make independent decisions. There are a lot of opportunities in the globalized world in which we live. Perceptions of political instability or negative reputation can have a very big impact that is not a specific policy decision but its consequences can be very big.

QUESTION: If we’re talking about the economy, it’s clear that Ukraine is in something of a bind right now. The Russians didn’t give them the gas deal they wanted, now they’ve suddenly started speed flying to Washington and trying to talk to Lagarde in Davos. These meetings are happening, but it’s not clear that Ukraine is actually bringing anything new to the table.

Is it clear to you what they’re bringing to the table? Do they have any new arguments? Or is their argument simply, please give us the money or we’ll have to take the money from Russia with all the political concessions that would entail?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: Again, I’ll leave it to the Ukrainian government to describe how it intends to meet the challenges that you mention, but I think it’s true that they are seeking to renegotiate the gas deal with Russia and haven’t yet succeeded. They are hoping to get the IMF to move forward with another tranche of assistance but haven’t yet met the IMF’s conditionality. And they’re hoping to get more support and investment from the United States and European Union, but as I described, the combination of the Tymoshenko case and the challenges to doing business in Ukraine remain a constraint on that assistance at the same time.

QUESTION: [Through Interpreter]. What is your opinion, what is your view of the reforms that the Yanukovych cabinet headed by Prime Minister Azarov is said to be conducting? And secondly, what would be your comment to observations of certain cynical domestic experts who say that relatively soft reactions of the U.S. administration to misbehavior of the Ukrainian government is conditioned by either complete loss of interest in Ukraine or the fact that not all of the highly enriched uranium has been transferred from Ukrainian territory yet?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: To clarify the second question, the suggestion is that the United States has been soft on the government of Ukraine either because we’re not interested or because we’re waiting for the HEU to be transferred? Is that the question?

QUESTION: [Through Interpreter]. Yes.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I guess I’d challenge the premise that we’ve been somehow soft. I’m not sure what that means. I think I’ve just described -- and I would also challenge the premise that we’re not interested. I’ve just described how very clear we’ve been about how this case stands in the way of the development of the relationship and some of the consequences that it has, and that our Secretary of State went out of her way to make this point clear to the President of Ukraine. I think that’s pretty direct.

I also don’t accept the notion that we’re not interested in Ukraine. Again, I think I’ve described not just the meeting that took place over the weekend and my visit here, but our consistent pattern of interest and engagement at so many levels over many months. I think you’ve seen a number of statements, letters coming under the direct signature of the Secretary of State. I’ve told you about some of my extensive engagements with the European Union. We have discussed it at the highest levels. Our President has met with your President. So I think there’s an enormous amount of interest in Ukraine. Again, I can attest personally to the Secretary of State’s interest who sees such potential in Ukraine and I think really wants to see it develop.

I owe you an answer to the first part of your question about reforms, and I would just say I do believe that the government is working hard on and is serious about reforms, and I had the opportunity to hear about them today. Ultimately markets are going to decide if reforms have been enough and I think what I described about this ongoing perception that there is still too much regulation, lack of transparency, and corruption standing in the way, it would be impossible to judge the reforms a success until markets and investors decide that Ukraine is a more attractive place.

QUESTION: [Through Interpreter]. You mentioned Russian-Ukrainian gas talks. Any advice for Ukraine how to influence the Russian position and get the conditions that Ukraine is seeking? Maybe the way to go is to sue in the International Arbitration Court. What would be your advice?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON: I think the most important thing Ukraine can do is work on its own energy efficiency, other sources of energy, and own sources of energy to make it less dependent on a single supplier. That’s ultimately the way to improve leverage in a negotiation about price. I think there’s a lot more that can be done in all three of those areas, and we would be ready to help.

Thanks, everybody.

Addressing the Challenge of MANPADS Proliferation

Andrew J. Shapiro
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Stimson Center

Washington, DC

February 2, 2012

As prepared

Thank you. It is my great pleasure to be here at the Stimson Center. Stimson has long been a leader in developing our understanding of international security and I want to thank the center for having me here today to speak on this important topic. I also want to thank Linc – not just for that kind introduction – but also for all the work he did when he ran the Political-Military Affairs Bureau. U.S. efforts to destroy and secure shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles started under Linc’s watch and as Special Envoy he helped focus international attention on this threat. His efforts have well prepared us for the current challenges we are facing today.

Today, I want to talk to you about our efforts to address the threat posed by shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile systems, also known as Man-Portable-Air-Defense-Systems or MANPADS. Currently in Libya we are engaged in the most extensive effort to combat the proliferation of MANPADS in U.S. history. But before I talk about Libya, let me first talk a bit about why we are so focused on this threat.

In the wrong hands, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles pose a major threat to passenger air travel, the commercial aviation industry, and possibly military aircraft around the world. Not only could a successful attack against an aircraft cause a devastating loss of life, but it could also cause significant economic damage. Airline travel is critical to our interconnected global economy. Any successful attack could therefore have very harmful economic effects not only in the region where the attack occurred, but also in countries around the world.

In 2002, just over nine years ago, the world was awakened to the threat posed by MANPADS when terrorists shot two missiles at an Israeli civilian Boeing 757 in Mombasa, Kenya. If the missiles had hit the plane, the attack could have resulted in hundreds of deaths and could have had a chilling effect on international air traffic.

While we can be thankful that no American civilian planes have been shot down by one of these systems, the use of MANPADS in Iraq and Afghanistan by insurgents has posed a threat to American and coalition troops, as well as to reconstruction efforts. Take for example the 2003 attack on a DHL cargo plane taking off from Baghdad International Airport. As it attempted to deliver mail from Iraq to nearby Bahrain, the plane was hit by a MANPADS missile, damaging the left wing and causing the loss of the hydraulic flight control systems. Miraculously, the crew was able to regain control and make an emergency landing. These attacks gained world-wide attention and prompted the U.S. government to make countering the proliferation of MANPADS a top national security priority.

MANPADS were first developed at the beginning of the Cold War by the United States and the Soviet Union. They were designed to be used by conventional armies against enemy aircraft. But today many of the older systems have almost no military utility, since they are ineffective against modern military aircraft equipped with countermeasures. Yet a number of countries still possess large stockpiles of these outdated systems. And since they are no longer militarily useful, countries’ often struggle to devote the necessary resources to properly secure them. In fact, for most countries, possession of these aging systems is often more of a liability than an asset. While these outdated weapons may be of little use to a host country’s military, they are prized systems for smugglers and terrorists. This makes improperly secured stockpiles of MANPADS a prime target for smugglers and for terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda.

