Covert financial assistance was a key element of U.S. foreign policy toward Bolivia during the Johnson Presidency. CIA documents have characterized the overall goals of the U.S. Government’s covert action programs in Bolivia during this period as follows:

"The basic covert action goals in Bolivia are to foster democratic solutions to critical and social, economic, and political problems; to check Communist and Cuban subversion; to encourage a stable government favorably inclined toward the United States; and to encourage Bolivian participation in the Alliance for Progress. The main direction and emphasis of C[overt] A[ction] operations is to force Communists, leftists, and pro-Castroites out of influential positions in government, and to try to break Communist and ultra-leftist control over certain trade union, student groups, and campesino organizations."

Covert action expenditures in Bolivia between fiscal year 1963 and fiscal year 1965 were as follows: FY 63-$337,063; FY 64-$545,342; and FY 65-$287,978. The figure for FY 65 included funds to influence the campesino movement, for propaganda, to support labor organizations, and to support youth and student groups. The FY 66 program also allocated funds to support moderate political groups and individuals backing General Barrientos for President.

When he took office in November 1963 President Johnson inherited a longstanding U.S. Government policy of providing financial support for Bolivian political leaders. The policy was intended to promote stability in Bolivia by strengthening moderate forces, especially within the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) itself, which had a strong left wing under the leadership of Juan Lechin Oquendo, General Secretary of the Mine Workers’ Federation.

In August 1963 the 5412 Special Group approved a covert subsidy to assist the MNR to prepare for the presidential elections scheduled for May 1964. The Special Group agreed in March 1964 that the MNR receive additional financial support. Paz won the election; Lechin (who had been Vice President under Paz) left the government and founded a rival leftist party.

On November 4, 1964, the new Vice President, General René Barrientos Ortuño (MNR), led a successful military coup d’état, forcing Paz into exile. In February 1965 the 303 Committee authorized a financial subsidy to the MNR under Barrientos (who was aware of U.S. financial support to the MNR) to help establish an organizational base for the presidential election scheduled for September. In May 1965 Barrientos responded to growing labor unrest by arresting and deporting Lechin and postponing the election. The 303 Committee, which considered a recommendation to support Barrientos as the best available candidate, agreed in July 1965 and March 1966 to authorize additional funds for MNR propaganda and political action in support of the ruling Junta’s plans to pacify the country and hold elections to establish a civilian, constitutional government.

When the presidential election was finally held in July 1966, Barrientos won easily, and officials concerned with the covert operation concluded that the objectives of the program-the end of military rule and a civilian, constitutional government whose policies would be compatible with those of the United States-had been accomplished.

Washington, March 10, 1964.

/1/ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group Meetings, S.G.114, March 12, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT
Increase of Subsidy Provided to the Bolivian Government to support its Covert Action Projects designed to break the power of the National Revolutionary Movement of the left (MNRI) and the Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB)

REFERENCE
Special Group action taken on 8 August 1963

/2/ As of January 3 Thomas Mann was Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

/3/ A discussion of this plan is contained in a January 9 memorandum prepared by J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division in CIA (DDP). (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-01690R, Directorate of Operations, Latin America Division, WH/1/Bolivia, [file name not declassified])

2. Accomplishments: The first [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] provided [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the following major accomplishments:

a. Eliminate Communist control over the National Campesino Federation.

b. Meet the necessary expenses in connection with the establishment of the new anti-left Confederation of Bolivian Workers (COB).

c. Provide support to democratic elements in an effort to unseat extremist leaders in the teachers, chauffeurs, and printers unions.

d. Break the power of the Communists over the Railroad Confederation and subsequent congresses of the flour, construction, and factory workers unions.

/4/ The recommendation was endorsed by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas C. Mann, on March 10. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group Meetings) According to minutes of the March 12 meeting, the Special Group approved the recommendation. (Ibid., Bolivia, 1962-1980)

Washington, May 28, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. I, Memoranda, December 1963-July 1964. Secret. According to a State Department copy, this memorandum was drafted by Nicholas V. McCausland (ARA), cleared by Henry E. Mattox (INR) and Allen D. Gordon (AID), and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Inter-American Affairs Robert W. Adams. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 BOL)

SUBJECT
The May 31 Elections in Bolivia

/2/ In particular, the United States pressed for better financial management of the Bolivian tin mines. The issue was discussed in a meeting between President Kennedy and President Paz on October 23, 1963; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, American Republics and Cuba, Microfiche Supplement.

In April, former President Siles (1956-1960) returned from his ambassadorial post in Spain to reenter politics as a champion of party unity (presumably under his leadership). He advocates the return of Lechin and other splinter elements to the MNR. Paz has resisted this, and so far opposition groups have been unable to unite against him.

/3/ Information on Barrientos’ role in the alleged coup plot is in telegrams 575 to La Paz, May 4; 1515 from La Paz, May 16; and 1547 from La Paz, May 25. (All ibid.) On May 15 Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Fox, Jr., the Air Attaché in La Paz, met with Barrientos at the Bolivian’s request to discuss relations with Paz. Fox told Barrientos to "use his head for something other than a hat rack. He [Barrientos] agreed and stated that he would get with the program and even though he would lose many Paz-haters, he would positively support Paz." (Department of the Army cable IN 293440, May 18; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 90-1156R, Directorate for Operations, Latin America Division, [file name not declassified])

Implications for the United States

/4/ The Embassy in La Paz reported Paz’s victory in the Presidential election in telegram 1580, June 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 BOL)

Paz seems committed to Bolivia’s economic and social development under the Alliance for Progress. Now outside the government party, Lechin is in a less advantageous position to obstruct Government efforts to rehabilitate the state-owned tin mines and in other ways to strengthen Bolivia’s economy. Nevertheless, Paz’ government inevitably will have further clashes with the Lechin and Communist-led miners if it is determined to carry out its rehabilitation program. If Paz is resolute, however, our aid policy should begin to show dramatic results in the near future and forces of political instability may be weakened.

/5/ Printed from a copy that indicates Grant G. Hilliker signed for Read above Read’s typed signature.

Washington, October 28, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. II, Memoranda, July-November, 1964. Secret.

SUBJECT
Bolivia

I talked briefly to Bill Dentzer, the Office Director for Bolivian/ Chilean Affairs, about the current goings-on in Bolivia. Here are some points of interest.

/2/ The Embassy reported on the student demonstrations and their political implications in telegram 426 from La Paz, October 24, suggesting that the demonstrations were in part a response to the shooting of a student in Cochabamba, and in part by the climate of political agitation and discord between Paz and the military. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL-8 BOL)

/3/ A separate assessment of the political unrest in Bolivia, which focused on the prospects for a military coup, is in an October 29 memorandum from Lieutenant General Alva R. Fitch, Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to Secretary of Defense McNamara. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 68A 306, Bolivia 000.1, 1964)

(a) Paz could stay on. This looks like the most likely alternative; Paz seems to be keeping the support of the military.

Bill went on to say that, while Paz is not particularly popular with the people, they probably like him "best." The people see no clear alternative and, under Paz, they at least get less instability.

(b) The military could capitalize on the present disturbances and take over the government. The leader of a military government could be Barrientos, but it could also be someone else; in this regard, it should be noted that Barrientos is not all that popular with the military.

Bill does not regard a military takeover as highly likely; however, it is in the ball park.

(c) Paz could get killed and there could be a state of anarchy for a while, followed by some sort of coalition. Bill feels this is not a likely alternative.

(d) Bill said that the possibility of a Communist takeover is nil. The Communists do not have enough popular following or acceptability. In addition, the military is violently opposed to them.

Bill went on to say that the main threat that the Communists pose is that, in a state of instability or transition, other parties will be looking around for support. In such a situation, the Communists, while not being able to take over the country, will be in a position to exert significant influence.

