United States - Japan Joint Statement on Defense Posture

Washington, DC

February 8, 2012

Following is the text of a joint statement by the United States and Japan released on February 8, 2012, in Washington, D.C and Tokyo:

Begin Text:

The United States and Japan are strongly committed to strengthening our robust security alliance, which is dedicated to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. We remain committed to mitigating the impact of U.S. forces on Okinawa, as well as to the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters. We believe that the current Futenma Replacement Facility plan is the only viable way forward.

Both sides underscore that the development of Guam as a strategic hub, with an operational Marine Corps presence including Marines relocated from Okinawa, remains an essential part of the Alliance’s Asia-Pacific Strategy.

The United States has conducted a strategic review of its defense posture in Asia in order to achieve a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable force structure in the region. Japan welcomes this initiative.

As part of this joint effort our two governments have started official discussions to adjust our current posture plans set forth in the Realignment Roadmap, in particular delinking both the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility. We are also reviewing the unit composition and the number of Marines who will relocate to Guam and we continue to be committed to achieving an end-state Marine presence remaining on Okinawa in line with the Roadmap.

In the weeks and months ahead, our two governments will be working to address a number of issues associated with these adjustments. This joint effort advances the strategic objectives of the Alliance and reflects our shared vision for the maintenance of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Bilateral Consultative Commission: Agreement Number 1 On Procedures for Conducting Demonstrations of Recording Media and/or Telemetric Information Playback Equipment

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

February 7, 2012

Geneva, Switzerland
February 7, 2012

The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Acting in accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Taking into consideration that the Parties have conducted the initial demonstrations, required by the Treaty, of recording media and telemetric information playback equipment,

Have agreed as follows:

The Parties shall conduct subsequent demonstrations, in accordance with the Treaty, of recording media and/or telemetric information playback equipment using the following procedures:

1. During the demonstration the providing Party shall:

(a) describe its telemetric signal conversion processes (from reception to recording) associated with the recording medium and telemetric information playback equipment to be demonstrated, or provide data on telemetry systems that enable the conversion of telemetric information contained on the recording medium to the form (format) that originates on board the missile before broadcast;

(b) demonstrate each type of recording medium to be provided to the receiving Party in accordance with subparagraph 6(a) of Part Two of the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Annex on Telemetric Information. Each such recording medium that is being demonstrated shall contain a recording of the following examples of telemetric information:

(i) actual telemetric information that was broadcast during the launch of an ICBM or SLBM; or

(ii) information with characteristic features of telemetric information that is broadcast during the launch of an ICBM or SLBM. 

In this connection, the recording contained on the recording medium that is being demonstrated must be suitable for demonstrating the playback of the telemetric information on the appropriate telemetric information playback equipment;

(c) describe each type of recording medium that is being demonstrated, as well as describe the recording methods and formats that are used for each type of recording medium;

(d) demonstrate all the telemetric information playback equipment in a manner that allows the receiving Party to observe a display or indicator that demonstrates that the telemetric information playback equipment is operating properly. Such telemetric information playback equipment shall be demonstrated in operation using all the types of recording media that are being demonstrated in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph;

(e) answer questions of the receiving Party pertaining to its ability to play back telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated recording media;

(f) for the examples of telemetric information recorded on the recording media that are being demonstrated, provide corresponding illustrative examples of summaries of each of the demonstrated recording media that meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Part Three of the Annex on Telemetric Information, and corresponding illustrative examples of interpretive data for the telemetric information that meet the requirements of paragraph 5 of Part Three of the Annex on Telemetric Information.

2. Upon completion of the demonstration, the providing Party shall provide to the receiving Party all the demonstrated recording media with the examples of telemetric information recorded on them, examples of summaries of each of the demonstrated recording media and examples of interpretive data for the telemetric information on the recording media, as well as other information that is additionally provided in order to achieve the objectives of the demonstration.

3. The Demonstration must be sufficient for the receiving Party to be able to get an idea of the full set of telemetric information playback equipment, as well as the technical requirements necessary for playing back the examples of telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated recording media.

4. During the demonstration the procedures for playing back telemetric information shall be demonstrated. The providing Party shall provide a description of those types of modulation, methods, modes, and recording formats, as well as methods for encoding telemetric information contained on recording media that allow the receiving Party to convert the telemetric information contained on the recording medium to the form (format) that originates on board the missile before broadcast.

5. Ambiguities and unresolved questions in connection with the demonstration shall be considered within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

6. The provisions of paragraphs 2-6 of Part Six of the Annex on Telemetric Information, which are applicable to the trainee team members, shall also apply to representatives of the receiving Party participating in demonstrations.

7. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

Done at Geneva on February 7, 2012, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission   John M. Ordway

Commissioner of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission   Vladimir L. Leontyev

Bilateral Consultative Commission: Decision on the Number of Launches of ICBMs and SLBMs Conducted in 2011, on Which an Exchange of Telemetric Information Will Be Carried Out in 2012

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

February 7, 2012

Geneva, Switzerland
February 7, 2012

In accordance with paragraph 2 of Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, the Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission decided that the Parties would exchange, in 2012, telemetric information on one launch of an ICBM or SLBM conducted by each Party during the period from February 5, 2011, to December 31, 2011.