Just as nuclear proliferation has been a major concern in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, so too is the proliferation of MANPADS. MANPADS were built to be portable, easy-to-use, and readily transferable, making them an ideal weapon for terrorists seeking to attack airliners. Some MANPADS are as small as four feet long, weighing less than 30 pounds. Yet, this light-weight weapon is capable of firing a missile at twice the speed of sound which can engage a plane flying as high as 15,000 feet and over 3 miles away within 10 seconds. By using infrared sensors, the first generation of MANPADS could lock onto an aircraft’s heat source to guide the missile to impact.

Most MANPADS require three parts to function: a missile packaged in a tube; a gripstock (also known as a launcher); and a battery. Importantly, the missile tube can only be used once. Unlike a rocket propelled grenade, it cannot be reloaded. Likewise, the battery only has enough energy to power the missile system long enough for one launch. While MANPADS are a guided system, they usually require some weapons training to be used effectively. These weapons require more than just ‘pointing and clicking,’ especially with the older models found in Libya that lack sophisticated guidance mechanisms. This is one of several factors that helps explain the limited number of successful attacks globally.

The most proliferated type of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile is also the first-generation of the system. It is an infrared-guided system designed by the former Soviet Union known as the SA-7. This weapon was introduced in the late 1960s, was heavily produced in the 1970s, and is the system most commonly held by terrorist groups. It is also the system that the Qadhafi regime stockpiled by the thousands. While MANPADS can vary greatly in the way they operate, they all pose a serious threat to international aviation.

Over the last decade, international awareness of the threat has grown and some important steps have been taken by the international community. For instance, regulations have been tightened on MANPADS exports. Guidelines have been established for stockpile management. And technological developments have been explored that could limit the use or the effectiveness of these weapons.

For years the United States has also worked to secure stockpiles of conventional weapons in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists. This remains one of the United States government’s top priorities.

In 2006, the U.S. government established an interagency MANPADS Task Force led by the State Department. To counter-proliferation, the MANPADS Task Force helps countries’ secure its stockpiles, maintain reliable inventories of its systems, and safely dispose of MANPADS stocks that are no longer needed for their national defense. Since 2003, our cooperation with more than 30 countries around the globe has led to the destruction of nearly 33,000 excess, loosely secured, or otherwise at-risk MANPADS.

This is also very much a multi-agency effort. The Department of Defense provides its technical expertise in providing physical security and stockpile management assessments to countries. Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security has a program within the Transportation Security Administration that assists countries to better protect their airports from a possible attack. DHS sends teams to countries to conduct vulnerability assessments in order to identify areas around international airports where MANPADS could be launched. DHS also help these countries’ develop a plan to counter this threat.

The State Department, along with our interagency partners, has worked in numerous post-conflict countries, including the Balkans, Burundi, and Liberia, to secure and destroy obsolete and excess weapons, especially MANPADS. For instance, between 2003 and 2004, we worked with Bosnia to destroy its government-held stockpile of almost 6,000 MANPADS. In each of these countries, these governments realized the enormous threat that unneeded weapons posed. Not only can these weapons end up in the hands of terrorists, but poorly maintained weapons depots also pose a threat to people who live near these sites.

Additionally, our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan required us to work in conflict environments. In both countries we worked to set up integrated Conventional Weapons Destruction programs that targeted high value weapons, specifically MANPADS. We also worked to protect the civilians from landmines, IEDs, unexploded ordnance, and excess weapons and unstable munitions. For example, in Iraq, the United States has invested more than $200 million in conventional weapons destruction projects since 2003. After more than three decades of violent conflict, Afghanistan is severely contaminated by landmines, unexploded ordinance, and excess conventional weapons and unstable munitions. Since the 1990s, the State Department has provided more than $200 million in humanitarian mine action and conventional weapons destruction assistance to Afghanistan. Our work in these countries, much of it under Linc’s stewardship, has helped prepare us for the challenge posed by the crisis in Libya.

LIBYA

For decades, the Qadhafi regime stockpiled MANPADS. By the time of the regime’s collapse, Libya had accumulated the largest stockpile of MANPADS of any non-MANPADS producing country in the world. Overall we estimate that the Qadhafi regime acquired a stockpile of approximately 20,000 MANPADS in the past four decades. The collapse of the regime has therefore created a major proliferation challenge for the new Libyan government, the region, and the entire international community.

In response to the crisis, the United States – as Secretary Clinton announced in Tripoli in November – has committed to providing $40 million dollars to assist Libya’s efforts to secure and recover its weapons stockpiles. We have also helped galvanize an international response to this crisis and have worked tirelessly in support of the new Libyan government.

We were concerned about Libya’s stockpiles of MANPADS well before the outbreak of fighting last spring. In fact, during the brief earlier effort to reestablish relations with Libya, MANPADS was a topic that we sought to address with the Qadhafi regime. As the Arab Spring spread and as protests gathered momentum in Libya, our MANPADS Task Force was well aware of the scope of the challenge. With our team’s experience working in other conflict countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, we also knew what to expect and we were ready to respond.

When the fighting escalated and the Qadhafi regime was pushed back from Benghazi, we took immediate steps to try to mitigate the proliferation dangers. In April of last year, we began providing $3 million in funding to NGOs to get them on the ground. These NGOs specialize in conventional weapons destruction and stockpile security and have significant experience. They immediately began working with the Transitional National Council or TNC to clear unexploded ordnance and remnants of war and assisted the TNC in securing loose weapons, including MANPADS.

We also deployed a team from our MANPADS Task Force to brief countries in the region on the potential proliferation dangers. Before Qadhafi was ousted from Tripoli, we had visited all of Libya’s neighbors and offered assistance with border security and provided advice on potential steps to improve aviation security.

Additionally, we worked to galvanize an international response to the crisis. We engaged our NATO allies and other close partners, and worked closely with the United Nations to develop an international response.

Once the stalemate broke and the fighting rapidly shifted in the TNC’s favor in August, we immediately deployed a State Department expert from the MANPADS Task Force to Benghazi. Mark Adams, who you will hear from shortly on the panel, is the head of our MANPADS Task Force and spent considerable time on the ground in Libya and can talk more about his experience. The initial primary objective was to reach an agreement with the TNC to set up a MANPADS control and destruction program that would enable us to set up what we call our Phase I efforts. Phase I entailed an effort to rapidly survey, secure, and disable loose MANPADS across the country. To accomplish this, we immediately deployed our Quick Reaction Force, which are teams made up of civilian technical specialists.