3. The upshot seems to me to be that there is little likelihood of something happening in Bolivia which we cannot live with. Given our "druthers," however, we would probably just as soon see the disturbances end with Paz still in the saddle.

GC

Washington, November 4, 1964, 9:22 p.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 BOL. Secret; Priority. Drafted by William L.S. Williams and Roger Brewin (ARA/BC) and approved by Adams. Also sent to Paris for TOPOL.

/2/ A November 4 situation report from Mann to the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) indicated that the coup began when pro-Barrientos commanders of the Ingavi Regiment in La Paz rebelled early on November 3. By late evening military garrisons in all major cities except La Paz had joined the Barrientos cause. When the army high command in the capital told Paz that the army would no longer support him in office, the President fled. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 70 D 443, Political Affairs and Relations, 1964, Pol 23, Internal Defense Plan)

/4/ Two separate reports prepared on November 5, one by the Central Intelligence Agency ([text not declassified]), and one by the Defense Intelligence Agency, provide details on the political situation and prospects in Bolivia resulting from establishment of the military junta. Both reports projected that the newly established junta would maintain the pro-U.S. position of the Paz government. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. II, Memoranda, July-November 1964)

In discussing the Bolivian situation with officials of other American governments you may in your discretion say that the U.S. government supported the constitutional government of Bolivia until it fell and that just prior to his departure President Paz through his foreign minister conveyed to our ambassador his thanks for the support and assistance we had given him during recent crisis.

For Lima, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Rio de Janeiro, Caracas: Embassies should make special effort brief appropriate officials because situation might arise in which we would wish consult on urgent basis on situation and attitude toward successor government.

Rusk

Washington, December 3, 1964.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. III, Memoranda. December 1964-September 1965. No classification marking. The Department of State copy indicates it was drafted by Brewin (ARA) on December 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 16 BOL) The following handwritten note is at the bottom of this memorandum: "Mr. President: Rusk, Mann, and I concur-the plan is to deal with this in State Department-from press point of view. McG.B." Sayre recommended the President concur in a December 3 covering memorandum to Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. III, Memoranda, December 1964-September 1965)

SUBJECT
Recognition of New Bolivian Government

/2/ The President approved the recommendation.

President Paz of Bolivia fled the country on November 4 and a military junta headed by former Vice President Rene Barrientos was installed on November 5. The new regime is in control of the country, has encountered no resistance, has reestablished constitutional liberties, and has reiterated its intentions to hold elections. Barrientos and his principal advisers have privately pledged that communist influence will be reduced and eventually eliminated, and that they will not reestablish relations with Cuba or Czechoslovakia. While the new government may not be able to fulfill completely all of its assurances, unless we resume normal relations with the Barrientos government, the possibilities for communist influence and chaos increase. Congressional leaders have been consulted and concur that recognition is desirable and U.S. performance on existing aid commitments should be resumed. The AFL-CIO has been reassured on labor rights by recent actions of the new government. The Barrientos government has been recognized by seven countries in Latin America, by most of the NATO powers, and by others including India, Japan, Israel, and the Republic of China.

W. Averell Harriman

Washington, January 29, 1965.

/1/ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Special Files, January-June 1965. Secret; Eyes Only.

SUBJECT
Provide Support to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and the Popular Christian Movement in Bolivia

/2/ Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Llewellyn E. Thompson concurred on February 3, but according to a February 5 handwritten note by Murat W. Williams (INR): "In approving this paper Ambassador Thompson remarked that he thought the whole question of this type of support in elections should be reviewed on a general basis. A distinction must be drawn between action to check communism and other activities in internal political affairs." (Memorandum from Mann to Thompson; ibid.) At a January 6 meeting of CIA and ARA officials Mann had suggested that, in response to a request for financial aid, "Barrientos should be told we do not like to intervene in an election of this nature, however if it were a ‘matter of Bolivian independence,’ we might do something." Mann thought it was time for Bolivia "to stand on its own feet." (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, January 8; ibid., ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964-1965) A message was sent to La Paz apparently turning down Barrientos’ request for financial aid, but with a proviso that the question could be reopened if events made it necessary. (Draft message to La Paz with handwritten note by Carter, January 14; ibid., Bolivia, 1962-1980)

a. To strengthen the organizational base of General Barrientos within all sectors of the population through aid to his newly organized political vehicle-the Popular Christian Movement. This movement will be used to make inroads into the crucial areas where the communists and leftist followers of Juan Lechin are strongest, thus undercutting their natural support.

b. To indicate to General Barrientos that the U.S. government is in support of him personally and of his efforts to create the conditions for stability and unity which are essential for the return to constitutional government.

(1) Because of the constitutional provision that anyone holding public office must resign from that office 180 days prior to an election, General Barrientos must step down from the Junta in order to run for the office of the presidency. General elections have been called for September 1965. When Barrientos does step down he will no longer have access to the facilities of the government such as air transport, vehicles, and even government funds. Thus he is seeking an alternate source of funding for his campaign. He [1 line of source text not declassified] provided a detailed budget of his requirements to establish his organizational base. He also provided a statement of his principles and program together with a listing of the individuals who would constitute his top command.

(2) [8-1⁄2 lines of source text not declassified]

(3) Barrientos is a long standing friend of the United States.

He received a good portion of his military training in the United States. He was Air Attaché to Washington, attended American University, and is a close friend of many high officials in the United States Government.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the proposal.]

This proposed activity has been fully coordinated with and approved by the U.S. Ambassador, Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann, and has been discussed in detail with appropriate officials of the Department of State.

/3/ The 303 Committee approved the recommendation by a vote by telephone on February 5. (Memorandum from Williams to Mann, February 16; ibid.) According to a February 10 memorandum [text not declassified] to ARA, Barrientos was informed on that date of the decision and of the U.S. Government view "that relations between sovereigns should be based upon dignity and mutual respect rather than financial considerations; but in order to dispel any doubts" in Barrientos’ mind "of our attitude toward him, his request was approved as a one-shot affair." (Ibid.) Privately the [text not declassified] assessment of the operation was more positive, pointing out that "the risk of exposing U.S. participation in the MPC program is probably worth taking, especially if the operation helps to unify the country, reduces political turmoil, and helps Bolivia along the road to economic and social progress. The exposure of U.S. participation would, undoubtedly, be embarrassing, but it probably would not lead to serious repercussions." (Memorandum from FitzGerald to Helms, March 3; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-01690R, Directorate of Operations, Latin America Division, WH/Bolivia, [file name not declassified])

La Paz, March 29, 1965, 6 p.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 BOL. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USSOUTHCOM for POLAD.

966. At President’s request, had four hour interview at his home with him and MinEconomy Berdecio March 28. Barrientos in apparent good health, disposition good, not suffering much pain from wound. (From other reports we understood Barrientos had been extremely anxious and depressed that wound might have caused permanent nerve damage. Since securing medical advice that no permanent damage will result, his attitude has improved remarkably. We are now reasonably sure wound not self-inflicted, though many politicians choose to believe it was.)

/2/ In a meeting between State and CIA representatives in Washington on March 31 FitzGerald remarked that although Barrientos and Ovando "don’t like each other, the truth is they are necessary to each other and recognize it." Ovando and Barrientos "say harsh words about each other from time to time, but often have a beer together at night." (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, April 2; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964-1965)

President explained logic of new position by admitting that his efforts to get political parties work together had failed. His efforts increase his own popularity had also failed. Since a political solution through conciliation not possible, a solution would have to be imposed. This means junta will remain in power for indefinite period, devote itself to governing effectively, without trying to win favor of all sectors of population. Admitted has made error in neglecting economic issues while trying achieve political compromises, but said he now could not be criticized for having failed try achieve political consensus.