Commissioner of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission   John M. Ordway

Commissioner of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission   Vladimir L. Leontyev

Bilateral Consultative Commission: Agreement Number 2 On the Amount of Telemetric Information on ICBM and SLBM Launches That Each Party Shall Provide

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

February 7, 2012

Geneva, Switzerland
February 7, 2012

The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Acting in accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

1. For each launch of an ICBM or SLBM for which telemetric information is provided in accordance with Article IX of the Treaty, Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty, and the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol to the Treaty, the Party conducting the launch shall provide telemetric information to the other Party beginning from the time of ignition of the first stage motor of the ICBM or SLBM, until:

(a) the end of issuance of the command for separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM; or;

(b) the end of issuance of the command for separation of the first of the other objects installed on the ICBM or SLBM for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space, from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM; or

(c) the expiration of one second after loss of active control of the missile’s control system (when the active stage of the missile does not respond to control signals), if such loss occurred prior to separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism or the first of the other objects installed on the ICBM or SLBM for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space, from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM, or until the moment of loss of the telemetric signal coincident with such loss of active control, whichever occurred earlier.

2. Each Party shall provide, in the interpretive data for the telemetric information, names of data elements and their location in the telemetry frame, as well as descriptions necessary to identify the command for separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism or the first of the other objects installed on the ICBM or SLBM for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space, from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM.

3. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

Done at Geneva on February 7, 2012, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission   John M. Ordway

Commissioner of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission   Vladimir L. Leontyev

New START Treaty Implementation Update

Fact Sheet

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

February 5, 2012

Key Point: On February 5, 2011, the New START Treaty entered into force. From that day and every day that has followed, the Treaty has been contributing to U.S. national security.

Type One and Type Two Inspections The Treaty provides for 18 on-site inspections per year. There are two basic types of inspections. Type One inspections focus on sites with deployed and non-deployed strategic systems. Type Two inspections focus on sites with only non-deployed strategic systems. Each side is allowed to conduct ten Type One inspections and eight Type Two inspections annually.

On the Treaty’s first birthday, February 5, 2012, implementation is well underway and the process so far has been positive and pragmatic. The good working relationship we established during the negotiations in Geneva continues today. We are in constant communication with the Russians, which helps to make the process precise and efficient.

The United States and Russia kept pace with each other on inspections all year and we have both now conducted 18 inspections – the maximum number allowed under the Treaty each year.

The New START Treaty data exchanges are providing a very detailed picture of U.S. and Russian strategic forces, and the inspections enable each side to confirm the validity of that data. Of course, the Treaty’s verification regime is backed up by each side’s own national technical means (i.e., satellites and other monitoring platforms).

The United States and Russian Federation have exchanged over 1,800 New START notifications through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. The sides exchange information on numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of weapons systems and facilities that are subject to the Treaty. These notifications help to track movement and changes in the status of systems. For example, a notification is sent every time a heavy bomber is moved out of its home country for more than 24 hours.

In addition, every six months we exchange a comprehensive database. This gives us a full accounting of exactly where weapons systems are located, whether they are out of their deployment or operational bases and gone to maintenance, or have been retired. This semi-annual exchange, along with the mandatory treaty notifications that provide continuous updates, create a “living document” that gives us a comprehensive look into each other’s strategic nuclear forces.

The Parties have conducted three Treaty-required exhibitions. The Russian Federation exhibited the RS-24 mobile ICBM and its associated launcher in March 2011. That was the first time we had a chance to see the RS-24, the new Russian mobile missile with multiple warheads.

B-1B Demonstration Following the U.S. exhibition demonstrating that B-1B heavy bombers are no longer capable of employing nuclear armaments, these aircraft no longer count toward the central Treaty limits regarding deployed heavy bombers.

During the same time period, the United States exhibited the B-2A heavy bomber and conducted a one-time exhibition to demonstrate that B-1B heavy bombers are no longer capable of employing nuclear armaments.

Both Parties have conducted demonstrations of the equipment to be used during telemetry exchanges. Hammering out these technical details will help expedite the exchange of telemetric information. Under the Treaty, in 2012 the Parties may exchange telemetric information on ICBM and SLBM launches that occurred in 2011.

The Treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) held its first session in April 2011, and has since met two additional times. Under the Treaty, this implementing body must meet at least two times per year.

When the New START Treaty is fully implemented, it will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950s, the first full decade of the nuclear age. Further, the limits on deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, SLBMs, and heavy bombers that can carry nuclear weapons will be well below previous limits. This Treaty represents a significant step forward in building a more stable, cooperative relationship with Russia.

Addressing the Challenge of MANPADS Proliferation

Andrew J. Shapiro
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Stimson Center

Washington, DC

February 2, 2012

As prepared

Thank you. It is my great pleasure to be here at the Stimson Center. Stimson has long been a leader in developing our understanding of international security and I want to thank the center for having me here today to speak on this important topic. I also want to thank Linc – not just for that kind introduction – but also for all the work he did when he ran the Political-Military Affairs Bureau. U.S. efforts to destroy and secure shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles started under Linc’s watch and as Special Envoy he helped focus international attention on this threat. His efforts have well prepared us for the current challenges we are facing today.

Today, I want to talk to you about our efforts to address the threat posed by shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile systems, also known as Man-Portable-Air-Defense-Systems or MANPADS. Currently in Libya we are engaged in the most extensive effort to combat the proliferation of MANPADS in U.S. history. But before I talk about Libya, let me first talk a bit about why we are so focused on this threat.