A fact often overlooked in our response to events in Libya, is that – unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan – we did not have tens of thousands of U.S. forces on the ground, nor did we control movement and access. This meant we did not have complete freedom of movement around the country. Our efforts on the ground therefore had to be carefully coordinated and fully supported by the TNC. To keep the Libyans in the lead, our technical specialists were embedded in support of TNC-led teams to pursue loose MANPADS. While this did lend some constraints on our ability to ramp up, it also had the important benefit of ensuring that we had complete TNC support for our efforts. And I can tell you, we didn’t need to explain to the TNC the importance of securing weapons. They fully understood that weapons proliferation was a real threat to a new Libya and they worked rapidly to organize teams to secure and recover weapons.

In September, as the fighting was still going on, these teams swept the country, scouring ammunition storage sites and more than 1,500 bunkers to find MANPADS. Additionally, teams and experts were also provided by the British Government – and a British colleague who oversaw this deployment, is here today as well. Thus far these teams have helped to identify, recover, and secure approximately 5,000 MANPADS and components.

But this raises the question – how many are still missing? The frank answer is we don’t know and probably never will. There are a few reasons for this:

First, we do not have precise information about the Qadhafi regime’s weapons stockpiles. The Qadhafi regime was anything but transparent. And we don’t have exact information about the regime’s weapons inventories. Our teams are working to piece together information we have gained from packing slips in the MANPADS crates that can give us information on the quantities of various shipments. But there is a lot that we don’t know about Qadhafi’s weapons stockpile. For instance, we don’t know how many systems over the last 20-40 years were used in training or military exercises or were damaged or destroyed as a result of improper storage or exposure to the elements. Therefore, getting an exact figure on the number missing is difficult because we don’t know exactly how many the Qadhafi regime still possessed at the time of its collapse.

A second reason is that weapons storage sites were a major target of NATO airstrikes. For months, NATO forces pounded away at the Qadhafi regime’s weapons depots. Time and time again our teams came across weapons storage sites where we knew MANPADS were stored only to find that these sites had been completely obliterated by NATO strikes. Whatever weapons were in these storage facilities were likely destroyed and were buried under mounds of rubble left behind. While this is good news from a counter-proliferation perspective, it makes coming up with an exact count a challenge to say the least. Additionally, the NATO bombing campaign focused intently on taking out Libya’s air defense systems and their corresponding storage sites. We believe that many MANPADS were stored with other anti-aircraft artillery at these facilities and were likely destroyed during the campaign.

Third, many of these weapons were taken by militias and anti-Qadhafi forces during the fighting. The Libyan opposition – including militias and private citizens – removed significant quantities of weapons from weapons depots, including MANPADS during the uprising. As has been well documented by journalists on the ground, Libyan rebels often took whatever weapons were available. Despite the fact that MANPADS are only designed to target aircraft, have little utility against opposing ground forces, and are dangerous for the user when used this way, we know that opposition forces regularly used MANPADS in direct combat against Qadhafi loyalists. This is significant because it means that many of the unaccounted for missiles may have been used in the fighting.

Furthermore, because many militias believe MANPADS have some utility in ground combat, many militia groups remain reluctant to relinquish them. As the process of demobilizing militias continues, we expect to see many of these weapons being turned over to the control of the Libyan national army. While the integration process has been slow and challenging, at the very least, we believe this means that the large stockpiles of weapons under militia control have remained inside Libya – albeit outside the control of the Libyan government. We don’t have precise numbers on how many are under militia control. But given that these were the forces that were often the first to liberate weapons sites from Qadhafi control, we believe that a substantial number are held by these militias.

Yet clearly we cannot rule out that some weapons may have leaked out of Libya. Our efforts in Libya are therefore designed to reduce risk and mitigate the threat as effectively and comprehensively as we can. This is why the United States and the international community have been working with countries in the region to improve border security and improve their aviation security. We are working closely with NATO, the EU, and the UN to coordinate our efforts on the ground and across the region. To date, the United Kingdom has pledged at least £1 million pounds and, as mentioned, has provided a team of technical experts to support and coordinate activities. The Netherlands has contributed €900,000 Euros. Germany has contributed €750,000 Euros. And Canada has pledged $1.6 million Canadian dollars. Other countries, such as France and Italy have also made significant contributions.

PHASE II

The work to secure and recover Libya’s weapons stockpiles is a long-term effort. Now that we have completed our initial rapid sweep across the country, we are entering what we call Phase 2. This involves helping the new Libyan government conduct a full inventory of all weapons stockpiles, as well as assisting them to improve border security to help detect and interdict illicit activity.

In December I travelled to Tripoli to get an update on our progress and to discuss the transition to this new phase in our efforts with the new Libyan government. And from my visit, and from the experience of our teams on the ground, I can tell you the new Libyan government is firmly committed to addressing this issue.

In early December, the Libyan government signed a Conventional Weapons Destruction Technical Arrangement, which provides the basis for expansion into Phase 2 operations. This was the first bilateral agreement the new Libyan Ministry of Defense has signed and is a key indicator of the new Libyan governments’ desire to comprehensively address weapons security. This agreement also created the Libya Center for Mine Action or LMAC, which was named as the Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) lead for these issues. Our contract specialists will help support the LMAC. The LMAC is also functioning as the central point for coordination of international efforts to assist the Libyans in conventional weapons destruction.

Our conventional weapons destruction efforts are also serving to support Libya’s new government. Our Phase 2 efforts will also help aid the Libyan government’s efforts to integrate militias and veterans of the fighting. We plan to assist the Libyans to conduct a thorough inventory of all weapons storage areas in Libya to create a full picture of both old, unstable, obsolete, or at-risk, as well as up-to-date weapons and munitions. This is not just about MANPADS, but about all weapons. And it entails helping the Libyans consolidate weapons into secure facilities and assisting them to destroy items that the Libyans deem in excess of their security requirements. Throughout Phase 2, the State Department will also maintain 2 Mobile MANPADS teams which will operate independent of the survey, inventory, and destruction activities. They will respond to any ad-hoc MANPADS discoveries or issues throughout Libya.

Completing an entire survey of Libya’s weapons stockpiles, will take time and will require a lot of manpower. It entails an effort to find out exactly how many MANPADS were inside of each of the weapons sites that were targeted by NATO. This is a painstaking process that will require heavy equipment and excavation crews. Additionally, before we can even begin to excavate these sites must be swept for unexploded ordnance from the bombing campaign. To complete this task our funding will help support the hiring of many veterans of the conflict, who will be trained in conventional weapons destruction activities. We believe that this is a win-win for the government of Libya and for the United States. We are helping Libya get a handle on its weapons stockpiles, while at the same time aiding their demobilization efforts.

