Chapter 1. U.S. Policy Towards Terrorism, Hijacking of Aircraft, and Attacks on Civil Aviation

Israeli Attack on Beirut Airport and Hijacking of TWA Flight 840, January-December 1969

--  1. Telegram 294530 From the Department of State to the Consulate in Montreal, January 1, 1969, 0202Z [ PDF version   ] 

A message from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Loy to IATA Director-General Knut Hammarskjold expressing U.S. concern about recent hijackings. Loy condemned Israel for the attack on Khaldeh Airport in Lebanon and noted that the U.S. had registered disapproval of the Athens hijacking of an El Al aircraft.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Unclassified. Drafted by Loy (E/TT), cleared by Roger P. Davies (NEA) and Styles (E/OA/AVP), and approved by Rusk. 

Counselor Raviv of the Israeli Embassy called on the Department to discuss the upcoming ICAO meeting to consider the Lebanese complaint about Israel's Beirut airport raid and Israel's counter-complaint about the Athens hijacking of an El Al aircraft. The U.S. position was that the UN Security Council should deal with the political aspects of the problem, while the ICAO concentrated on safeguarding international civil aviation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential. Repeated to Montreal, Ottawa, Beirut, London, and Rome. Drafted by Arthur R. Day (IO/UNP) on January 13; cleared by E/OA/AVP, in substance in NEA/IAI and NEA/ARN; and approved by Elizabeth Brown.

The Department informed posts that at the ICAO meeting Lebanon would seek sanctions against Israel for the Beirut airport raid and gave details of Israel's counter-complaint on the Athens El Al hijacking. The Department stressed its position that the ICAO should avoid political debate and concern itself with the technical aspects of aviation security.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Limited Official Use. Repeated to 25 posts and the U.S. representative to ICAO. Drafted by Thomas J. Carolan, Jr. (IO/UNP) on January 19; cleared in NEA/IAI, E/OA/AL, NEA/ARN, L/UNA, IO/UNP, and L/SCA; and approved by Popper (IO).

The Department informed the Embassies that the ICAO Council voted to consider the Lebanese complaint on the Beirut airport raid but to exclude the Israeli counter-complaint on the Athens El Al hijacking. Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. began to draft a resolution on prevention of violence against international civil aviation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Limited Official Use. Repeated to USUN. Drafted by Carolan; cleared in NEA/ARN and in substance in NEA/IAI and E/OA/AL; and approved by Brown.

Embassies Beirut and Tel Aviv were informed that ICAO President Binaghi announced that the ICAO Council had adjourned its extraordinary session to discuss the Beirut airport raid without reaching agreement on a course of action.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Montreal and USUN. Drafted by Carolan on January 31; cleared in NEA, E, and L; and approved by Brown.

Richardson reported that the Department of State had taken action in response to the Zurich El Al attack, and that a discussion had taken place between Israeli Minister Argov and Assistant Secretary of State Sisco. Sisco informed Argov that the U.S. was sending a letter of protest to the UN Security Council and urged France and the UK to do the same. The matter would also be placed on the ICAO Council agenda.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File: 74D 164. Secret.

The Israeli Embassy reported that TWA Flight 840 from Rome to Tel Aviv had been hijacked and was presumed en route to Lebanon. Instructions to Embassy Beirut stressed U.S. insistence that all passengers be treated as a single group.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Confidential; Flash. Repeated Flash to Tel Aviv, Rome, Ankara, Cairo, Amman, Montreal, and USUN. Drafted by Atherton; cleared in NEA/ARN, IO/UNP, and E/AV; and approved by Davies.

The Syrian Government hinted that the release of TWA Flight 840 passengers might be tied to the release of Syrian military pilots held by the Israelis. The Israeli Government told Syria and the United States that this would not happen.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv. Drafted and approved by Davies and cleared by Eliot.