/3/ In telegram 957 from La Paz, March 26, the Embassy reported that the junta planned to arrest "300 Communists and leftists" and exile them to Paraguay as political asylees. The documents in question were three letters from the Italian Communist Party to Lechin regarding $25,000 that it allegedly sent him." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 BOL)

/4/ At the same March 31 meeting between State and CIA officials (see footnote 2 above), Vaughn remarked: "You don’t have to go down many notches economically in Bolivia to be at the disaster point." Vaughn said that "we have been hard, we have demanded performance in return for aid. He questioned, however, whether Barrientos can deliver." The group decided to send an observer to Bolivia to "give Barrientos advice on current economic and political problems-particularly the question of whether or not to have elections, as scheduled." (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, April 2; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964-1965)

/5/ Not further identified.

Much of this extended conversation spent reviewing major economic issues such as COMIBOL, budget, railroads, Lloyd. Barrientos assured me he now prepared come to grips with these issues. Conversation also included some observations political scene, in which Barrientos said he less concerned by Falange plotting, believed Falange being led on by PRIN. He expressed some reservations about Siles and MNR as troublemaking element, and indicated he felt political parties largely limited their activities to conspiracy.

Comment: On March 28 ARMA found great relief expressed by general staff officers that divisive forces pressing on junta had been eliminated, a reaction which would tend confirm new line taken by Barrientos and junta. Believe we can expect a few more decisions from junta on economic and administrative problems. Though Barrientos may have lost some ground by having to agree to withdraw as candidate, he remains as junta president and could reconsider candidacy if public clamor for him became intense. Apparently junta has made no decision on further postponement elections at this time.

Henderson

On May 24, 1965, the Department of State reported to the White House that the military junta headed by General Barrientos had committed Bolivian armed forces against the miners in the state-owned tin mining enterprise, COMIBOL. The purpose of this action was to remove labor union leaders, "who are to a large extent either communist or far leftist, and practically all of whom are opposed to the Government of Barrientos," and who "have resisted reform and sabotaged the rehabilitation program" initiated by the junta to reduce labor costs and improve the ability of the government to manage the mines in order to ensure further U.S. assistance to COMIBOL. The report noted that although the junta "undertook its action without U.S. commitments for assistance, it has hoped for such aid." (Department of State Background and Situation Report, as of 1400, May 24, attached to memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, May 24; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 BOL)

Barrientos had requested such assistance, including arms, so he could move into the mines. The request was considered on May 19 at the weekly meeting of ARA and CIA representatives. According to ARA’s record of this meeting, prepared on May 20, FitzGerald asserted that providing arms to Barrientos to move into the mines "would make us ‘strike breakers,’ and ‘this we can’t do.’ " Sayre responded: "I think you’re right on the arms question. I think we’re really not going to finance it." A handwritten note in the margin, apparently made by Denney, said: "but we did!" (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, Denney, and Evans, May 20; Department of State INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964-1965)

The Department informed Ambassador Henderson that AID had authorized approximately $1.8 million in "special financial support for planned military intervention in COMIBOL mines." (Telegram 644 to La Paz, May 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 BOL) The Department authorized Ambassador Henderson "to commit all funds requested and communicate this to GOB." In addition, the Department instructed Henderson to look into arranging for emergency military supplies and equipment, including ammunition and planes. (Telegram 624 to La Paz, May 24; ibid.)

Also on May 24 General Ovando signed, on his own initiative, cease-fire agreements with student and labor leaders representing the tin miners. Under the terms of the agreements, Ovando would halt troop movements on the mines and withdraw troops from the mines already occupied, while the workers agreed to return to work. The government and the miners were to negotiate their differences. This action, according to a Central Intelligence Agency report of May 26 ([document number not declassified]), "was a direct violation of junta policy and determination to follow through with military operations to gain control over the tin mines." As a result, the report indicated, "the military government of General Rene Barrientos is in serious danger of collapse." The report continued, "an assessment of those forces attempting to oust him reveals that a successor government would probably permit Communists and extreme leftists to consolidate and increase their power." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Bolivia, Vol. III, Memoranda, December 1964-September 1965) The report was forwarded on May 26 to McGeorge Bundy by CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Ray Cline.

On May 27, with indications that Barrientos and Ovando were near an open split, Ovando became co-President of the junta along with Barrientos with both men having the right to exercise authority of commander-in-chief over the armed forces. According to a May 28 Department of State Situation Report, "Barrientos earlier had told our Ambassador that he intended to elevate Ovando to the co-Presidency in order to ‘keep an eye on him.’ " The report continued:

"We believe that relations between Ovando and Barrientos, never notably good, have now reached their nadir, though their differences are again momentarily plastered over. A split between the two would divide the Armed Forces, whose ability to act as a stabilizing anti-

communist influence over the near and longer term would be drastically diminished. We have instructed our Embassy to continue exerting every reasonable effort to prevent such a split, and that such efforts should be from a posture of neutrality as between the two men. A senior United States officer, who served in Bolivia for four years and is closely acquainted with both Barrientos and Ovando, will leave the United States for Bolivia Friday evening [May 28]. He will emphasize to both men the paramount importance which the highest levels of the United States Government attach to the preservation of the unity of the Bolivian Armed Forces."

The report was forward to the White House under cover of a memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy on May 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 BOL)

Washington, June 5, 1965.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. III, Memoranda, December 1964-September 1965. Secret.

SUBJECT
Bolivia: Visit of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Wimert to La Paz

/2/ Dated May 31 and June 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US)

/3/ Dated May 30 and May 31. (Ibid., POL 1 BOL; and Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. III, Cables, December 1964-September 1965)

/4/ A record of meetings of the Bolivian mission with Vaughn on June 3 and Mann on June 4 was transmitted in telegram 670 to La Paz, June 7. The main points of the mission’s presentation were a request for immediate U.S. assistance to allow Bolivia to increase its armed forces by 10,000 to maintain security in cities where the army occupied the mines, to improve the image of the armed forces, and to provide funds for social and road projects so that surplus miners could be hired. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL BOL-US)

Wimert’s presence in La Paz was reported in today’s New York Times, the source being Bolivian. We are treating the article as inaccurate, as it is in a number of respects, and explaining, if asked, that Wimert was in La Paz in preparation for his imminent assignment to Santiago as Army Attaché.

On the basis of his talks and observations, Colonel Wimert believes that civilians and military alike realize the necessity of Presidents

Barrientos and Ovando sticking together. He says that General Ovando can be classified as a "conniver" who has always been known to play various parties against one another, and that Ovando has not been making key decisions and is not as forceful as Barrientos. He has, however, a fair knowledge of economic problems and government administration. General Barrientos, Wimert thinks, would best be described as a "can-doer", perhaps too impetuous, and not given to thinking out the entire problem. According to Wimert, Barrientos has matured and is becoming more aware of the economic problems of the country, and believes that the Junta now has to stop shooting and come up with positive programs, especially in the mines, to give the people something in return for having supported the Junta.

Wimert’s characterizations of the two men coincide with our own, but our problem will be to shape and make realistic the Junta’s generalized desires to move forward on the socio-economic front.

/5/ Hawthorne Mills signed for Read above Read’s typed signature.

Washington, June 19, 1965.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. III, Memoranda, December 1964-September 1965. Secret.

SUBJECT
Report on Bolivia

Enclosed is a report on Bolivia prepared by the Latin American Policy Committee during the past two weeks. The Committee, chaired by State, includes representatives of DOD, AID, CIA and USIA. The report outlines actions that are now underway and that will be carried out during the next thirty to sixty days. Such actions are designed to prevent possibility of serious political, economic and social disturbances in Bolivia.