In the wrong hands, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles pose a major threat to passenger air travel, the commercial aviation industry, and possibly military aircraft around the world. Not only could a successful attack against an aircraft cause a devastating loss of life, but it could also cause significant economic damage. Airline travel is critical to our interconnected global economy. Any successful attack could therefore have very harmful economic effects not only in the region where the attack occurred, but also in countries around the world.

In 2002, just over nine years ago, the world was awakened to the threat posed by MANPADS when terrorists shot two missiles at an Israeli civilian Boeing 757 in Mombasa, Kenya. If the missiles had hit the plane, the attack could have resulted in hundreds of deaths and could have had a chilling effect on international air traffic.

While we can be thankful that no American civilian planes have been shot down by one of these systems, the use of MANPADS in Iraq and Afghanistan by insurgents has posed a threat to American and coalition troops, as well as to reconstruction efforts. Take for example the 2003 attack on a DHL cargo plane taking off from Baghdad International Airport. As it attempted to deliver mail from Iraq to nearby Bahrain, the plane was hit by a MANPADS missile, damaging the left wing and causing the loss of the hydraulic flight control systems. Miraculously, the crew was able to regain control and make an emergency landing. These attacks gained world-wide attention and prompted the U.S. government to make countering the proliferation of MANPADS a top national security priority.

MANPADS were first developed at the beginning of the Cold War by the United States and the Soviet Union. They were designed to be used by conventional armies against enemy aircraft. But today many of the older systems have almost no military utility, since they are ineffective against modern military aircraft equipped with countermeasures. Yet a number of countries still possess large stockpiles of these outdated systems. And since they are no longer militarily useful, countries’ often struggle to devote the necessary resources to properly secure them. In fact, for most countries, possession of these aging systems is often more of a liability than an asset. While these outdated weapons may be of little use to a host country’s military, they are prized systems for smugglers and terrorists. This makes improperly secured stockpiles of MANPADS a prime target for smugglers and for terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda.

Just as nuclear proliferation has been a major concern in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, so too is the proliferation of MANPADS. MANPADS were built to be portable, easy-to-use, and readily transferable, making them an ideal weapon for terrorists seeking to attack airliners. Some MANPADS are as small as four feet long, weighing less than 30 pounds. Yet, this light-weight weapon is capable of firing a missile at twice the speed of sound which can engage a plane flying as high as 15,000 feet and over 3 miles away within 10 seconds. By using infrared sensors, the first generation of MANPADS could lock onto an aircraft’s heat source to guide the missile to impact.

Most MANPADS require three parts to function: a missile packaged in a tube; a gripstock (also known as a launcher); and a battery. Importantly, the missile tube can only be used once. Unlike a rocket propelled grenade, it cannot be reloaded. Likewise, the battery only has enough energy to power the missile system long enough for one launch. While MANPADS are a guided system, they usually require some weapons training to be used effectively. These weapons require more than just ‘pointing and clicking,’ especially with the older models found in Libya that lack sophisticated guidance mechanisms. This is one of several factors that helps explain the limited number of successful attacks globally.

The most proliferated type of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile is also the first-generation of the system. It is an infrared-guided system designed by the former Soviet Union known as the SA-7. This weapon was introduced in the late 1960s, was heavily produced in the 1970s, and is the system most commonly held by terrorist groups. It is also the system that the Qadhafi regime stockpiled by the thousands. While MANPADS can vary greatly in the way they operate, they all pose a serious threat to international aviation.

Over the last decade, international awareness of the threat has grown and some important steps have been taken by the international community. For instance, regulations have been tightened on MANPADS exports. Guidelines have been established for stockpile management. And technological developments have been explored that could limit the use or the effectiveness of these weapons.

For years the United States has also worked to secure stockpiles of conventional weapons in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists. This remains one of the United States government’s top priorities.

In 2006, the U.S. government established an interagency MANPADS Task Force led by the State Department. To counter-proliferation, the MANPADS Task Force helps countries’ secure its stockpiles, maintain reliable inventories of its systems, and safely dispose of MANPADS stocks that are no longer needed for their national defense. Since 2003, our cooperation with more than 30 countries around the globe has led to the destruction of nearly 33,000 excess, loosely secured, or otherwise at-risk MANPADS.

This is also very much a multi-agency effort. The Department of Defense provides its technical expertise in providing physical security and stockpile management assessments to countries. Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security has a program within the Transportation Security Administration that assists countries to better protect their airports from a possible attack. DHS sends teams to countries to conduct vulnerability assessments in order to identify areas around international airports where MANPADS could be launched. DHS also help these countries’ develop a plan to counter this threat.

The State Department, along with our interagency partners, has worked in numerous post-conflict countries, including the Balkans, Burundi, and Liberia, to secure and destroy obsolete and excess weapons, especially MANPADS. For instance, between 2003 and 2004, we worked with Bosnia to destroy its government-held stockpile of almost 6,000 MANPADS. In each of these countries, these governments realized the enormous threat that unneeded weapons posed. Not only can these weapons end up in the hands of terrorists, but poorly maintained weapons depots also pose a threat to people who live near these sites.