Butler was instructed to deliver an enclosed letter concerning TWA Flight 840 to the ICAO. The text includes details of the hijacking incident.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Unclassified. Drafted by Harry Feehan (E/AO/AVP) and Loy on August 30; cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, Davies, Carolan, and L; and approved by Loy.

Davies and Williams discussed the Flight 840 hijacking situation. Williams reported that the Israeli Consulate in New York was harassing TWA, and that there was an organized effort to dictate TWA's actions in connection with the hijacking. Davies said that the U.S. Government had urged the Israelis to cool the situation down, and that the U.S. would not allow the commercial considerations of one of its flag carriers to be damaged.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bryan H. Baas (NEA/ARN), and approved by Brown.

The Department endorsed the positions taken by Chargi Zurhellen in conversations with the Israelis over TWA Flight 840 and defended the actions taken by TWA.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Davies, and cleared by Lloyd (S/S).

The Department of State reported a frank conversation between Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Davies and Israeli Chargi Argov on the hijacking of TWA Flight 840. Davies observed that he thought Syria might be looking for a way out of the situation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Baas and Davies, cleared by Lloyd, and approved by Davies.

Embassy Beirut expressed reluctance to use PanAm's overflight issue as a way to pressure Syria over TWA Flight 840, and confessed that the Embassy could not think of any levers to secure the release of the remaining Israeli passengers. While deploring the PFLP hijacking, Embassy Beirut opined that Syria had handled the matter correctly.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis.

The Italian Foreign Office noted that the Syrians were again suggesting the swap of the Israeli passengers of TWA Flight 840 for imprisoned Syrian pilots; Embassy Rome commented that there was virtually no chance the Israelis would agree to this scheme.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv.

Rogers briefed the President on the status of TWA Flight 840, detailed the action taken by the airline and the U.S. Government, and noted the arrival in Damascus of two representatives from the International Committee for the Red Cross.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret. Attached but not printed was a transmittal memorandum Sisco sent to Rogers indicating that the memorandum was drafted by Baas and cleared by Johnson and Davies.

TWA Chairman Tillinghast reported to Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation and Telecommunications Loy conversations that had taken place between TWA executives and General Akil in Syria on the status of TWA Flight 840. The Syrians clearly stated their intention to hold the two remaining passengers until the Israeli Government freed their pilots. Akil also said that the PFLP would not benefit from the hijacking.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Loy. The conversation was held in Paris.

Eban requested that the U.S. Government spare no efforts to free the two Israeli passengers of TWA Flight 840 in light of the worsening situation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. No classification marking.

Sisco provided Rogers with a status report on TWA Flight 840, noting action taken by the ICAO and the NATO Advisory Committee. Sisco highlighted the current efforts taken by the ICRC, World Health Organization, and the Governments of Italy and the USSR. He reported that the U.S. would ask the Israelis to consider the proposed Syrian pilot swap.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Seelye and cleared by Davies and Loy. A copy was sent to Johnson.

The Department of State provided a follow-up report on TWA Flight 840 that noted on-going contacts with Italy and the USSR, a request for assistance to UN Secretary-General U Thant, emergency sessions of the ICAO, contact with Director-General of IATA Hammerskjold, and contacts with the ICRC.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret. Drafted by Thomas J. Scotes (NEA/ARN) on September 9 and cleared by Sisco, Seelye, Loy, and in substance with Johnson.

Rogers updated the President on efforts to resolve the TWA Flight 840 hijacking and free the remaining Israeli hostages. Rogers cited U.S. activity to gain adherence to the Tokyo Convention, efforts to resolve the Cuban hijacking situation, and work in the UN Security Council and the ICAO.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Confidential. Drafted by Styles on September 16. Kissinger summarized and sent this memorandum to the President, stating that it "represented a reasonable package at the present time." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 131, Hijackings II)

Acting Secretary of State Richardson informed Embassy Tel Aviv that Israeli Counselor Raviv had been told that third-party efforts to secure the release of the passengers of TWA Flight 840 had been exhausted. In the Department's estimation, Syria would not agree to release the passengers without a face-saving quid-pro-quo. Raviv said the Israelis could not agree to any trade-off.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Beirut, Rome, and USUN. Drafted by Seelye on September 18; cleared by Loy, Theodore A. Wahl (NEA/IAI) and Brant (S/S); and approved by Davies.