/2/ In a telephone conversation with President Johnson on June 5, McNamara stated that he was "worried" about a blowup in Bolivia. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McNamara, Alpha Series, June 5, 1965, 4:50 p.m., Tape 6506.01, PNO 4) In a telephone conversation earlier that afternoon, Johnson told Mann that "he wanted to have a Task Force composed of high level people from CIA, State, Defense," to develop contingency plans for Guatemala, Colombia, and Bolivia. The President said "he would like to have a Task Force which meets regularly and to which he could look for advice and information." (Ibid., Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2 1965-June 2, 1966) On June 8 Helms reported that Vance said he was going to phone Vaughn and "have him proceed immediately to set up a task force or task forces to develop contingency plans on Colombia, Guatemala and Bolivia." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 80-B01285A, Helms Chrono as DDP and DDCI)

/3/ Transmitted to Bundy on June 24, the paper provides extensive coverage of seven possible contingencies for Bolivia. These included assassination of Barrientos, of Ovando, forced removal of either Barrientos or Ovando by pressures applied by the other, the onset of a political crisis in which the United States would be required to side with Barrientos or Ovando, Communist-supported disorder erupting in Bolivia and threatening the lives and property of non-combatants, non-Communist political elements seeking to topple the Junta by an armed coup, or fighting erupting between the Barrientos and Ovando factions in the Bolivian military. In general the plan recommended supporting Barrientos, if possible, and seeking peaceful means-through unilateral and multilateral channels (such as the OAS)-to disarm any crisis. Direct use of U.S. forces was recommended only in the case of a Communist-supported coup, and only with close consultations with key OAS members. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1-1 BOL)

/4/ Dentzer reported on his impressions about Bolivia based on his trip in a June 25 memorandum to Vaughn. (Ibid., POL 15 BOL)

/5/ Initialed for Read in an unidentified hand.

BOLIVIA

This paper considers the short-term outlook for Bolivia and United States actions over the next 30 to 60 days. It has been approved in substance by the Latin American Policy Committee.

[Omitted here are a "Background" section on political events leading up to the crisis in Bolivia’s mines and a "Current Developments" section dealing with the events of May and early June 1965.]

Our short-term aim is to take advantage of GOB willingness to bring stability to the mining areas, in order to gain what progress we can for COMIBOL and the increased political stability for Bolivia which could grow out of successful action. This is the first time in more than a decade, and perhaps the last time for a long while, that a Bolivian government has a chance to bring law and order to the mines. We seek to attain these ends, however, without unduly jeopardizing the status quo, since any change now in the situation which finds the Armed Forces in power could have unpredictable consequences. We also seek to achieve these goals without decreasing the financial incentive for the government to take a variety of actions which would improve the development and long-term stability of the country. With the expulsion or voluntary exile of many communists and extreme leftists, and the split within the PCB, communist influence is now weaker than it has been for some time. To keep the extreme left from regaining its organized base in the mines, GOB policies affecting them must be sound and workable. Meanwhile, with no viable alternative to the Junta now on the Bolivian political scene, the principal danger to the Junta lies from within; Barrientos and Ovando must be given strong encouragement to stick together. These are the principal problems lying immediately ahead. Beyond that are our longer-term goals. These involve getting the Armed Forces to retire from running the government before they fail, seriously damage their influence, or are torn asunder. To accomplish this, a viable political alternative to the Junta government must be present within a year or so. That alternative may be General Barrientos as a civilian candidate for the Presidency, especially if the mine rehabilitation scheme goes well.

The entry of government troops into the potentially most rebellious mines on June 11 and 12 without bloodshed was a great victory for the government. If the Junta successfully completes the operations in which it is now engaged, its prestige will be greatly enhanced. If something goes wrong, that is, if it stops now or fails in the attempt-and we do not think the Junta is out of the woods yet-its claim to the reins of government will be jeopardized and it will face bloody skirmishes with its enemies. We are cautiously optimistic that the Barrientos-Ovando relationship will hold together for a while. We do not think anything has happened to change the underlying causes of differences between the two; they both reached the brink and, looking over it, retreated from it; realizing that the abyss below represented, in all likelihood, a suicidal split in the Armed Forces and the removal from the Bolivian scene of the only force for order and stability, given present political and economic conditions. Their relations probably will come under more intense strain, as the COMIBOL reorganization progresses, and the question of whether and when to call for elections becomes again a divisive issue for the Junta. Elections originally were called for May, postponed until September, delayed until October, and most recently postponed indefinitely.

The following special actions are underway to carry out U.S. objectives:

a. Advice to the GOB, directly from Embassy/USAID and through the Triangular Operation’s Advisory Group, on COMIBOL policy and operations. U.S. financial and recruiting assistance to obtain competent non-Bolivian nationals to manage individual mines.

b. Undertake a $1 million P.L. 480 Title IV wheat program to stock COMIBOL commissaries with cheap flour for the miners.

c. Prepare special projects, as requested by the recent GOB mission to the U.S., which increasingly can absorb unemployed miners and which manifest GOB and U.S. desire to assist the mining areas. Embassy/USAID to make initial recommendations by June 17.

a. Report by CINCSO and the MilGroup in La Paz by June 16 on whether Bolivian force levels should be increased, whether additional needs for military hardware exist, and whether the discipline and reliability of the Armed Forces can be improved by any short-term measures.

b. Insure stepped-up delivery of the two T-28D aircraft is arranged for June 17.

c. Improve GOB capacity to deter and control riots through the supply of a limited number of personnel-carrying armored cars.

d. Encourage the GOB to intensify its drive to collect weapons from the miners and to insure their destruction so that they do not get back into circulation.

a. Reiterate through various channels to key leaders the importance attached by the U.S. to Junta unity.

b. Continue discussions with governments of countries adjoining Bolivia on the significance of developments there to the hemisphere and to their national interest.

c. Seek to influence union elections and developments, including action by American trade union contacts.

d. Increase through all official U.S. sources the quality and quantity of political biographic data on individuals who may become important in the near future.

e. Complete contingency plans to deal with possible emergencies.

Washington, July 13, 1965.

/1/ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Special Files, July-December 1965. Secret; Eyes Only. This is a revised version of a draft prepared in the CIA on June 7. (Ibid., 303 Committee Files, c. 21, June 25, 1965)

SUBJECT
Expansion of Political Action Program in Bolivia

/2/ Document 153.

/3/ The June 7 draft proposal occasioned considerable discussion before and after its preparation. When FitzGerald stated at a June 2 meeting of representatives of the ARA and CIA that it might be an ideal time to "give [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a little covert support," Denney replied that "it seems like a waste of money to me." (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, Denney, and Evans, June 4; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964-1965) At the June 25 meeting of the 303 Committee the draft proposal was criticized by the participants because it openly supported Barrientos. There was a difference of opinion expressed concerning the relative merits of Barrientos and Ovando and the risk, according to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, that supporting one over the other could cause a "ruinous civil war." The 303 Committee agreed to postpone decision on the proposal pending further study. (Ibid., 303 Committee Files, c. 22, July 26) The revised July 13 proposal reflected a U.S. policy decision, according to Sayre, "to encourage moderate and responsible civilian political organizations looking to the time when pressure will greatly increase on the junta to make concessions to the desire of political groups to participate in the government or to hold elections." (Memorandum by Sayre, July 7; National Security Council 303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Bolivia, 1962-1980) This memorandum was addressed to the Acting Deputy Under Secretary (Thompson) and was marked "not sent."

a. To help create the conditions for an orderly transfer of power to a constitutional government which would have reasonable prospects for stability.

b. To maintain in the meantime the stability of the junta government through aid to political groups and individuals who will support continuation of the present regime until the orderly transfer of power can take place, which may not occur for a year or two.