Once this time-consuming process is completed we plan to transition to a third Phase that will seek to ensure Libya’s weapons stockpiles meet modern standards. This involves updating storage facilities, improving security, and assisting the Libyans efforts to implement the most up-to-date stockpile management practices.

This will clearly be a long-term effort and there is a lot of work to do between now and Phase III, but the United States and the international community are committed to assisting the new Libyan government on this path.

To conclude, I believe our efforts in Libya and around the world have demonstrated our strong commitment to addressing the threat posed by shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. While there is no easy solution to the proliferation challenge posed by MANPADS, this Administration and the international community is working vigilantly to take steps to reduce the threat posed by these weapons.

I know in these budget constrained times, State Department assistance programs are under great scrutiny. But our diplomatic and development work saves lives and helps foster stability in every region of the world, which helps strengthen U.S. national security. There is no clearer example of this than our efforts to counter the proliferation of MANPADS. This work, along with our other Conventional Weapons Destruction programs, helps create the conditions for stability to return to war-torn regions. By removing or securing these destabilizing systems, as well as other deadly remnants of war, we are helping children, families, and communities to live in safety and therefore helping war-torn countries recover.

And with that, I would be happy to take a few questions.

Keynote Address to Korea Society Gala Dinner

Kurt M. Campbell
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Seoul, South Korea

January 31, 2012

Thank you very, very much for that very warm introduction. And let me just say welcome and thank you to all our friends, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, Ambassadors, National Security Advisor, all of our colleagues and friends that we have the honor to work with. Let me also say a special thank you and welcome to the business communities of the United States and Korea. For our American friends who are forward-deployed aspects of our business community in particular, thank you for representing our country so well. I also want to thank my long, old friend Tom Hubbard for his service for all that he has done.

And I thought that the presentation from Mark Minton – one is always a little wary of homework assignments – but I thought that was fantastic. And it really was emblematic of the progress that the Society has made in the last couple of years. I must confess that a few years ago I was present at a session in which we discussed the U.S.-Korea relationship – this is only five or six years ago – there was enormous anxiety that the generation that had fostered such strong relations between our two countries, first during the Korean War and then subsequently, was passing from the scene. And there was enormous anxiety and worry whether younger Americans and Koreans would share the same bonds, the same interests in one another. I must tell you before I came yesterday, I had to get my young daughters off the computer, and I found them listening and looking at every aspect of Korean culture. I think as Mark indicated, there is an absolute renaissance of interest in all things Korean in the United States. And I have to say, a few years ago, I think all of us quietly had some anxiety.

Now, there is no relationship that the United States has in the world that we have more confidence in, and more comfort in, than the relationship between the United States and South Korea. In many respects this is represented here today by the promise of Ambassador Sung Kim. I cannot tell you how wonderful it is for me to be able to see him serving here at a time of such importance between our two relationships. And I just want to thank him for his continuing service and his commitment to our two countries.

I want to say a little bit about American policy and about where I think the United States and South Korea can go, but I want to just start with just a quick personal note. We all live incredibly busy lives. I find myself often just rushing from place to place. But occasionally you have those moments – they often are very brief – where you are reminded of something that just sticks with you. So we landed, rushed through the snow from the airport, went, quickly changed. But I had a few moments at the hotel, waiting for our car to come, and I looked to the right. There was a stand of birch trees with the most beautiful snow. And it was a reminder to me of one of the things that I love most about Korea. I love the beauty. I love the sense of calm. I love every aspect in detail, the commitment to those small places. And although we often think about the snow being difficult in terms of traffic, and the challenge of getting around, but I hope you all take a moment as you leave tonight and just observe the serenity and the beauty and the wonder of Seoul and all that the Korean people have managed to build and create (Applause).

Now much in recent months has been made of the so-called pivot of the United States more towards the Asia-Pacific region. And I want to underscore something that Tom Hubbard, Ambassador Hubbard said that I fully agree with. The truth is, the United States has never left Asia. We have been deeply engaged in the region with its countries and peoples, not just for decades, but for hundreds of years. What we are hoping to convey, is that after a period of necessary and intense engagement in the Middle East and South Asia, the United States is returning to a focus, to a recognition that in the twenty-first century, the lion’s share of the history of the world will be written in the Asia-Pacific region. And the United States wants to be a part of that; we want to be an active friend and open engager with all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. And so what you are seeing in Asia is not simply a momentary surge or a quick policy push that will be quickly replaced by a focus elsewhere. I don’t believe that’s the case. I think what you are witnessing is a fundamental reorientation of American priorities to a place where we all understand that the greatest dynamism, the greatest possibilities lie, in the Asia- Pacific region.

So you have seen over the course of the last few years a determined effort to join the region’s most important international multilateral forum. The President earlier went to the East Asia Summit where for the first time we were invited to join. We are actively participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum. But, in addition to these multilateral engagements, we also recognize that Asia looks to the United States to continue to play a role as an optimistic, engaged trade and economic partner. There are times under these kinds of challenges where Americans might question whether we are able to compete in the same way, but frankly, it was the encouragement of Korean friends and others that caused us to push through with the Korea Free Trade Agreement, with the largest majority supporting this agreement of any trade agreement we have had in almost 50 years. Now this is in many respects, yes, a referendum on a trade agreement, but it is also a representation of how Americans feel about South Korea and about our future together. And I want you to deeply appreciate that commitment, and that sense of friendship and partnership.

Our commitment also is to develop and strengthen all of our security partnerships and alliances, and to develop new relationships with key partners that are simply now just emerging as Asian Pacific nations, like India, like Vietnam, like Indonesia. And of course we recognize in the United States that one of the most important relationships for us to get correct, for us to get right, is our relationship between the United States and China. We recognize quite clearly that every country in Asia wants a better relationship with China, and we support that. And any strategy that the United States implements that does not have that at its core will fail. So we understand that this is not a matter of geo-strategy, it is a matter of geography. And we too want a strong, constructive, deep partnership with China. This is our destiny, it is our commitment. It is a necessity that the United States and China work together in peace; that we compete, but that we compete in ways that bring prosperity and peace to Asia as a whole.