The Department of State updated on-going efforts to resolve the TWA Flight 840 hijacking and noted that the Syrians had imprisoned the PFLP hijackers. The memorandum discussed the Syrian position on the Tokyo Convention, as relayed through IATA. Efforts also continued through Italy, the USSR, and the ICAO.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret. Drafted by Seelye. Gleysteen signed for Eliot.

UN Ambassador Yost noted that he had urged the Syrians to take early action to resolve the TWA Flight 840 situation. Syrian Ambassador to the UN Tomeh urged the U.S. to continue "quiet diplomacy" and suggested that Israel release the captured Syrian pilots a few weeks after the release of the Israeli passengers.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Beirut, and Rome.

While sharing Embassy Tel Aviv's concern that the Israelis might be losing patience over TWA Flight 840, the Department of State emphasized that it had little leverage to use with the Syrians. The Department rejected suggestions to be more aggressive with Syria by attempting to prevent its election to the UN Security Council, concluding that the prisoner/hostage swap would be the best way to end the crisis.

National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Seelye and April Glaspie (NEA/ARN) on September 19; cleared by Jones, Wahl, Loy, Davies and Lloyd; and approved by Sisco.

Kissinger summarized Embassy Tel Aviv's assessment of the TWA Flight 840 hijacking in telegram 35088 and attached to the memorandum a retyped copy of the telegram.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 331, Hijackings II. Secret. Nixon wrote "I agree" in the margin next to the last two recommendations and instructed Kissinger to "follow through."

On September 20 Rogers and Eban discussed the Israeli passengers on TWA Flight 840 still held by Syrian hijackers. Eban said that the idea of linking the release of the passengers to the release of captured Syrian pilots was "intolerable." Rogers agreed that the two cases could not be equated. Eban commended Italy's efforts and said there was little more UN Secretary-General U Thant could do.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Atherton on September 23, and approved by Brown on September 27.

Davies recommended that Rogers send an oral message to Syrian President Nur al-Din al-Atasi on the TWA Flight 840 hostage situation. Attached was a telegram containing Rogers' message to al-Atasi urging the Syrian Government to release the two remaining passengers.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret. Drafted by Baas and Davies and cleared by Seelye. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the attached draft telegram was drafted by Baas and Davies on September 24, cleared by Seelye, Wahl, Beaudry, and Loy, and approved by Rogers, and was sent to the Embassy in Rome.

Eliot updated Kissinger on the status of TWA Flight 840. He noted that the Syrians were no longer afraid of Israeli reprisals, explained that the Italian Ambassador was highly critical of Israeli Government maneuvering, and informed Kissinger that the Department of State had sent Rogers' message to Syrian President al-Atasi. See Document 27.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Baas on September 26, and cleared by Seelye and Davies. Gleysteen signed for Eliot.

Consulate staff reported on a U.S. dimarche to Israel on the proposed pilot-hostage exchange in the matter of TWA Flight 840. Rafael said that Israel would reject an out-right swap, but suggested a way in which the United States could be seen to pressure Israel and bring about a conclusion without an advance deal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv.

Richardson updated the President on diplomatic attempts to resolve the TWA Flight 840 incident.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 331, Hijackings II. Confidential. Kissinger sent the memorandum to Nixon on October 15 under a covering note summarizing the memorandum.

Eliot provided a status report on the TWA Flight 840 hostages. According to confirmed reports, the Syrian Government had released the hijackers and requested outside mediation to bring the hostage situation to an end.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Baas and cleared by Seelye, Davies, Sisco, and Joan S. Gravatt (E/OA/AVP).