(a) The present situation in Bolivia is different from that prevailing at the time the referenced memorandum was prepared and approved. The chief new developments have been (1) the failure of Barrientos’ effort to have himself elected president quickly and the indefinite postponement, announced on 7 May 1965, of the national elections previously scheduled for October of this year; (2) the mid-May decision of the junta to carry out drastic reforms in the operation of the state mining corporation known as COMIBOL, including the use of force to extend governmental authority to the mining areas; (3) the subsequent arrest and deportation to Paraguay of the extreme leftist labor leader and politician Juan Lechin and later of other troublemakers of the far left; (4) the ensuing increased tensions and stresses within governmental, military and political circles, heightened by public disturbances which occurred during the last half of May and (5) the naming on 26 May of Ovando as co-president of the junta.

(2) The present co-presidential arrangement is regarded as essentially unstable over the long term. There appears to be strong sentiment within the junta in favor of keeping Ovando from ousting Barrientos and vice-versa, since any such move by either might irreparably damage the solidarity of the armed forces and split them into irreconcilable factions. This could in turn destroy both the junta’s ability to govern and public acceptance of the military establishment. The regime would rapidly collapse under those circumstances. The Embassy and the CIA [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] believe that such a collapse would entail passage of the political initiative to extremist groups of both the Right and the Left, with a high probability that a prolonged period of chaotic civil disturbance and/or civil war would ensue.

(3) The Popular Christian Movement (MPC), regarded in January 1965 as the main vehicle for the promotion of Barrientos’ presidential candidacy, has come to play a definitely secondary role. It lacks political sophistication and good leadership, and has remained essentially a rural, peasant organization without substantial appeal to urban elements of the population. In view of this and of the indefinite postponement of elections, the MPC is no longer considered adequate as the primary focus of the political action program although it remains a useful instrument for mobilizing peasant support. Of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] approved on 5 February 1965, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had been expended as of the end of June 1965, directly for MPC organizational, propaganda, and administrative expenses and indirectly for related support to the regime.

(4) The essential factors in the present situation lead to the conclusion that the present regime should continue, as the only apparent feasible alternative for the time being to chaos and the eventual dominance of extremist groups, pending the holding of elections and installation of a constitutional government. There are strong feelings among junta members as well as subordinate officers of the armed forces in favor of the indefinite maintenance of military pre-eminence in Bolivia, as insurance against a resurgence of the sentiment that resulted in the downgrading of the military establishment during the 12-year tenure of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR). Coupled with this is a realization that strong-arm tactics are not enough and that the military must work to establish broadly-based support-passive if not active-for its chosen role. There are political elements also which appear willing to back the military for the time being, by non-opposition if not by any overt act, lest a worse fate befall them. The U.S. Government’s role should accordingly be that of encouraging the emergence of a national consensus along these lines. It will be necessary to provide covert support to these individuals and groups that can be mobilized behind U.S. policy objectives, since overt action, or even inaction, on the part of the U.S. which appeared to favor one faction or another would imperil the unity of the regime.

(5) The fluidity of the situation in the country makes it impossible at this time to identify all elements to be aided through covert channels. [11 lines of source text not declassified] There will necessarily be flexibility in the extent of the covert funding to be provided each of these and other groups, in view of the rapidity with which Bolivian events tend to move.

[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

Bolivia needs a moderate and effective government. There is neither a single party nor a likely combination of parties capable of forming a viable government with which we could cooperate. Hence, for the present, there is no acceptable alternative to the junta, and there may be none for a year or more. The unity of the armed forces is the key factor in the continued strength of the government. The armed forces could be split by the rivalry of Barrientos and Ovando, both of whom desire to be the constitutional president. Meanwhile there is increased maneuvering among civilian parties and groups who are looking toward the time when they can play a more meaningful role in governmental affairs. In the long run there must be a civilian government, and we should encourage the growth of conditions which will make this possible. As the civilian political situation unfolds we should identify that group which gives promise of being most viable politically and most energetic in attacking developmental problems, and give it our support. Under present circumstances we must carefully assess the relative strengths of Barrientos and Ovando as well as other leaders. We are inclined to favor Barrientos at this time, but we must not antagonize Ovando, about whose orientation and motivations we should know more, by playing favorites in such a way as to set Ovando against us or to cause him to bring his differences with Barrientos to a head.

[Omitted here is additional discussion of the proposal.]

This proposal has been coordinated with and approved by the U.S. Ambassador in La Paz and has been discussed in detail with appropriate officials of the Department of State.

/4/ The recommendation was endorsed by Thompson on July 19. (Ibid., 303 Committee Files, c. 23, August 9, 1965) In a July 21 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Executive Secretary of the 303 Committee Peter Jessup indicated that "both State and Vance have approved" the proposal and wrote "I have no magic formula either and recommend working along with Barrientos as the only semi-competent available." Bundy initialed his approval. (National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Subject File, Bolivia) The 303 Committee approved the recommendation on July 26. (Memorandum for the Record, July 27; ibid.) At the request of Ambassador Henderson, the 303 Committee on March 28, 1966, approved a request for [text not declassified] additional funding to strengthen the political coalition backing Barrientos in the upcoming election, with the stipulation that such requests would "be frowned upon" in the future. (Memorandum from Koren to Gordon, March 28; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Special Files, January-June 1966). The CIA paper, February 26, proposing the extension of the political action program is ibid., c. March 28, 1966)

La Paz, May 31, 1966.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 70 D 443, Def 19, Military Assistance, 1966. Secret; Official-Informal.

Dear Linc:

The short run Country Team objective in the domestic political field has been to foster the circumstances in which elections can be held. In this effort, we have held no brief for, and we have tried to avoid identification with any particular candidate.

The Armed Forces must eventually transfer power. This can be done by violence, or by elections.

The civilian political parties must eventually accept responsibility for governing the country, and for engaging in political activities, as contrasted with quasi-military activities. This can only come about by holding elections.

We have used our resources to further this objective of elections, both with the Junta, and with the leaders of the political parties (with the sole exception of the extreme left). We have encouraged the Junta to stand firm on the date of elections, once chosen; and have encouraged political leaders to take a positive attitude towards the elections.

Any slate of candidates for the Presidency must include Barrientos, both because he is willing to fight to be included, and because he has genuine popular support. He can be eliminated by physical violence, or by political chicanery, but as long as he lives, he will return to the fight. He could also lose at the polls, although at present writing this seems unlikely, but in that event, the new government would face a formidable opposition.

Since Barrientos is a necessary element to holding elections, but not because he is our "chosen candidate", we have used some of our resources with him. He will not be an easy president to deal with, and his regime may not live out its term. Much will depend on his cabinet, and the degree of influence individual ministers are able to exercise. But if there are to be elections, he has to be there, and we have to deal with him.

Elections with Barrientos as the sole candidate, however, with the major traditional political parties abstaining, would increase the probabilities of post-election instability. The Falange would certainly abstain if their candidates were running only against Barrientos. We, therefore, encouraged Andrade to take a chance (he didn’t really need much persuasion) in order that the MNR (as still the major political force in the country, even though presently divided) would be represented at the polls. This has caused the Junta and the Armed Forces some serious doubts, since they regard the MNR, however represented, as their mortal enemy (shades of 1946 and 1952).

The Andrade candidacy, and some behind-the-scenes maneuvering, (and, modestly, our own conversations with Falange leaders) has now brought the Falange into the campaign. The conditions are therefore present for a (relatively) meaningful election.