At the top of the list of U.S. commitment to Asia is a recognition for it to be successful, it must be bipartisan. So you will see over the course of the coming months, fairly deep, difficult debates in the United States, issues about domestic policy, certain aspects of our foreign policy. But I think one thing you will not see are deep divisions about U.S. strategy and focus in Asia. There is a deep, bipartisan commitment that the foundations of our engagement, a strong military engagement, key focus on institutions, strong, robust trade and economic engagement. These are the elements of American strategy that will continue into the future.

So what does that mean for the Korea-U.S. relationship going forward? And let me just say a few things in terms of how I see the relationship in the coming months. Now, I have had the privilege to serve in a variety of capacities over the last couple of years. I have seen every high-level diplomatic engagement between the United States and every country in Asia. And I must say, when we celebrated the Summit in October, in Washington, D.C., I have never seen a meeting that was more like a celebration, a celebration of what the United States and South Korea mean to one another, and again, transcending politics.

So our goals for the coming months is to recognize, first and foremost, that the most difficult period in any relationship is actually immediately after a period of enormous accomplishment. There is a tendency to want to sit back, to reflect, to congratulate yourself. That’s impossible in this relationship, and it is impossible in Asia. We must maintain momentum; we must be committed; we must work together on so many different things.

First and foremost is the implementation of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement. I must tell you, we together, those of us who pushed for it, who supported it, in the business community, in diplomacy and elsewhere, we raised a lot of expectations. We truly did. And now we must fulfill what we have suggested is possible. So I hope over the course of the next few years we will be able to see the kinds of growth and economic exchanges and engagement between our two countries that we both talked so optimistically about.

Later this year Korea will be hosting a wonderful Expo in Yeosu. And I want to just say how proud the United States is, that we will be sending a very strong Exhibition to support the oceans and shoreline session this summer. We have brought forward Jacques Cousteau’s grandson, Philippe Cousteau, to design our Exhibition. Daniel Dae Kim, a wonderful Korean-American actor, will be one of our key players on the ground representing the United States. And Ambassador Kim will also be representing us. It is our determination to have the most innovative, exciting exhibition that draws Koreans and friends visiting Korea from around the region and the world.

Previous speakers have spoken about the challenge of North Korea. And I just want to say I have much greater confidence about developments in North Korea, because of the partnership with South Korea. Our partnership is so tight, our consultations are so close, that I am confident that whatever happens, we will be able to meet the challenge together. And I share with South Korean friends that there is hope in diplomacy. But I must be very clear that that hope of diplomacy rests on the reality of a very strong deterrence and military commitment and that will be unwavering. And I want to send a very clear message again to South Korean friends that any engagement with North Korea, that if North Korea wants a better relationship with the world, that the first stop is a better relationship with South Korea. It is absolutely essential. And the United States wants to work to support that, to encourage that, and to bring a more fulfilling peace and stability to the Asia-Pacific region.

Lastly, I want to say that the thing that Mark Minton discussed, and that we have seen over the course over the last several years, is the most exciting dimension of our relationship. It is the fact that young people, and cultural exchange has grown by leaps and bounds. And so our relationship is no longer simply about military deterrence or partnership, although that continues to be essential. It is not simply about the economic engagement, although that is going to be important and will lead to an increasingly vigorous commitment between our two countries. Now it extends to every group between our two nations, between young people, people who are interested in the arts, in film, in music. We are truly living through the most wonderful renaissance in our relationship

And I just – one of the reasons I wanted to come this evening. I flew a long way, I actually came from Washington, D.C. – but it was to pay tribute to the work of the Korea Society, what they have done, what they have meant for our relationship these last 55 years. But I just want to say that the work going forward is going to be even more important. And I want to thank all of you for committing to support this most wonderful relationship. Sometimes we have to remind ourselves that we are involved in diplomacy, because our bonds are so tight, and our friendship is so deep. So I wish you all a wonderful evening of good food, good friendship, companionship with the people in this room this evening. And as you go home this evening, in addition to driving safely, take a moment to reflect on the beauty of this wonderful land and the work that we have been able to do together and that we will do together in the future. Thank you all very much.

Combating Corruption and Bribery in APEC: Promoting Open Governance and Market Integrity to Strengthen Economic Growth and Competiveness

David M. Luna
Director for Anticrime Programs , Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

Moscow, Russia

February 2, 2012

Good morning.

As we start the new APEC year under the leadership of the Government of the Russian Federation, let me thank all of the economies here and the international organizations that worked with the United States last year to ensure success during our chairmanship of APEC’s Anti-Corruption and Transparency (ACT) Experts’ Working Group.

In passing the baton as Chair to Timur Eyvazov, I would like to provide a brief summary of what the ACT achieved in 2011, and I hope that we will be able to build on this momentum during the Russian Chairmanship to continue implementing the actions outlined in the ACT’s five-year strategy.

Last November in Honolulu, Hawaii, I joined Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton and other ministers at the APEC High Level Policy Dialogue on Open Governance and Economic Growth to discuss how economies and communities – including representatives from business, academia, and non-governmental and labor organizations – from across the Asia-Pacific region can work to enhance public trust by combating corruption and by committing to transparent, fair, and accountable governance. Participants also underscored how good governance can spur high-quality economic growth by fostering and sustaining the entrepreneurial spirit that nurtures innovation, enhances competitiveness, reduces market distortions, and promotes trade and long-term investment.

The 2011 APEC High Level Policy Dialogue also reaffirmed and reinforced the commitment by economies to report on their implementation of previously-agreed APEC anti-corruption and transparency policies. We join our ACT colleagues in looking forward to seeing the first reports at SOM II and to learning more about economies’ anti-corruption and transparency efforts.

It is clear that our senior officials have placed a high priority on including effective transparency and anti-corruption measures as part of the overall APEC agenda, and open governance is fundamental to our work in many ways as it shines a light on corruption and empowers communities to monitor and voice their perspectives on government policies and the use of resources. Conversely, when a government hides its work from the view of the public, the public’s trust in the government erodes.

Good governance tools are critical to nurturing long-term, sustainable growth and to supporting the regional development and prosperity to which we all aspire. Working together with civil society, economies can harness greater innovation, efficiencies, and technologies that help shape a better future across communities.

Inspired by the Arab Spring, people around the world are demanding more transparency in government. Governments can demonstrate their commitment to uphold the highest levels of integrity by adopting effective anticorruption policies that put accountability front and center.

As Secretary Clinton has emphasized: Empowering citizens to fight corruption and harnessing new technologies to strengthen governance are also vital. Openness is not only good for governance, it is good for sustainable GDP growth.