The Embassy reported that Rafael had told the DCM that Israel would participate in a three-way exchange with Syria and Egypt, conducted through the ICRC, to resolve the TWA Flight 840 hostage incident. He stressed the need for secrecy to avoid public debate in Israel.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

The Embassy reported that the three-way hostage exchange designed to resolve the TWA Flight 840 hostage incident appeared to have fallen through because of difficulties between the ICRC and the Syrian Government. Rafael renewed Israel's threat to take action and asked the U.S. to try to get the ICRC mission moving forward.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

The Department of State instructed the Mission in Geneva to approach the ICRC as soon as possible to restore the swap agreement and bring the TWA Flight 840 incident to an end. Embassy Tel Aviv was asked to inform Rafael that the U.S. Government was approaching the ICRC and the UAR.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Beirut. Drafted by Baas on November 20; cleared by Sisco, Davies, and Seelye; and approved by Johnson.

According to information from the Italian Foreign Ministry, the TWA Flight 840 three-way exchange had resumed. ICRC Representative Renard told the Italian Ambassador that the Israelis had accepted the Syrian request and would release the 2 pilots plus 11 other Syrians detainees if the Israelis were released in advance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

The Department of State informed Rogers that the Syrians had permitted TWA Flight 840 and its two remaining passengers to leave Damascus. Israel had released 13 prisoners to Syria and 50 detainees to the UAR, in exchange for 2 Israeli pilots.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Baas, cleared by Davies, Seelye, and Brown, and approved by Sisco.

Policy Towards Kidnapping of U.S. Officials Abroad, April 1970-April 1971

Department of State officials recommended programs for protecting diplomatic personnel overseas.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 US. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch. Macomber approved the recommendations.

Macomber discussed policy options available to reduce politically motivated kidnapping of U.S. officials abroad.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 US. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch and Frederic L. Chapin (ARA/LA/MGT), cleared in draft in L, INR, and O/SY, and approved in ARA. Macomber did not initial the memorandum, and there is no indication that Johnson approved or disapproved of the recommendations.

Macomber addressed how the Department of State could reduce the political benefits derived by politically motivated kidnappers who attack U.S. officials.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 US. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch, Chapin, Mark B. Feldman, and William C. Lieblich (L/ARA) and cleared in draft or substance in L, EUR, IO, and H. Macomber did not initial the memorandum, and there is no evidence that Johnson approved or disapproved of the recommendations.

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Macomber and Secretary of State Rogers discussed the problem of kidnapping. The Secretary decided that for the present the Department of State should follow an ad hoc policy on kidnappings and should collaborate with other international organizations to devise additional methods to improve security capabilities.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 US. Confidential. The memorandum, drafted by J. Stewart Cottman, Special Assistant to Macomber, is incomplete. No complete version was found.

The Department of State updated, at Kissinger's request, its action on a terrorism and kidnapping agenda item at the Organization of American States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, OAS 3. Confidential. Drafted by Richard A. Poole (ARA/USOAS/EO), cleared by Pedersen, OAS Ambassador Jova, Meyer, and Feldman. Melvyn Lwitsky signed for Eliot.

Adopted resolution of the OAS with regard to Acts of Terrorism and the Kidnapping of Persons and Extortion in Connection with that Crime.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. No classification marking.

The position paper was written for the special Organization of American States meeting on kidnapping and other criminal acts against diplomats and officials abroad.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Attached but not published were Tabs A and B.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. No classification marking. Drafted by William V. Whittington (L/T) on April 6, and cleared by Crimmins (ARA) and Jova.