Additionally, our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan required us to work in conflict environments. In both countries we worked to set up integrated Conventional Weapons Destruction programs that targeted high value weapons, specifically MANPADS. We also worked to protect the civilians from landmines, IEDs, unexploded ordnance, and excess weapons and unstable munitions. For example, in Iraq, the United States has invested more than $200 million in conventional weapons destruction projects since 2003. After more than three decades of violent conflict, Afghanistan is severely contaminated by landmines, unexploded ordinance, and excess conventional weapons and unstable munitions. Since the 1990s, the State Department has provided more than $200 million in humanitarian mine action and conventional weapons destruction assistance to Afghanistan. Our work in these countries, much of it under Linc’s stewardship, has helped prepare us for the challenge posed by the crisis in Libya.

LIBYA

For decades, the Qadhafi regime stockpiled MANPADS. By the time of the regime’s collapse, Libya had accumulated the largest stockpile of MANPADS of any non-MANPADS producing country in the world. Overall we estimate that the Qadhafi regime acquired a stockpile of approximately 20,000 MANPADS in the past four decades. The collapse of the regime has therefore created a major proliferation challenge for the new Libyan government, the region, and the entire international community.

In response to the crisis, the United States – as Secretary Clinton announced in Tripoli in November – has committed to providing $40 million dollars to assist Libya’s efforts to secure and recover its weapons stockpiles. We have also helped galvanize an international response to this crisis and have worked tirelessly in support of the new Libyan government.

We were concerned about Libya’s stockpiles of MANPADS well before the outbreak of fighting last spring. In fact, during the brief earlier effort to reestablish relations with Libya, MANPADS was a topic that we sought to address with the Qadhafi regime. As the Arab Spring spread and as protests gathered momentum in Libya, our MANPADS Task Force was well aware of the scope of the challenge. With our team’s experience working in other conflict countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, we also knew what to expect and we were ready to respond.

When the fighting escalated and the Qadhafi regime was pushed back from Benghazi, we took immediate steps to try to mitigate the proliferation dangers. In April of last year, we began providing $3 million in funding to NGOs to get them on the ground. These NGOs specialize in conventional weapons destruction and stockpile security and have significant experience. They immediately began working with the Transitional National Council or TNC to clear unexploded ordnance and remnants of war and assisted the TNC in securing loose weapons, including MANPADS.

We also deployed a team from our MANPADS Task Force to brief countries in the region on the potential proliferation dangers. Before Qadhafi was ousted from Tripoli, we had visited all of Libya’s neighbors and offered assistance with border security and provided advice on potential steps to improve aviation security.

Additionally, we worked to galvanize an international response to the crisis. We engaged our NATO allies and other close partners, and worked closely with the United Nations to develop an international response.

Once the stalemate broke and the fighting rapidly shifted in the TNC’s favor in August, we immediately deployed a State Department expert from the MANPADS Task Force to Benghazi. Mark Adams, who you will hear from shortly on the panel, is the head of our MANPADS Task Force and spent considerable time on the ground in Libya and can talk more about his experience. The initial primary objective was to reach an agreement with the TNC to set up a MANPADS control and destruction program that would enable us to set up what we call our Phase I efforts. Phase I entailed an effort to rapidly survey, secure, and disable loose MANPADS across the country. To accomplish this, we immediately deployed our Quick Reaction Force, which are teams made up of civilian technical specialists.

A fact often overlooked in our response to events in Libya, is that – unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan – we did not have tens of thousands of U.S. forces on the ground, nor did we control movement and access. This meant we did not have complete freedom of movement around the country. Our efforts on the ground therefore had to be carefully coordinated and fully supported by the TNC. To keep the Libyans in the lead, our technical specialists were embedded in support of TNC-led teams to pursue loose MANPADS. While this did lend some constraints on our ability to ramp up, it also had the important benefit of ensuring that we had complete TNC support for our efforts. And I can tell you, we didn’t need to explain to the TNC the importance of securing weapons. They fully understood that weapons proliferation was a real threat to a new Libya and they worked rapidly to organize teams to secure and recover weapons.

In September, as the fighting was still going on, these teams swept the country, scouring ammunition storage sites and more than 1,500 bunkers to find MANPADS. Additionally, teams and experts were also provided by the British Government – and a British colleague who oversaw this deployment, is here today as well. Thus far these teams have helped to identify, recover, and secure approximately 5,000 MANPADS and components.

But this raises the question – how many are still missing? The frank answer is we don’t know and probably never will. There are a few reasons for this:

First, we do not have precise information about the Qadhafi regime’s weapons stockpiles. The Qadhafi regime was anything but transparent. And we don’t have exact information about the regime’s weapons inventories. Our teams are working to piece together information we have gained from packing slips in the MANPADS crates that can give us information on the quantities of various shipments. But there is a lot that we don’t know about Qadhafi’s weapons stockpile. For instance, we don’t know how many systems over the last 20-40 years were used in training or military exercises or were damaged or destroyed as a result of improper storage or exposure to the elements. Therefore, getting an exact figure on the number missing is difficult because we don’t know exactly how many the Qadhafi regime still possessed at the time of its collapse.

A second reason is that weapons storage sites were a major target of NATO airstrikes. For months, NATO forces pounded away at the Qadhafi regime’s weapons depots. Time and time again our teams came across weapons storage sites where we knew MANPADS were stored only to find that these sites had been completely obliterated by NATO strikes. Whatever weapons were in these storage facilities were likely destroyed and were buried under mounds of rubble left behind. While this is good news from a counter-proliferation perspective, it makes coming up with an exact count a challenge to say the least. Additionally, the NATO bombing campaign focused intently on taking out Libya’s air defense systems and their corresponding storage sites. We believe that many MANPADS were stored with other anti-aircraft artillery at these facilities and were likely destroyed during the campaign.