Some flies, of course, remain in the ointment, this being Bolivia. If the Junta plays too many tricks on Andrade, he will either throw his support to a unified MNR, or be discredited. In either case, the hand of the more extreme elements of the MNR will be strengthened, and Bolivia will face a prolonged period of civil unrest.

It is one thing to win an election in Bolivia, it is quite another to govern this country. Any administration needs an organization with workers everywhere; a political philosophy responsive to popular demand however imperfectly expressed; and skill in the arts of government. The MNR, disregarding for the moment its present plight, could muster these elements. Barrientos’ present political coalition can not, although he has personal charisma and political flair. The Falange has few assets in this respect, and would quickly polarize the political scene.

This means to me that after the election will come a period of political jockeying for new, more meaningful alignments. We hope that this jockeying will be in purely political terms, and that violence can be avoided. But uncertainty and a certain amount of boiling and bubbling cannot be avoided.

Finally, there is always the enigma of Ovando. We know very little certainly about him. We do know that he is unlikely to precipitate a showdown; that he is a master of devious maneuver; that he puts the unity of the Armed Forces above everything else; that he avoids imposing a decision (which has resulted in vacillation and indecision on many trying occasions); and that he has told us on a number of occasions that Barrientos must be a candidate for the Presidency, against moderate opponents, naming Andrade of the MNR and Romero of the Falange.

This leads us to conclude that Ovando now wants elections, with Barrientos winning. He could then retire with glory, to command a unified Armed Forces, free from the divisive threat of Barrientos, and thus control the only real unified force in the country. If Barrientos succeeds in governing the country for four years, he will have resolved at least some of the sticky problems which now confront the government, and Ovando could easily succeed him. If Barrientos does not do what the Armed Forces thinks he should do, Ovando could remove him, although this would always be dangerous, both to the Armed Forces, and to the country.

If we are wrong, and Ovando intends to out-maneuver Barrientos, we will have little chance to anticipate his move. We have, therefore, been careful to keep a clear channel to Ovando, too.

/2/ In a June 3 memorandum to Morris commenting on Henderson’s letter, Williams wrote that this strategy was approved months ago and confirmed more recently in a 303 Committee paper. He went on to indicate that he was "puzzled that at this late hour, thirty days before the elections in Bolivia, the Ambassador should ask Mr. Gordon if he approves a strategy which we have been pursuing for many months." (Ibid.)

Sincerely,

Doug

Washington, July 1, 1966.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January 1966-December 1968. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Bolivian Elections

Bolivia holds a national election on Sunday.

/2/ Results of the Bolivian election, in which Barrientos won handily, are reported in airgram CA-219 to all ARA posts except Caracas, July 8, 1966. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 BOL)

The best that can be said for the elections is that it will serve to put Bolivia back in the ranks of constitutional government-in form, if not in substance.

/3/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, July 15, 1966.

/1/ Source: National Security Council, Files of the 303 Committee, Subject File, Bolivia. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on this memorandum reads: "Distributed to members of 303 Committee for information on 21 July 1966. Not reflected in 303 Minutes."

/2/ William V. Broe, chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the Deputy Directorate of Plans, briefly summarized the covert action program for Bolivia in a July 15 memorandum to Helms: "With the election of Rene Barrientos as President of Bolivia on July 3, 1966 this action was brought to a successful completion." Broe continued, "in view of President-elect Barrientos’ arrival in Washington next week, it might be appropriate to remind the Committee of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] actions undertaken with Committee approval in Bolivia." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Bolivia, 1962-1980) A separate undated briefing memorandum on [text not declassified] support for Bolivian Presidential candidate Barrientos was forwarded by the CIA to Rostow on July 14 (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence Files, Guerrilla Problems in Latin America) under cover of a memorandum from Broe to Jessup. (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. VIII) On July 16 Rostow provided President Johnson a copy of this briefing memorandum, with the following note: "This is to explain why General Barrientos may say thank you when you have lunch with him next Wednesday, the 20th." (Ibid.)

/3/ Document 153.

/4/ Document 158.

/5/ Not printed. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, c. 35, March 28) Also see footnote 4, Document 158.

The referenced memoranda, the most recent of which was approved by the 303 Committee on 28 March 1966, concerned a political action program for Bolivia. The purpose of this [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] program was through covert means to ensure the orderly transfer of power via elections to a civilian, constitutional government whose policies would be compatible with those of the United States by:

(1) Providing covert financial assistance to the groups supporting the candidacy of General Barrientos.

(2) Providing covert financial encouragement to opposition groups who might otherwise abstain and endanger the legitimacy of the elections.

(3) [3 lines of source text not declassified]

The objectives of this program have been accomplished. A new political party was built to provide the platform for General Barrientos. This base was reinforced by a coalition of already existing parties. Despite many internal stresses, this pro-Barrientos complex was held together during the crucial pre-electoral period by [1 1⁄2 lines of source text not declassified] covert financial support. At the same time covert financial assistance was given to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a rival party to ensure its participation in the elections. In addition, a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] subsidy payment was made to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a second important opposition party which was considering withdrawing from the electoral process. When these two most important opposition parties would not abstain from elections, three other groups made [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] entries into the race, with the result that the election contest took place between the Barrientos coalition and five opposition slates.

The combination of providing money and covert guidance to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] contending parties changed the political climate from a volatile, conspiratorial atmosphere with little discussion of peaceful resolution through elections to a full fledged electoral atmosphere with the traditional violence and conspiracy thrust into the background.

While the very final count of the elections is not in at this writing, it can be said that General Barrientos has won by the impressive majority of about 60% of the vote in an election praised by OAS observers as democratic and honest. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The inauguration on 6 August 1966 will mean the end of 21 months of military rule and the beginning of what hopefully will be a four-year term of office for the desired civilian, constitutional government.

It is obvious that the recent election of this government is but the first step towards establishing political stability in Bolivia. Much depends on the political acumen of Barrientos himself, who is faced with the task of manipulating and maneuvering the many divergent political forces which now may be expected to turn their energies to toppling him. The military, suppressed since 1952 by the previous regime, has obtained another taste of power during the past 21 months, and although its announced intention is to withdraw from politics, this may be only temporary. The opposition parties will not want to depend on honest elections in 1970 and can be expected to begin the anti-government scheming which is endemic to Bolivian politics. The economic problems continue to be as serious and extensive as ever. In summary, while the above described political action program has returned Bolivia to a constitutional government headed by a popular president, the prognosis whether Barrientos can last out his term of office must be one of cautious optimism.

Washington, July 21, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

/1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 BOL. Confidential. Drafted by Patrick F. Morris (ARA/BC) and approved in S on July 27. The meeting was held in Rusk’s office immediately following a meeting between Barrientos and Gordon that focused on the status of negotiations with the Export-Import Bank, the delay in U.S. disbursements for a loan for COMIBOL, and U.S. supplying Bolivia with helicopters under the MAP program. (Ibid.)

President-elect Barrientos visited Washington July 19-23, in a private capacity, primarily to address the International Platform Association, a public speaking group, on July 22. He had lunch with President Johnson at the White House on July 20 and according to the President’s Daily Diary, there was an exchange of gifts, followed by luncheon in the State Dining Room at 1:50 p.m. (Johnson Library) No further record of discussions has been found. In telegram 7236 to La Paz, July 14, the Department had instructed the Embassy to inform Barrientos not to expect substantive discussions nor concessions during his trip. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 BOL)

SUBJECT
Visit of General Rene Barrientos Ortuno, President-elect of the Republic of Bolivia.

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Gen. Rene Barrientos Ortuno, Pres.-elect of Bolivia
Jaime Berdecio, Minister of National Economy-Bolivia
Julio Sanjines, Ambassador of Bolivia
Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary-ARA
Douglas Henderson, Ambassador-La Paz
Patrick F. Morris, Country Director-BC

The Secretary opened the meeting by congratulating the President-elect on his successful electoral campaign. He indicated that he and President Johnson had followed developments in Bolivia with a great deal of interest and were happy to see a return to a constitutional government in that country. He said that General Barrientos’ election victory was impressive.