U.S. Response to Hijackings by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Additional Anti-Hijacking Measures, September 1970-June 1972

The Embassy reported that TWA Flight 741, Swissair Flight 100, and PanAm Clipper 93 had been hijacked, and that Pan Am Clipper 03 was presumed hijacked. An El Al flight had landed in London with three dead passengers and another three taken hostage by hijackers.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Immediate; Limited Official Use. Repeated to Athens, Beirut, Belgrade, Zagreb, Bern, Tel Aviv, London, the consulates at Frankfurt and Zurich, USINT Cairo, USINT Damascus, USINT Baghdad, and CINCUSAFE.

Haig provided the President with a status report on diplomatic efforts to deal with the demands of the hijackers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

Rogers told Nixon that he had made a humanitarian appeal to the Arab chiefs of mission for the safety of the hijacking hostages held in Jordan by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, President's Evening Reading: Lot 74 D 164. Secret.

The Department of State communicated to the Embassy that it would be desirable for the Jordanian forces to warn the PFLP that if it blew up the aircraft and killed the passengers, Jordanian forces would assure that no PFLP members would survive.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson, and cleared by Sisco and Eliot.

Kissinger provided the President with a situation report on the hijackings and noted that he had met with Secretary of State Rogers, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs Sisco, Secretary of Defense Laird, and Director of Central Intelligence Helms that morning to discuss possible actions related to the hijackings.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Top Secret; Sensitive.

The Department instructed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Transportation and Telecommunications Rein to discuss at the Regional Civil Air Attachi meeting the question of international sanctions against nations assisting hijackers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Franklin K. Willis (L/E) and approved by David B. Ortman (E/OA/AVP).

Kissinger provided the President with a midday situation report on the hijacked airliners and events in Amman.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information. The record of the WSAG meeting of September 9 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XXIV, Arabian Peninsula; Middle East Region, 1969-1972; Jordan 1970.

The Chargé in Amman recommended against asking Jordanian King Hussein to issue a warning to the PFLP at this time.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Secret; Flash; Nodis.

Kissinger provided the President with a status report on the hijacked airliners, attendant diplomatic negotiations, and possible contingency actions.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information.

Kissinger provided the President with an evening status report on the hijacking situation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information. Haig signed for Kissinger.

A proposal for the President's approval for a program to deter future hijacking of U.S. aircraft approved by the FAA, the airline industry, the appropriate departments and agencies including State and domestic and international airline organizations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for action. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. There is no indication that the President saw it, but on September 14, Laird wrote to Kissinger "pursuant to the decision of the President that we should provide military personnel on U.S. Flag air carriers, we propose to detail the necessary military personnel to the Department of Transportation." Tab B was attached and is printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 742-743.

Kissinger reported that the hijackers' deadline had been extended by 72 hours and the situation in Amman was becoming very tense.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

The telegram transmitted the text of a UN Security Council resolution that expressed grave concern about the hijackings.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Unclassified. Repeated to Algiers, Beirut, Bern, Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Tel Aviv, USINT Cairo, the U.S. mission to Geneva, and the consulate in Jerusalem.

Kissinger provided the President with a midday report on the hijacking/hostage situation, noting that the PFLP was provisionally prepared to release women, children, and the sick in return for fedayeen in British, German, and Swiss custody.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information.

Kissinger provided the President with a midday report on the hijacking situation suggesting that the negotiations reached a critical stage, and "fantastic tension" existed within the PFLP.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum is an unsigned copy.

Chargi O Dell saw no point in approaching Jordanian authorities or Arab League officials for assistance because governments could only minimally influence the hijackers. He recommended against any military action.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Rogers.

The memorandum provided a summary of international U.S. anti-hijacking efforts.

Source: National Archives, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Stevenson and Malmborg.

Kissinger provided the President with an update on the hijackers' demands. He noted that the three hijacked aircraft had been blown up after the removal of all passengers. The hijackers announced that all but 40 hostages had been released and were free to leave Jordan. Kissinger also mentioned that the ICRC was withdrawing from its role as negotiator.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information.

The Department encouraged stocktaking of the hijacking situation and provided advice to all recipient posts to continue the "cool, prudent approach" in maintaining the unity of the group negotiating with the PFLP.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Sisco and Beaudry, and approved by Sisco.