Third, many of these weapons were taken by militias and anti-Qadhafi forces during the fighting. The Libyan opposition – including militias and private citizens – removed significant quantities of weapons from weapons depots, including MANPADS during the uprising. As has been well documented by journalists on the ground, Libyan rebels often took whatever weapons were available. Despite the fact that MANPADS are only designed to target aircraft, have little utility against opposing ground forces, and are dangerous for the user when used this way, we know that opposition forces regularly used MANPADS in direct combat against Qadhafi loyalists. This is significant because it means that many of the unaccounted for missiles may have been used in the fighting.

Furthermore, because many militias believe MANPADS have some utility in ground combat, many militia groups remain reluctant to relinquish them. As the process of demobilizing militias continues, we expect to see many of these weapons being turned over to the control of the Libyan national army. While the integration process has been slow and challenging, at the very least, we believe this means that the large stockpiles of weapons under militia control have remained inside Libya – albeit outside the control of the Libyan government. We don’t have precise numbers on how many are under militia control. But given that these were the forces that were often the first to liberate weapons sites from Qadhafi control, we believe that a substantial number are held by these militias.

Yet clearly we cannot rule out that some weapons may have leaked out of Libya. Our efforts in Libya are therefore designed to reduce risk and mitigate the threat as effectively and comprehensively as we can. This is why the United States and the international community have been working with countries in the region to improve border security and improve their aviation security. We are working closely with NATO, the EU, and the UN to coordinate our efforts on the ground and across the region. To date, the United Kingdom has pledged at least £1 million pounds and, as mentioned, has provided a team of technical experts to support and coordinate activities. The Netherlands has contributed €900,000 Euros. Germany has contributed €750,000 Euros. And Canada has pledged $1.6 million Canadian dollars. Other countries, such as France and Italy have also made significant contributions.

PHASE II

The work to secure and recover Libya’s weapons stockpiles is a long-term effort. Now that we have completed our initial rapid sweep across the country, we are entering what we call Phase 2. This involves helping the new Libyan government conduct a full inventory of all weapons stockpiles, as well as assisting them to improve border security to help detect and interdict illicit activity.

In December I travelled to Tripoli to get an update on our progress and to discuss the transition to this new phase in our efforts with the new Libyan government. And from my visit, and from the experience of our teams on the ground, I can tell you the new Libyan government is firmly committed to addressing this issue.

In early December, the Libyan government signed a Conventional Weapons Destruction Technical Arrangement, which provides the basis for expansion into Phase 2 operations. This was the first bilateral agreement the new Libyan Ministry of Defense has signed and is a key indicator of the new Libyan governments’ desire to comprehensively address weapons security. This agreement also created the Libya Center for Mine Action or LMAC, which was named as the Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) lead for these issues. Our contract specialists will help support the LMAC. The LMAC is also functioning as the central point for coordination of international efforts to assist the Libyans in conventional weapons destruction.

Our conventional weapons destruction efforts are also serving to support Libya’s new government. Our Phase 2 efforts will also help aid the Libyan government’s efforts to integrate militias and veterans of the fighting. We plan to assist the Libyans to conduct a thorough inventory of all weapons storage areas in Libya to create a full picture of both old, unstable, obsolete, or at-risk, as well as up-to-date weapons and munitions. This is not just about MANPADS, but about all weapons. And it entails helping the Libyans consolidate weapons into secure facilities and assisting them to destroy items that the Libyans deem in excess of their security requirements. Throughout Phase 2, the State Department will also maintain 2 Mobile MANPADS teams which will operate independent of the survey, inventory, and destruction activities. They will respond to any ad-hoc MANPADS discoveries or issues throughout Libya.

Completing an entire survey of Libya’s weapons stockpiles, will take time and will require a lot of manpower. It entails an effort to find out exactly how many MANPADS were inside of each of the weapons sites that were targeted by NATO. This is a painstaking process that will require heavy equipment and excavation crews. Additionally, before we can even begin to excavate these sites must be swept for unexploded ordnance from the bombing campaign. To complete this task our funding will help support the hiring of many veterans of the conflict, who will be trained in conventional weapons destruction activities. We believe that this is a win-win for the government of Libya and for the United States. We are helping Libya get a handle on its weapons stockpiles, while at the same time aiding their demobilization efforts.

Once this time-consuming process is completed we plan to transition to a third Phase that will seek to ensure Libya’s weapons stockpiles meet modern standards. This involves updating storage facilities, improving security, and assisting the Libyans efforts to implement the most up-to-date stockpile management practices.

This will clearly be a long-term effort and there is a lot of work to do between now and Phase III, but the United States and the international community are committed to assisting the new Libyan government on this path.

To conclude, I believe our efforts in Libya and around the world have demonstrated our strong commitment to addressing the threat posed by shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. While there is no easy solution to the proliferation challenge posed by MANPADS, this Administration and the international community is working vigilantly to take steps to reduce the threat posed by these weapons.