General Barrientos thanked the Secretary and said that Bolivia was a democratic country; that he had won the election but now he had to win at successfully governing his country. He said that Bolivia made common cause with the United States in upholding the democratic processes, improving economic conditions and in countering communism.

The Secretary asked the General what he considered his three most important problems. The General answered that the first was tin; Bolivia must increase its production and at the same time must receive adequate prices for the tin it sells. The second most important concern of his Government is transportation; Bolivia must construct a road network so as to integrate the national territory. The General and Ambassador Henderson described to the Secretary the road projects which were either under way or under consideration for United States assistance. General Barrientos said that the third area of importance was the connecting of Bolivia with outside world by better means of transport. He said that on his way to the United States he had stopped in Peru and talked to President Belaunde about the necessity for a road from the Peruvian port of Ilo to the Bolivian border near Lake Titicaca. He said the Peruvians have agreed to request assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank to construct this road. He said that this road was of primary importance for Bolivia.

The Secretary then asked about Bolivia’s food production capacity. He wanted to know whether Bolivia was dependent upon large food imports or whether it was comparatively self sufficient. It was explained to the Secretary that a large segment of the indigenous population lived from subsistence agriculture with potatoes as a staple; that in recent years Bolivia had become self-sufficient in rice and sugar, but that it was a net importer of wheat and wheat products.

The Secretary then asked about educational problems. Ambassador Henderson explained that the United States Government was assisting the Bolivians in defining their educational needs through a contract with Ohio State University.

General Barrientos explained that there was a need for technical education especially in the agricultural sector since campesinos who were taught to read and write but who were not taught how to be better farmers usually became migrants to the cities. He said it was absolutely necessary to educate the campesino in practical agriculture so that they would stay on the land.

The Secretary asked about health problems and was informed that tuberculosis and silicosis were serious problems in the country especially in the high lands. The high incidence of tuberculosis was related to malnutrition. It was also explained that the anti-malaria campaign begun initially by the Rockefeller Foundation in 1949 has been very successful, continuing under the Bolivian Government with some assistance from the United States.

The Secretary asked General Barrientos about the kind of cabinet he thought he would have. The General answered that he hoped to have a competent cabinet composed of men dedicated to the solution of the nation’s problems. He said he hoped to avoid choosing representatives of various political groups in order to satisfy partisan demands. He said that he realized that he would have problems with the political groups by doing this but that his main interest was in satisfying the people, not political parties.

The Secretary said that President Kennedy set an example by choosing people on the basis of their reputations. He said that he did not know personally practically anybody in his first cabinet except his brother Robert Kennedy who became Attorney General.

The Secretary then asked about Bolivia’s relations with its neighbors. The General answered that Bolivia was on good terms with all of the neighboring countries with the exception of Chile. He said that there was a very deep feeling that Bolivia should have access to the sea.

The Secretary asked whether or not joint economic projects developing contiguous border areas might not be an indirect way of lessening tensions so that an eventual solution could be worked out.

Ambassador Henderson asked General Barrientos whether some kind of regional development wasn’t the answer. General Barrientos responded that the northern part of Chile was very poor; that regional development projects would only improve the economic condition of that area and would make Chile more determined to keep it than it is now.

The Secretary said that accelerated economic growth in border areas have proved to be one way of lessening the possibility of border problems. He used the Saar region as a specific example.

General Barrientos said that he thought the Bolivian situation was different since Bolivia was seeking access to the sea.

Ambassador Sanjines then described a plan of providing Bolivia with a port within an enclave of ten square kilometers between the present cities of Tacna and Arica. He said he did not believe that there was need for a corridor from Bolivia to the sea, if Bolivia could have a port on the ocean which was duly recognized as Bolivian territory, this would be sufficient. He said with air transport becoming more and more important such an enclave was sensible since one would be able to take off from La Paz and land on Bolivian territory on the Pacific Ocean.

The Secretary suggested that such a port might be multi-national or perhaps an Alliance for Progress port.

The Bolivian Ambassador insisted that the only way that Bolivia would be interested was if the Bolivian flag would fly over the territory.

The Secretary concluded the meeting by emphasizing President Johnson’s dedication to the Alliance for Progress and his specific interests in agriculture, education and health. He said that the President had a passion for performance; that he was interested not in just words but deeds. He wanted to see concrete accomplishments under the Alliance as the result of United States assistance as well as the result of the efforts of the various countries themselves.

On March 16, 1967, the Embassy in La Paz reported that President Barrientos had personally informed Ambassador Henderson that two guerrilla suspects had been detained by Bolivian authorities and, upon interrogation, had admitted association with a group of 30 to 40 guerrillas "led by Castroite Cubans" and other foreigners. The suspects reportedly mentioned that Che Guevara was leader of the guerrilla group, but they had not seen him. Barrientos urgently requested U.S. communications equipment to enable the Bolivian Government to locate reported guerrilla radio transmitters. Henderson made no commitments beyond a promise to look into what the United States could do. (Telegram 2314 from La Paz, March 16; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 BOL)

A year earlier there were intelligence reports that Che Guevara was in South America, but U.S. analysts found little supporting evidence. In a March 4, 1966, memorandum concerning rumors of Guevara’s presence in Colombia, FitzGerald noted that "penetrations of insurgent groups had revealed no indication of Guevara’s presence in any of these groups." (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS, Operational Group, Job 78-5505, Area Activity-Cuba) Further analysis by the Agency identified seven conflicting rumors of Guevara’s whereabouts. A March 23, 1966, memorandum prepared in the Western Hemisphere Division noted that Guevara’s usefulness had been reduced to his ability as a guerrilla, and that "with his myth he is ten feet tall; without it, he is a mortal of normal stature." Under the circumstances, the Agency concluded:

". . . it is not believed justifiable to divert considerable amounts of time, money and manpower to an effort to locate Guevara. It is considered far more important to use these assets to penetrate and monitor Communist subversive efforts wherever they may occur, since Guevara’s presence in an area will not affect greatly the outcome of any given insurgent effort." (Ibid.)

On March 24, 1967, the Embassy in La Paz reported that Barrientos met with the Deputy Chief of Mission on March 23 to advise him that the guerrilla situation had worsened and that this deterioration caused him increasing concern. Barrientos believed the guerrilla activity was "part of a large subversive movement led by Cuban and other foreigners." He pointed out that Bolivian troops in the area of guerrilla activity were "green and ill-equipped," and reiterated his urgent request for U.S. assistance. The Embassy told Barrientos that "our military officers were working with the Bolivian military to ascertain facts relating to requirements." (Telegram 2381 from La Paz, March 24; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 BOL) Two U.S. military assistance advisory group officers reported that on March 23 guerrillas had ambushed a 22-man Bolivian Army patrol near Nancuahazu, prompting the Embassy to report to the Department on March 27: "There is now sufficient accumulation of information to bring Country Team to accept as fact that there is guerrilla activity in area previously mentioned, that it could constitute potential security threat to GOB." (Telegram 2384 from La Paz, March 27; ibid.)