Tools such as APEC’s Transparency Standards and other sectoral standards can help provides businesses, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, with greater access to laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings. These resources will help to enable greater regional economic integration, expansion of trade and investment flows, and job creation. I applaud economies that are also encouraging ethical business practices and implementing codes of ethics in export sectors that are of vital interest to SMEs.

Codes of conduct and financial disclosure systems also help promote public integrity and economic growth, and the United States welcomes the APEC Principles for Financial/Asset Disclosure by Public Officials that the ACT developed last year. These Principles will serve as a useful tool to prevent corruption, as they will help APEC economies identify conflicts of interest and assist in detection and prosecution of those who engage in illicit enrichment and other forms of corruption.

Through our continued cooperation with the private sector, we are leveling the playing field for businesses across APEC economies. In working with the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) and other partners, we ushered in a new era of cooperation between the public and private sectors that will help forge a more connected, innovative, and dynamic Asia Pacific region.

Working with ABAC, the ACT advanced the importance of how corruption increases the costs of doing business, hinders economic performance, undermines competitiveness, and hampers the ability of economies to attract foreign direct investment. Capital flows gravitate to markets with open governance systems within a framework that respects the rule of law, while markets with poor governance and high levels of perceived corruption tend to have lower levels of portfolio investment.

Combating corruption and bribery and protecting legitimate business revenues by dismantling illicit markets and networks also require collective action and shared responsibility among APEC partners, as well as close coordination with relevant regional and international organizations that have expertise and capacities to help improve the overall governance climate in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States is proud that the ACT, in partnership with ABAC, also advanced anti-bribery as a core area of cooperation in 2011.

The United States would like to congratulate Russia for joining the OECD Working Group on Bribery. We hope that Russia’s active leadership in APEC and engagement at the OECD will inspire more of our partners to intensify their efforts against foreign bribery. Russia should also be commended for volunteering to host the Conference of States Parties of the UN Convention against Corruption in 2015.

In 2011, the ACT also took a more comprehensive and holistic approach to combating corruption and illicit trade to ensure integrity in global markets and supply chains, thereby helping to protect our shared prosperity and economic competitiveness. I hope that the ACT will continue to confront criminal entrepreneurs and market actors that navigate between licit and illicit worlds, tainting supply chains and threatening the integrity of our markets.

As we learned in the two ACT workshops in 2011 in San Francisco and Washington, DC, broken supply chains, compromised markets, and the corruption that both facilitates and is financed by illicit trade poses serious threats to our legitimate businesses. We agreed that the proliferation of counterfeit, pirated, and gray-market goods diminishes brand identities, company reputations, and returns on research and innovation and increases operating costs and investment risks for all market investors. We must continue working together to fight the corruption that greases illicit value chains and enables transnational networks.

As we strengthen our partnerships with other international organizations, APEC ACT members can, in fact, translate and advance our principles and commitments in a variety of other fora. Our call for strengthening anticorruption measures and transparency should continue to ring out around the world. In UNCAC, we should take the lessons and principles we have developed in APEC and lead by example on transparent, inclusive reviews; on the inclusion of stakeholders outside of government; and on developing practical measures to cooperate on asset recovery, such as the global Focal Points initiative supported by INTERPOL and StAR. The voices of members of our group are already heard in the G20, the OECD Working Group on Bribery, the ADB-OECD Anticorruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific, the Open Government Partnership, and in the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership that will include robust anticorruption elements. We should continue to work together to multiply our efforts here through our leadership in these and other relevant fora.

Through our continued cooperation with international partners and our heightened commitment to responsible governance, we can build a firm foundation to invest and reap integrity dividends for future generations.

From Tokyo to New York to Beijing and Moscow, the ACT is developing innovative partnerships and capacities to tackle corruption and bribery. When both the public and private sectors lead and partner together, we can create a culture of integrity that has a lasting impact. We can create a better future by uniting in our support of accountability and good governance against corruption.

Again, I wish Russia a great and successful year in APEC 2012 and applaud my ACT colleagues for developing a vibrant course of action, a long-term strategy to combat corruption in our economies and a new path towards economic progress that nurtures open and cleaner governments and enhances integrity in markets and supply chains.

Interview With Judy Dempsey From the International Herald Tribune and Special Contributor to the Munich Security Conference

Rose Gottemoeller
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

On-the-Record Interview*

Washington, DC

January 19, 2012

QUESTION: Late last year, the Americans broke off conventional arms control talks with Russia. Why?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: The situation simply could not continue indefinitely. The Russian Federation had “suspended implementation” of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) in December 2007. Last fall, we decided we needed to take action. Together with a group of other Treaty signatories--NATO allies and partners Moldova and Georgia--we agreed to halt implementation of the Treaty with Russia. We continue to implement the CFE Treaty with all the other states-parties. We were sending a message; we considered it to be a rational countermeasure, and did it more in sorrow than in anger. It was a message to Russia that we would like to see them come back into implementation of the Treaty. The United States is committed to revitalizing the conventional arms control regime in Europe and continues to consult on finding a way forward with our Treaty partners.

QUESTION: What could restart negotiations?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Right now, I think we’re in a good place. It is still premature to talk about negotiations, but ceasing the implementation of the CFE Treaty toward Russia actually opens up an environment to explore new opportunities for the future of conventional arms control in Europe. But first we need to do some very basic work on the concepts and substance, together with our allies and partners, including the Russians. Everybody knows that the CFE Treaty simply is not relevant anymore to the current security situation in Europe. It was negotiated at a time when the Warsaw Pact was still standing against us.

QUESTION: It was a Cold War relic?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: What we have now is an opportunity for a regime that would be clearly post Cold War. We need to think ahead about what will be most helpful, contributing to resolving the frozen conflicts and strengthening regional security. I think the Russians have the same interest in stable and predictable security relationships as other countries.

QUESTION: If you look at the entirety of Russia’s security outlook, tactical nuclear weapons are an important card, because its conventional forces are so weak. Where do we stand with regard to tactical nuclear weapons?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: It is true that the Russian military doctrine is quite clear on the strategic importance they give to tactical nuclear weapons. But we need to pull the aperture wider. When President Obama signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010, he said that the United States would like to negotiate further reductions in three categories of nuclear arms: in deployed strategic nuclear weapons, in non-deployed strategic nuclear weapons (for example, held in storage facilities) and in non strategic nuclear weapons, the so-called tactical nuclear weapons, which are the ones that concern Europe. The President made it very clear that we want to tackle all three categories in the next arms reduction negotiations with Russia.