Kissinger reported to the President that 350 passengers had been removed from Jordan, but that more than 50 hostages, mostly Americans, remained in PFLP hands.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information.

Saunders reported that the NSC was expecting new information on the hijacking situation since an ICRC representative would soon be meeting with the Bern Group.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Secret.

Kissinger reported on the results of the Bern Group meeting with the ICRC.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information.

The Department agreed with the view that the Jordanian Government should assume a greater role in the hostage crisis.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Scotes, cleared by Seelye, Davis, and Beaudry, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Bonn, London, Tel Aviv, and USUN New York.

Stevenson briefed Rogers on three anti-hijacking initiatives to be discussed at the ICAO meeting in Montreal on September 18.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 4. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Rhinelander. Copies were sent to Sisco and Meadows. Tabs A-C were attached but not published.

The telegram consists of excerpts from Secretary of Transportation Volpe's statement that was to be delivered before the ICAO council.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Priority; Limited Official Use. Drafted by Gravatt and approved by Meadows (E/OA).

The Department outlined a major presentation on anti-hijacking measures scheduled to be presented at the CCMS meeting in October.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Confidential. Repeated to all NATO capitals. Drafted by H. C. Blaney; cleared by Moynihan and Stevenson and DOT/FAA, OST, SCI, EUR, E/AV, and Behr in substance; and approved by Springsteen (EUR).

The telegram contained excerpts from Secretary Rogers' discussion with Israeli Prime Minister Meir on the hijacking and hostage problem in Amman.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by H. H. Stackhouse (NEA/IAI) on September 18, cleared by Atherton and Seeley, and approved by Sisco.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings II. Confidential. Sent for information. Tab A was attached but not published.

The Department transmitted information on the special ICAO Council meeting held to consider U.S. proposals on hijacking.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Limited Official Use. Repeated to the Consulate in Montreal for US ICAO. Drafted by Meadows and Gravatt, cleared in IO and L, and approved by Meadows.

Stevenson prepared the briefing memorandum and the attached talking points in advance of Irwin's meeting with the French and German Ambassadors to discuss the hijacking proposals made in the ICAO Council.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. No classification marking. Drafted by Meadows and cleared by Rhinelander and Hillenbrand. Attached but not published at Tab B was a proposed note.

At the request of the PFLP, the United Arab Republic provided a list of names of the detained fedayeen to be released in exchange for the remaining hostages.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Secret; Flash. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Bern, Bonn, London, and Geneva.

Rhinelander and Rein communicated to Flanigan the measures proposed by the Department of State to maintain international momentum after adoption of the ICAO resolution.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. No classification marking. Drafted by Joseph A. Silberstein (E/AO/AVP) and Rein and cleared by Rhinelander. Tabs A-C were attached but not published.

Kissinger provided the ideas his staff had generated for leveling possible sanctions on countries that were uncooperative in combating hijacking.

Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials. NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings II.  Secret.

Kissinger asked the committee to prepare a list of countries that were expected to be uncooperative during hijackings, as well as a list of possible sanctions that could be used against them.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings II. No classification marking.

Posts were asked to invite host governments to attend the Washington Conference on International Air Transportation Security scheduled for January 1971.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Brasilia, Melbourne, Montreal for U.S. ICAO representative, Karachi, and NATO. Drafted by Gravatt (E/OA/AVP) and R. P. Boyle (FAA), cleared in ARA, EA, EUR, NEA, OIC, AFI, and by Silberstein.

In response to Kissinger's request, the committee transmitted a list of possible actions against countries that were uncooperative on hijacking.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Secret.

The telegram communicated the final text of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft agreed upon at the Hague.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Unclassified; Immediate. Repeated to USUN and the Consulate at Montreal with a request that the Department pass to FAA, DOT, CAB, and Justice.