I know in these budget constrained times, State Department assistance programs are under great scrutiny. But our diplomatic and development work saves lives and helps foster stability in every region of the world, which helps strengthen U.S. national security. There is no clearer example of this than our efforts to counter the proliferation of MANPADS. This work, along with our other Conventional Weapons Destruction programs, helps create the conditions for stability to return to war-torn regions. By removing or securing these destabilizing systems, as well as other deadly remnants of war, we are helping children, families, and communities to live in safety and therefore helping war-torn countries recover.

And with that, I would be happy to take a few questions.

Interview With Judy Dempsey From the International Herald Tribune and Special Contributor to the Munich Security Conference

Rose Gottemoeller
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

On-the-Record Interview*

Washington, DC

January 19, 2012

QUESTION: Late last year, the Americans broke off conventional arms control talks with Russia. Why?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: The situation simply could not continue indefinitely. The Russian Federation had “suspended implementation” of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) in December 2007. Last fall, we decided we needed to take action. Together with a group of other Treaty signatories--NATO allies and partners Moldova and Georgia--we agreed to halt implementation of the Treaty with Russia. We continue to implement the CFE Treaty with all the other states-parties. We were sending a message; we considered it to be a rational countermeasure, and did it more in sorrow than in anger. It was a message to Russia that we would like to see them come back into implementation of the Treaty. The United States is committed to revitalizing the conventional arms control regime in Europe and continues to consult on finding a way forward with our Treaty partners.

QUESTION: What could restart negotiations?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Right now, I think we’re in a good place. It is still premature to talk about negotiations, but ceasing the implementation of the CFE Treaty toward Russia actually opens up an environment to explore new opportunities for the future of conventional arms control in Europe. But first we need to do some very basic work on the concepts and substance, together with our allies and partners, including the Russians. Everybody knows that the CFE Treaty simply is not relevant anymore to the current security situation in Europe. It was negotiated at a time when the Warsaw Pact was still standing against us.

QUESTION: It was a Cold War relic?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: What we have now is an opportunity for a regime that would be clearly post Cold War. We need to think ahead about what will be most helpful, contributing to resolving the frozen conflicts and strengthening regional security. I think the Russians have the same interest in stable and predictable security relationships as other countries.

QUESTION: If you look at the entirety of Russia’s security outlook, tactical nuclear weapons are an important card, because its conventional forces are so weak. Where do we stand with regard to tactical nuclear weapons?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: It is true that the Russian military doctrine is quite clear on the strategic importance they give to tactical nuclear weapons. But we need to pull the aperture wider. When President Obama signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010, he said that the United States would like to negotiate further reductions in three categories of nuclear arms: in deployed strategic nuclear weapons, in non-deployed strategic nuclear weapons (for example, held in storage facilities) and in non strategic nuclear weapons, the so-called tactical nuclear weapons, which are the ones that concern Europe. The President made it very clear that we want to tackle all three categories in the next arms reduction negotiations with Russia.

QUESTION: But why should the Russians agree to cuts in tactical weapons?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Again, you have to look at the full picture. The Russians have always said that they are concerned about U.S. up-load capabilities…

QUESTION: …meaning that the U.S. could relatively quickly bring back a substantial number of reserve nuclear weapons from storage…

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: …and that could be a part of the picture for future negotiations. I am not saying that we are making an official proposal at this point. But you have to have an idea what the trade-offs might be.

QUESTION: So far, there really has not been much movement on tactical weapons.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: I would not say that. In fact, there has been movement in two areas: First, the United States has made it clear that we want to begin talking sooner rather than later about the issues affecting further reductions. And we want to begin talking sooner rather than later about transparency measures that we might pursue even before we get back to the negotiating table. And so, we are looking at some ideas in that regard. In the meantime, there is some important homework that we have to do within the NATO Alliance--the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review is taking place right now. We know that NATO is committed to an extended deterrent and will remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist. In May, we are going to have the NATO summit in Chicago. That is an opportunity to reach some conclusions on what NATO policy is going to be with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons.

QUESTION: Does missile defense complicate things?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: We hope not! (laughs) Because we talk until we are blue in the face to make the point that we believe cooperation on missile defenses in Europe would be very much in the interests of the Russian Federation. Our goal is to reach agreement on a political framework to move missile defense cooperation forward and strengthen the overlapping capabilities that we have. We want to address the common threat that ballistic missiles pose for security in Europe, including for Russia. Through this cooperation, Russia would see first-hand that this system is designed and capable to defend only against missiles originating from the Middle East. At the same time, we have been trying to convey to them also that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe are not intended nor will they be capable to undermine the Russian strategic offensive armed forces. The Russians remain to be convinced. But I don’t think it’s a hopeless situation. Not by any stretch of the imagination.

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* The interview was given to and published by the Munich Security Conference.

Opening Statement at the Conference on Disarmament

Rose Gottemoeller
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

Geneva, Switzerland

January 24, 2012

As delivered

Thank you very much Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President. At the outset of my remarks, please allow me to congratulate Ecuador, and you personally, on your assumption of the first Presidency of the 2012 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Ambassador Kennedy and I wish you well as you guide the work of this Conference forward; you may count on the U.S. delegation’s full support.

I would also like to extend our best wishes to the other CD Presidents for the 2012 session -- Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, and Germany. We look forward to working with all of you during this year.

Accomplishments

I spoke at the CD’s opening session last January and I am pleased to be here again to highlight the progress on arms control and disarmament that has been made over the course of the past year.