QUESTION: But why should the Russians agree to cuts in tactical weapons?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Again, you have to look at the full picture. The Russians have always said that they are concerned about U.S. up-load capabilities…

QUESTION: …meaning that the U.S. could relatively quickly bring back a substantial number of reserve nuclear weapons from storage…

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: …and that could be a part of the picture for future negotiations. I am not saying that we are making an official proposal at this point. But you have to have an idea what the trade-offs might be.

QUESTION: So far, there really has not been much movement on tactical weapons.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: I would not say that. In fact, there has been movement in two areas: First, the United States has made it clear that we want to begin talking sooner rather than later about the issues affecting further reductions. And we want to begin talking sooner rather than later about transparency measures that we might pursue even before we get back to the negotiating table. And so, we are looking at some ideas in that regard. In the meantime, there is some important homework that we have to do within the NATO Alliance--the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review is taking place right now. We know that NATO is committed to an extended deterrent and will remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist. In May, we are going to have the NATO summit in Chicago. That is an opportunity to reach some conclusions on what NATO policy is going to be with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons.

QUESTION: Does missile defense complicate things?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: We hope not! (laughs) Because we talk until we are blue in the face to make the point that we believe cooperation on missile defenses in Europe would be very much in the interests of the Russian Federation. Our goal is to reach agreement on a political framework to move missile defense cooperation forward and strengthen the overlapping capabilities that we have. We want to address the common threat that ballistic missiles pose for security in Europe, including for Russia. Through this cooperation, Russia would see first-hand that this system is designed and capable to defend only against missiles originating from the Middle East. At the same time, we have been trying to convey to them also that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe are not intended nor will they be capable to undermine the Russian strategic offensive armed forces. The Russians remain to be convinced. But I don’t think it’s a hopeless situation. Not by any stretch of the imagination.

_______________

* The interview was given to and published by the Munich Security Conference.

Opening Statement at the Conference on Disarmament

Rose Gottemoeller
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

Geneva, Switzerland

January 24, 2012

As delivered

Thank you very much Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President. At the outset of my remarks, please allow me to congratulate Ecuador, and you personally, on your assumption of the first Presidency of the 2012 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Ambassador Kennedy and I wish you well as you guide the work of this Conference forward; you may count on the U.S. delegation’s full support.

I would also like to extend our best wishes to the other CD Presidents for the 2012 session -- Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, and Germany. We look forward to working with all of you during this year.

Accomplishments

I spoke at the CD’s opening session last January and I am pleased to be here again to highlight the progress on arms control and disarmament that has been made over the course of the past year.

The New START Treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011. Implementation is going well and continues to contribute positively to the U.S.-Russian relationship. The treaty represents a strong foundation for further bilateral reductions and an important step on the path towards a world without nuclear weapons. Discussions between our two governments on the next steps are underway.

I am also pleased to report that the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) and its Protocols came into force in 2011. The PMDA commits the United States and the Russian Federation each to dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium -- enough material for many thousands of nuclear weapons.

Expanding beyond bilateral issues, the five Nuclear Weapon States have started a regular dialogue on verification issues and confidence-building measures related to nuclear disarmament, as part of our commitment to carry out our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Article VI obligations.

The United States is proud to be at the leading edge of transparency efforts -- publically declaring our nuclear stockpile numbers; participating in voluntary and treaty-based inspections measures; working with other nations on military to military, scientific and lab exchanges, sponsoring site visits and frequently briefing others on our nuclear programs and disarmament efforts.

The United States is committed to securing ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and we have been engaging the United States Senate and the American public on the merits of the Treaty. As we move forward with our process, we call on all governments to declare or reaffirm their commitments not to conduct explosive nuclear tests. We thank and congratulate Ghana, Guinea, Guatemala and Indonesia for ratifying the Treaty in the past year. We ask that all the remaining Annex 2 States join us in moving forward toward ratification.

I am also gratified to report progress on the extension of treaty-based negative security assurances through regional Nuclear Weapons Free zones. The Obama Administration transmitted the relevant Protocols of the African and South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. We were also glad that the Nuclear Weapon States and the states of ASEAN resolved long standing differences related to the South East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone’s Protocol language: Along with the other NPT depositary states, we have lent our strong support to the efforts of the facilitator for the 2012 Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone Conference, Finnish Under Secretary Jaako Laajava.

Regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States is proud of the progress made towards a world free of chemical weapons. We continue to make steady progress in destroying our chemical weapons. By April of this year, we anticipate we will have destroyed 90% of our stockpile. The remaining 10% will be destroyed while assigning highest priority to ensuring the safety of people, protecting the environment, and complying with national standards for safety and emissions, as called for in the Convention.

Last month, the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention met here in Geneva for their Seventh Review Conference. They agreed to a standing set of agenda items that cover national implementation, developments in science and technology and assistance and cooperation, all of which will serve to strengthen the effect of the treaty and help bridge the interrelated work being undertaken in the security, public health, law enforcement and scientific communities. This was done under the able direction of our CD colleague, Ambassador Paul van den IJsell.

Mr. President, before proceeding further on CD matters, please allow me to discuss recent developments regarding the European Union’s proposal for a “Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.”

Over the past four years, United States and European experts have regularly consulted on drafts of the EU “Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.” After an extensive interagency review of the EU’s initiative, the United States has decided to enter into formal consultations with the European Union and spacefaring nations to develop an International Code of Conduct, because the long-term sustainability of the space environment is at risk from space debris and irresponsible activities.

As Secretary Clinton announced on January 17, the United States is prepared to work in active partnership with all governments to develop a Code that can be adopted by the greatest number of spacefaring nations around the globe.

We believe that an international Code can help strengthen the long-term sustainability of space and promote safe and responsible use of space, while at the same time ensuring the inherent right of self-defense is not impaired. As more countries and companies field space capabilities, it is in our mutual interest that they act responsibly. A widely-subscribed International Code can encourage responsible space behavior and single out those who act otherwise, while reducing risks of mishaps, misperceptions, mistrust, and misconduct.

We expect to actively participate in the international discussions on an international Code throughout this year and beyond. As part of this process, the United States looks forward to the multilateral experts’ meetings that the European Union plans to convene in the near future.

We also look forward to the Group of Government Experts on outer space TCBMs that is scheduled to convene this summer. We see this as a key opportunity to develop practical measures to enhance transparency and confidence building and sustain the peaceful exploitation of outer space.

The Impasse at the CD

Mr. President, while the international community has been active and achieved results in many areas during the past year, the Conference on Disarmament appears to be no closer to an “honest day’s work” than it was last January.