The Departments of State and Transportation agreed upon closer coordination of action in response to hijackings of international commercial aircraft.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the letter.

Macomber outlined an international action program to deal with failure to punish hijackers or return aircraft, crews, passengers, or property; upgrading the safety of international aviation; and specifically bringing pressure on Algeria to resolve the Western Airlines hijacking. Two Americans had hijacked a Western Airlines aircraft to Algeria with $500,000 in ransom money.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 331, Hijackings II. Secret. Johnson's telegram to the Algerian chargi is attached but not published.

Levine updated Kissinger on recent activities generated by new acts of air piracy.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings II. Secret. Sent for information.

Rogers reported that the Department of State had introduced a resolution in the ICAO calling for a resumption of work on an international convention to provide sanctions against governments that aided hijackers.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, President's Evening Reading: Lot 74 D 164.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Drafted by Gravatt on June 21, cleared by Joseph N. Greene, Jr. (IO/UNP), and approved by Silberstein.

The Olympic Attack and the Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, September-December 1972

Hoskinson reported on the Israeli hostage situation in Munich and commented that the Department of State was at a loss over how to apply pressure on the terrorists.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 368, 1976 Olympics. Secret. Sent for information.

Excerpts of telephone conversations between President Nixon, the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig, Secretary of State Rogers, and Attorney General Kleindiest on September 5 discussing how to respond to the death of athletes of the Israeli Olympic team.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Telcons, 1972. No classification marking. The transcripts were prepared in the White House.

Kissinger was informed that the Israeli Olympic athletes were killed during a rescue mission attempted by West German security forces. Hoskinson suggested that there was very little that could be done to prevent terrorism.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 368, 1976 Olympics. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger wrote: "Thanks, Sam" on the first page. Attached but not published was a memorandum for the President to use at a meeting with Rogers and Kissinger.

Prior to meeting with Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig at 8:30 a.m., the President and Kissinger discussed how to respond to the Munich Olympic massacre.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 771-2. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume. At 8:32 a.m., Rogers and Haig joined the President and Kissinger; see Document 94.

The President, his Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, Secretary of State Rogers, and Haig discussed how to respond to the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes in Munich.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972. Secret. Drafted by Haig on September 11. Haig stated that the meeting began at 10 a.m., but according to the President's Daily Diary it began at 8:30 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

Discussion of how to respond to the Munich Olympic terrorist incidents.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 771-5. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Hoskinson and Rondon recommended that action against international terrorism should not be pursued in the United Nations at this time.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 368, 1976 Olympics. Secret. Sent for action. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "OBE." There is no indication that Kissinger agreed or disagreed with any of the recommendations.

Rogers informed the President of the anti-terrorism initiatives he planned to take after the Munich Olympics massacre.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, President's Evening Reading: Lot 74 D 164. No classification marking.

Rogers and Israeli Ambassador Rabin discussed how to respond to the Munich incident.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 609, Country Files, Middle East, Israel, Sept 1971-Sept. 1972. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Stackhouse (NEA/IAI) on September 7 and approved by Atherton, Bremer, and Eliot. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Kuwait, Jidda, Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Tripoli, and USUN.

In a personal message to ambassadors, Rogers said that Nixon had charged him with the responsibility to mobilize the international community to take action to combat terrorism and directed them to approach host governments in an attempt to persuade the Arabs to disassociate themselves from terrorists.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by G. Norman Anderson of (NEA/EGY). Copies were sent to 55 embassies. Cleared by Sisco, Fessenden, Ross, Phillip H. Stoddard (INR/DDR/RNA), Herz, Hummel, Davies, and Atherton; and approved by Rogers.

Ambassador Bush was directed to transmit a letter to Secretary-General Waldheim from Secretary Rogers expressing continued U.S. interest in the problem of terrorism.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John Norton Moore (L) and cleared by Sisco and De Palma.