The New START Treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011. Implementation is going well and continues to contribute positively to the U.S.-Russian relationship. The treaty represents a strong foundation for further bilateral reductions and an important step on the path towards a world without nuclear weapons. Discussions between our two governments on the next steps are underway.

I am also pleased to report that the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) and its Protocols came into force in 2011. The PMDA commits the United States and the Russian Federation each to dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium -- enough material for many thousands of nuclear weapons.

Expanding beyond bilateral issues, the five Nuclear Weapon States have started a regular dialogue on verification issues and confidence-building measures related to nuclear disarmament, as part of our commitment to carry out our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Article VI obligations.

The United States is proud to be at the leading edge of transparency efforts -- publically declaring our nuclear stockpile numbers; participating in voluntary and treaty-based inspections measures; working with other nations on military to military, scientific and lab exchanges, sponsoring site visits and frequently briefing others on our nuclear programs and disarmament efforts.

The United States is committed to securing ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and we have been engaging the United States Senate and the American public on the merits of the Treaty. As we move forward with our process, we call on all governments to declare or reaffirm their commitments not to conduct explosive nuclear tests. We thank and congratulate Ghana, Guinea, Guatemala and Indonesia for ratifying the Treaty in the past year. We ask that all the remaining Annex 2 States join us in moving forward toward ratification.

I am also gratified to report progress on the extension of treaty-based negative security assurances through regional Nuclear Weapons Free zones. The Obama Administration transmitted the relevant Protocols of the African and South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. We were also glad that the Nuclear Weapon States and the states of ASEAN resolved long standing differences related to the South East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone’s Protocol language: Along with the other NPT depositary states, we have lent our strong support to the efforts of the facilitator for the 2012 Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone Conference, Finnish Under Secretary Jaako Laajava.

Regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States is proud of the progress made towards a world free of chemical weapons. We continue to make steady progress in destroying our chemical weapons. By April of this year, we anticipate we will have destroyed 90% of our stockpile. The remaining 10% will be destroyed while assigning highest priority to ensuring the safety of people, protecting the environment, and complying with national standards for safety and emissions, as called for in the Convention.

Last month, the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention met here in Geneva for their Seventh Review Conference. They agreed to a standing set of agenda items that cover national implementation, developments in science and technology and assistance and cooperation, all of which will serve to strengthen the effect of the treaty and help bridge the interrelated work being undertaken in the security, public health, law enforcement and scientific communities. This was done under the able direction of our CD colleague, Ambassador Paul van den IJsell.

Mr. President, before proceeding further on CD matters, please allow me to discuss recent developments regarding the European Union’s proposal for a “Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.”

Over the past four years, United States and European experts have regularly consulted on drafts of the EU “Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.” After an extensive interagency review of the EU’s initiative, the United States has decided to enter into formal consultations with the European Union and spacefaring nations to develop an International Code of Conduct, because the long-term sustainability of the space environment is at risk from space debris and irresponsible activities.

As Secretary Clinton announced on January 17, the United States is prepared to work in active partnership with all governments to develop a Code that can be adopted by the greatest number of spacefaring nations around the globe.

We believe that an international Code can help strengthen the long-term sustainability of space and promote safe and responsible use of space, while at the same time ensuring the inherent right of self-defense is not impaired. As more countries and companies field space capabilities, it is in our mutual interest that they act responsibly. A widely-subscribed International Code can encourage responsible space behavior and single out those who act otherwise, while reducing risks of mishaps, misperceptions, mistrust, and misconduct.

We expect to actively participate in the international discussions on an international Code throughout this year and beyond. As part of this process, the United States looks forward to the multilateral experts’ meetings that the European Union plans to convene in the near future.

We also look forward to the Group of Government Experts on outer space TCBMs that is scheduled to convene this summer. We see this as a key opportunity to develop practical measures to enhance transparency and confidence building and sustain the peaceful exploitation of outer space.

The Impasse at the CD

Mr. President, while the international community has been active and achieved results in many areas during the past year, the Conference on Disarmament appears to be no closer to an “honest day’s work” than it was last January.

Despite herculean efforts by a number of CD Member States, the CD continues to languish, and a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), the next logical and necessary step in the multilateral nuclear disarmament process, remains no closer to negotiation.

We did see some rays of hope last year. Australia and Japan hosted a series of extensive FMCT technical experts’ discussions on the CD’s margins that allowed the international community an opportunity to exchange views and gain perspectives in a sustained and organized way. The Chairs’ summaries of these discussions will make a useful contribution to our collective body of knowledge when eventual FMCT negotiations begin.

The United States initiated consultations among the P5 and others on unblocking FMCT negotiations in the CD and to prepare our own countries for what certainly will be a prolonged and technically challenging negotiation.

Last summer, the Secretary-General of the United Nations asked Member States to continue their dialogue on ways to improve the operation and effectiveness of the UN’s multilateral disarmament machinery, in particular the CD.

In the view of the United States, all of these efforts have been worthwhile, but regrettably, none has achieved the desired result of moving this body forward on FMCT negotiations and work on other important issues.

Mr. President, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton addressed the CD last February, she had stressed that, “Global nuclear security is too important to allow this matter [FMCT] to drift forever."