Despite herculean efforts by a number of CD Member States, the CD continues to languish, and a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), the next logical and necessary step in the multilateral nuclear disarmament process, remains no closer to negotiation.

We did see some rays of hope last year. Australia and Japan hosted a series of extensive FMCT technical experts’ discussions on the CD’s margins that allowed the international community an opportunity to exchange views and gain perspectives in a sustained and organized way. The Chairs’ summaries of these discussions will make a useful contribution to our collective body of knowledge when eventual FMCT negotiations begin.

The United States initiated consultations among the P5 and others on unblocking FMCT negotiations in the CD and to prepare our own countries for what certainly will be a prolonged and technically challenging negotiation.

Last summer, the Secretary-General of the United Nations asked Member States to continue their dialogue on ways to improve the operation and effectiveness of the UN’s multilateral disarmament machinery, in particular the CD.

In the view of the United States, all of these efforts have been worthwhile, but regrettably, none has achieved the desired result of moving this body forward on FMCT negotiations and work on other important issues.

Mr. President, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton addressed the CD last February, she had stressed that, “Global nuclear security is too important to allow this matter [FMCT] to drift forever."

At the most recent session of the UNGA First Committee, we all witnessed and experienced the growing international frustration with the status quo here in Geneva. Not surprisingly, and with no small amount of justification, many in the international community are losing patience with the current situation in the CD.

Every government represented in this room has national security concerns and obligations associated with an FMCT, including my own. But as responsible governments, we also have a collective obligation to and responsibility for international peace and security, to which an FMCT would significantly contribute.

An FMCT Is As Vital As Ever

The FMCT is not some sort of deliberate diversion from “real” nuclear disarmament. Along with the CTBT, an FMCT is an absolutely essential step for global nuclear disarmament.

Simply stated, we can’t get to the end, if we don’t start at the beginning. A verifiable end to the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is necessary if we are to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. How can we make progress towards a world without nuclear weapons while some states continue to produce the key component for building up their nuclear arsenals?

A universal halt to the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons is essential. Some states have already declared a moratorium on such production, but others have not. Some, such as the United States, have reduced their military stocks of fissile material, whereas others are actively engaged in further production. The path to a world without nuclear weapons will require many steps. The next logical step in halting the increase of nuclear arsenals is an FMCT.

Mr. President, in Action 15 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document’s Action Plan, all States Parties agreed that the CD should begin immediate negotiation of an FMCT. The United States remains firmly committed to an FMCT as a tangible contribution to our “full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI,” as stated in that Action Plan. As the 2015 NPT review process gets under way this year, every NPT State Party has a responsibility to help make an FMCT a reality. In fact, every nation should share in the work that will create the conditions necessary to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free world.

Looking Ahead

Here in Geneva, and New York, and in capitals around the world, there has been a vigorous debate over the state of the UN’s multilateral disarmament machinery in general and the CD impasse, in particular.

I have been speaking about this at various venues and I will reiterate my thoughts here. Some people have spoken about amending the consensus rule at the CD, in order to break the current logjam. The United States does not share the view that the impasse in the CD is the result of its procedural rules. On the contrary, we believe that the consensus rule has served CD members well by providing assurance that individual member states’ national security concerns can be met.

There may be a case for some modifications to how decisions are taken on small procedural items at the CD, but those issues are not at the heart of the impasse. The road will remain blocked until all members of the CD are convinced that commencing negotiations is in their national interest, or at least, not harmful to those interests. The United States is working hard to make the case to those countries with reservations about the FMCT that starting negotiations is not something to fear.

Of course, for any negotiation to be substantive and worthwhile, the key states most directly affected by an FMCT should be involved. When it comes down to what is in the best interest of international security, the negotiating venue for the FMCT is of less importance than the participants. As a matter of pragmatism, however, the CD -- which includes every major nuclear capable state -- remains the best option for achieving a viable, effective FMCT.

Once FMCT negotiations have begun, CD members will face many complex and contentious issues, including the difficult issue of scope. We are well aware that CD members are divided on this issue. Ambassador Shannon’s Report to the CD, from which the Shannon Mandate is derived, highlighted these disagreements. His Report of his consultations made it abundantly clear that members could not agree on this key issue, nor on many others. What members did agree on is embodied in a key line in that Report following a listing of those contentious issues. That crucial line said: “…it has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the ad hoc Committee any of the above noted issues.”

The U.S. position is clear: FMCT obligations, including verification obligations, should cover only new production of fissile material. Step-by-step approaches to arms control and nonproliferation have been very successful over the years. A step-by-step approach would serve us well with an FMCT. One essential step in the process should be a legal ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

We are fully aware that many CD members have a different view and this issue will be the subject of vigorous debate. That is what negotiations are for, and the United States is ready to have that debate. What is not helpful is an effort to “pre-negotiate” the outcome of any negotiations by an explicit reference to existing stocks in a negotiating mandate.

We would not be alone in seeing this as a thinly-veiled effort to prevent negotiations from getting underway.

Regarding the possibility of the CD simultaneously negotiating on the four core issues (FMCT, nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, and prevention of an arms race in outer space); it is not a practical option. It is difficult to see how a body that has not negotiated any of these topics over the last sixteen years could take on the responsibility for negotiating all four at one time. The CD should focus on one major negotiation at a time, as it did during the CTBT negotiations. Given the reality that an FMCT would set the stage for further progress in reducing nuclear arsenals, it has been repeatedly endorsed by CD member states as the priority nuclear disarmament negotiation.

Conclusion

Mr. President, we hope that 2012 will be the year when the Conference on Disarmament emerges from its prolonged impasse and once again contributes to international peace and security by beginning negotiations on an FMCT.

The CD and its predecessor bodies have a long history of delivering landmark agreements, all of which were contentious in their own right and took years to complete. But in each case, the nations and people who assembled in this historic chamber persevered, and helped to create a multilateral arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament structure that supports the security of the international system to this very day.

An FMCT will make a critical contribution to this international security architecture. As Secretary Clinton said last February, this agreement is “too important a matter to be left in a deadlock forever.”

If the CD fails to deliver an FMCT negotiation this year, we will again have shirked our responsibility to move forward towards a world without nuclear weapons…. We recognize that this is a crucial year for the CD as an institution and that the UN General Assembly is monitoring our progress closely. Let’s seize the opportunity to make real progress here and restore the vibrancy of this once vital institution. Business as usual is a recipe for disaster.

We look forward to consulting and working with the CD Member and Observer states as the 2012 session proceeds. Time is short and the stakes are high.

Thank you, Mr. President.