The Department discussed its strategy on handling terrorism issues at the UN General Assembly.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential; Routine. Repeated to 21 additional posts. Drafted by Armitage, and cleared by De Palma, Stevenson, Atherton, and Sisco.

Rogers provided the President with an initial report on current measures to combat terrorism and proposals for the future.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by Atherton on September 14 and cleared by Donelan, Sisco, Armitage, Boyd, Wright, Fessenden, and Ross.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by Donelan on September 20.

De Palma and Sisco briefed Rogers on the Department's scenario for handling the terrorism item at the UN General Assembly.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by Armitage and cleared by Fessenden, L, Ross, EA, Atherton, and ARA. Tabs A and B are attached but not published.

Stevenson described the new draft convention for prevention of terrorism to be circulated by the United States at the United Nations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. No classification marking. Drafted by Moore. The draft convention was attached but not published.

The Department of State instructed key posts to explain to host governments that a vote against inscription of the terrorism item on the UNGA agenda would be a vote against the Secretary-General and would weaken the United Nations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Herz and Armitage and approved by Atherton, Moore, and Daniel Goott (EUR). Sent to Kuala Lumpur, New Delhi, Valletta, Singapore, Vientiane, and USUN; repeated to Amman, Islamabad, and Kathmandu.

Ambassador Bush reported that inscription of Secretary-General Waldheim's terrorism item would likely fail.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential; Priority.

Extracts from Secretary of State Rogers' remarks before the UN General Assembly setting out steps to counter international terrorism.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12. Unclassified; Priority. Drafted by C. J. Grip (IO/TRC), and cleared in substance in IO/P and E/AVP.

The President directed the establishment of a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism to be chaired by Secretary of State Rogers.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. No classification marking. See Document 110 for text of Nixon's message to Rogers.

The President described the membership of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism and set the scope of its activities.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. No classification marking.

Kissinger answered the President's query about attacks on U.S. businesses overseas in a 3-page memorandum that summarized a longer CIA memorandum on the topic.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 310, Cabinet Committee on Terrorism. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicated that the President saw it. Tab B was attached but not published.

The Department reported on a setback to U.S.-supported terrorism items at the UN General Assembly.

Source: National Archives. RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by Armitage and cleared by De Palma, Bettauer, and Meyer. M.J. Habil signed for Eliot.

NSC staffers updated Kissinger on the status of the Terrorism Convention and the Convention on the Protection of Diplomats at the United Nations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 310, Cabinet Committee on Terrorism. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Saunders and Young. Tab A is published as Document 112.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 310, Cabinet Committee on Terrorism. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the first page of the memorandum reads: "OBE."

Rogers recounted for the President both domestic and international counterterrorism actions undertaken by the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Armin Meyer with concurrence from Sisco.

Rogers asked Kleindienst how the U.S. Government could prevent terrorist violence by Yugoslav imigri groups operating in the United States and asked Kleindienst to investigate these types of activities.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. No classification marking. Drafted by Director of Eastern European Affairs Richard G. Johnson and John R. Crook (L/EUR) on October 27 with concurrence by Russell, Brower, Baker, Armin Meyer, and Stoessel. An August 21, 1972, memorandum from the Yugoslavian Government was attached but not published.

The memorandum summarized the CIA's assessment of the terrorist threat to U.S. business enterprises overseas.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 310, Cabinet Committee on Terrorism. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum reads: "OBE."

Rogers reported that the UN's Legal Committee had voted to support a "disappointingly weak" resolution on terrorism.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, President's Evening Reading: Lot 74 D 164.

Ambassador Bush explained how Arab pressure on Africans and Third World discontent with Western nations led to a weak and ineffectual UN resolution on terrorism.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential.

The Department agreed with reluctance that the U.S. delegation should participate on the terrorism committee required by the UNGA terrorism resolution.

Source:  National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8.  Confidential; Routine.  Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, and NATO.  Drafted by Armitage and cleared by De Palma.