At the most recent session of the UNGA First Committee, we all witnessed and experienced the growing international frustration with the status quo here in Geneva. Not surprisingly, and with no small amount of justification, many in the international community are losing patience with the current situation in the CD.

Every government represented in this room has national security concerns and obligations associated with an FMCT, including my own. But as responsible governments, we also have a collective obligation to and responsibility for international peace and security, to which an FMCT would significantly contribute.

An FMCT Is As Vital As Ever

The FMCT is not some sort of deliberate diversion from “real” nuclear disarmament. Along with the CTBT, an FMCT is an absolutely essential step for global nuclear disarmament.

Simply stated, we can’t get to the end, if we don’t start at the beginning. A verifiable end to the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is necessary if we are to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. How can we make progress towards a world without nuclear weapons while some states continue to produce the key component for building up their nuclear arsenals?

A universal halt to the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons is essential. Some states have already declared a moratorium on such production, but others have not. Some, such as the United States, have reduced their military stocks of fissile material, whereas others are actively engaged in further production. The path to a world without nuclear weapons will require many steps. The next logical step in halting the increase of nuclear arsenals is an FMCT.

Mr. President, in Action 15 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document’s Action Plan, all States Parties agreed that the CD should begin immediate negotiation of an FMCT. The United States remains firmly committed to an FMCT as a tangible contribution to our “full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI,” as stated in that Action Plan. As the 2015 NPT review process gets under way this year, every NPT State Party has a responsibility to help make an FMCT a reality. In fact, every nation should share in the work that will create the conditions necessary to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free world.

Looking Ahead

Here in Geneva, and New York, and in capitals around the world, there has been a vigorous debate over the state of the UN’s multilateral disarmament machinery in general and the CD impasse, in particular.

I have been speaking about this at various venues and I will reiterate my thoughts here. Some people have spoken about amending the consensus rule at the CD, in order to break the current logjam. The United States does not share the view that the impasse in the CD is the result of its procedural rules. On the contrary, we believe that the consensus rule has served CD members well by providing assurance that individual member states’ national security concerns can be met.

There may be a case for some modifications to how decisions are taken on small procedural items at the CD, but those issues are not at the heart of the impasse. The road will remain blocked until all members of the CD are convinced that commencing negotiations is in their national interest, or at least, not harmful to those interests. The United States is working hard to make the case to those countries with reservations about the FMCT that starting negotiations is not something to fear.

Of course, for any negotiation to be substantive and worthwhile, the key states most directly affected by an FMCT should be involved. When it comes down to what is in the best interest of international security, the negotiating venue for the FMCT is of less importance than the participants. As a matter of pragmatism, however, the CD -- which includes every major nuclear capable state -- remains the best option for achieving a viable, effective FMCT.

Once FMCT negotiations have begun, CD members will face many complex and contentious issues, including the difficult issue of scope. We are well aware that CD members are divided on this issue. Ambassador Shannon’s Report to the CD, from which the Shannon Mandate is derived, highlighted these disagreements. His Report of his consultations made it abundantly clear that members could not agree on this key issue, nor on many others. What members did agree on is embodied in a key line in that Report following a listing of those contentious issues. That crucial line said: “…it has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the ad hoc Committee any of the above noted issues.”

The U.S. position is clear: FMCT obligations, including verification obligations, should cover only new production of fissile material. Step-by-step approaches to arms control and nonproliferation have been very successful over the years. A step-by-step approach would serve us well with an FMCT. One essential step in the process should be a legal ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

We are fully aware that many CD members have a different view and this issue will be the subject of vigorous debate. That is what negotiations are for, and the United States is ready to have that debate. What is not helpful is an effort to “pre-negotiate” the outcome of any negotiations by an explicit reference to existing stocks in a negotiating mandate.

We would not be alone in seeing this as a thinly-veiled effort to prevent negotiations from getting underway.

Regarding the possibility of the CD simultaneously negotiating on the four core issues (FMCT, nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, and prevention of an arms race in outer space); it is not a practical option. It is difficult to see how a body that has not negotiated any of these topics over the last sixteen years could take on the responsibility for negotiating all four at one time. The CD should focus on one major negotiation at a time, as it did during the CTBT negotiations. Given the reality that an FMCT would set the stage for further progress in reducing nuclear arsenals, it has been repeatedly endorsed by CD member states as the priority nuclear disarmament negotiation.

Conclusion

Mr. President, we hope that 2012 will be the year when the Conference on Disarmament emerges from its prolonged impasse and once again contributes to international peace and security by beginning negotiations on an FMCT.

The CD and its predecessor bodies have a long history of delivering landmark agreements, all of which were contentious in their own right and took years to complete. But in each case, the nations and people who assembled in this historic chamber persevered, and helped to create a multilateral arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament structure that supports the security of the international system to this very day.

An FMCT will make a critical contribution to this international security architecture. As Secretary Clinton said last February, this agreement is “too important a matter to be left in a deadlock forever.”

If the CD fails to deliver an FMCT negotiation this year, we will again have shirked our responsibility to move forward towards a world without nuclear weapons…. We recognize that this is a crucial year for the CD as an institution and that the UN General Assembly is monitoring our progress closely. Let’s seize the opportunity to make real progress here and restore the vibrancy of this once vital institution. Business as usual is a recipe for disaster.

We look forward to consulting and working with the CD Member and Observer states as the 2012 session proceeds. Time is short and the stakes are high.

Thank you, Mr. President.