In a 90-minute meeting with Ambassador Henderson on March 27, Barrientos appealed for direct U.S. budgetary support for the Bolivian armed forces to meet the "emergency and one in which Bolivia was ‘helping to fight for the U.S.’" In reporting this discussion to the Department, Henderson observed:

"I suspect that Barrientos is beginning to suffer some genuine anguish over the sad spectacle offered by the poor performance of his armed forces in this episode; i.e., an impetuous foray into reported guerrilla country, apparently based on a fragment of intelligence and resulting in a minor disaster, which further tended to panic the GOB into a lather of ill-coordinated activity, with less than adequate professional planning and logistical support." Henderson continued, "pressed by his military he may seek resort to the lobbying talents of Ambassador Sanjines in Washington in an effort to end-run proper channels of communication with U.S. authorities." (Telegram 2405 from La Paz, March 29; ibid.)

On March 29, the CIA reported that two guerrillas captured by the Bolivian Army had furnished information that the guerrilla movement "is an independent, international operation under Cuban direction and is not affiliated with any Bolivian political party. The Agency had received information about the development of other guerrilla groups in Bolivia. "Should these other groups decide to go into action at this time, the Bolivian Government would be sorely taxed to cope with them" in addition to the Cuban-backed group. (Memorandum from [name not declassified] to the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, March 29; Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS, Job 88-01415R, [file name not declassified])

On March 31, the Department responded to Henderson’s concerns: "We have no evidence ‘end runs’ being attempted here." The Department instructed the Embassy in La Paz:

"You may at your discretion inform Barrientos that we most reluctant consider supporting significantly enlarged army, either thru provision additional material or thru renewal budget support. We fully support concept of providing limited amounts of essential material assist carefully orchestrated response to threat, utilizing to maximum extent possible best trained and equipped troops available. Should threat definitely prove greater than capacity present forces, Barrientos can be assured U.S. willingness consider further assistance." (Telegram 166701 to La Paz, March 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 BOL)

Also on March 31, the Department informed U.S. posts in neighboring countries to Bolivia that the current plan "is to block guerrilla escape then bring in, train and prepare ranger-type unit to eliminate guerrillas." The Department also indicated that the United States was considering a special military training team (MTT) "for accelerated training counter guerrilla force." (Telegram 16641 to Buenos Aires, et al., March 31; ibid.)

On May 11 Rostow reported to President Johnson that "CIA has received the first credible report that ‘Che’ Guevara is alive and operating in South America." The information had come from interrogation of guerrillas captured in Bolivia. "We need more evidence before concluding that Guevara is operational-and not dead, as the intelligence community, with the passage of time, has been more and more inclined to believe." (Memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, May 11; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January 1966-December 1968) According to the CIA report, May 10, Che Guevara told [text not declassified] that he had come to Bolivia "in order to begin a guerrilla movement that would spread to the other parts of Latin America." (CIA Information Cable TDCS 314/06486-67; ibid.)

Washington, June 23, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January 1966-December 1968. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum indicates President Johnson saw it.

Mr. President:

This is what is going on with guerrillas in Bolivia:

Last March 24 Bolivian security forces were ambushed in a remote area of southeastern Bolivia as they were investigating reports of a guerrilla training camp. Since then 6 other skirmishes have been fought. The Bolivian forces have come off poorly in these engagements, losing 28 of their men to 2 or 3 known rebels killed.

/2/ In a June 4 cable to President Johnson, Rostow noted that "CIA believes that ‘Che’ Guevara has been with this group." He also indicated that "we have put Bolivia on top of the list more because of the fragility of the political situation and the weakness of the armed forces than the size and effectiveness of the guerrilla movement." (Ibid., Latin America, Vol. VI, June-September 1967) The CIA received information, reportedly based on a document written and signed by Che Guevara, in which the revolutionary stated that "revolt started in Bolivia because wide-spread discontent there and disorganization army." ([text not declassified] Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, [file name not declassified])

Estimates of the strength of the guerrillas range from 50 to 60 men. It appears that they were flushed out while still in a preliminary training phase and before they intended to open operations. Despite this, they have so far clearly out-classed the Bolivian security forces. The performance of the government units has revealed a serious lack of command coordination, officer leadership and troop training and discipline.

Soon after the presence of guerrillas had been established, we sent a special team and some equipment to help organize another Ranger-type Battalion. On the military side, we are helping about as fast as the Bolivians are able to absorb our assistance. The diversion of scarce resources to the Armed Forces could lead to budgetary problems, and our financial assistance may be needed later this year.

The outlook is not clear. The guerrillas were discovered early before they were able to consolidate and take the offensive. The pursuit by the government forces, while not very effective, does keep them on the run. These are two pluses.

At their present strength the guerrillas do not appear to pose an immediate threat to Barrientos. If their forces were to be quickly augmented and they were able to open new fronts in the near future, as now rumored, the thin Bolivian armed forces would be hard-pressed and the fragile political situation would be threatened. The hope is that with our help Bolivian security capabilities will out-distance guerrilla capabilities and eventually clear them out.

/3/ A June 14 memorandum prepared by the CIA focused on Cuban sponsorship of the Bolivian guerrillas and the failure of the Bolivian Government to meet the insurgency threat. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Guerrilla Problem in Latin America)

The Argentines and Brazilians are also watching this one. Argentina is the only other country with a military mission in La Paz. Close military ties between Argentina and Bolivia are traditional. The Argentines have also furnished military supplies to the Bolivians.

/4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, June 29, 1967.

/1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January 1966-December 1968. Secret. Prepared by Bowdler. Copies provided to Rostow and Sayre.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador of Bolivia
Julio Sanjines-Goytia

Mr. William G. Bowdler

At the invitation of the Bolivian Ambassador, I went to his residence this afternoon to discuss the Bolivian situation.

Most of the one-hour conversation was a monologue by the loquacious Ambassador describing the background to the Barrientos administration and the present political situation. Toward the end of the conversation, he got around to the two points he had on his mind.

The first was increased external assistance. I asked him what specifically he had in mind. He replied that he was not thinking of budgetary support since Bolivia had passed that stage and was proud of its accomplishment. I then asked him what type of project assistance he had in mind. On this he was very vague, saying that we should send a special mission from Washington to study what additional projects might be started to further Bolivia’s development.

The question in which he was most interested-and obviously the main purpose for the invitation-was to ask for our help in establishing what he called a "hunter-killer" team to ferret out guerrillas. He said this idea was not original with him, but came from friends of his in CIA. I asked him whether the Ranger Battalion now in training were not sufficient. He said that what he has in mind is 50 to 60 young army officers, with sufficient intelligence, motivation and drive, who could be trained quickly and could be counted on to search out the guerrillas with tenacity and courage. I asked him whether such an elite group would not cause problems within the army and perhaps even political problems between Barrientos and his supporters. The Ambassador said that these problems could be minimized by rotating a fixed number of the team back into the army at regular intervals. The rotation system would have the added benefit of bringing a higher degree of professionalism into the officer ranks of the army. I told him that his idea may have merit, but needs further careful examination.

Before leaving, I told him that I had seen reports that Bolivia might be considering declaring a state of war against Cuba. I asked him whether he had any information to substantiate these reports. He expressed complete surprise and strong opposition, pointing out that such action would expose Bolivia to international ridicule. He speculated that these reports might have been planted by Cuban exiles. He said that some Cubans had approached him along this line and there may well be Cuban exiles in Bolivia who are doing likewise with other Bolivian officials. I told him that I also thought that this action would be a serious mistake not only because of the light in which it would cast Bolivia, but also because of the serious legal and practical problems which would arise from being in a state of war with Cuba.

Upon departing, he said he appreciated having the opportunity to talk frankly with me and expressed the desire to exchange views on his country from time to time. I told him I would be happy to do this whenever he thought it useful.

WGB

In a July 5, 1967, memorandum to Special Assistant Walt Rostow, William Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff summarized the current U.S. military training role in Bolivia: "DOD is helping train and equip a new Ranger Battalion. The Bolivian absorption capacity being what it is, additional military assistance would not now seem advisable. [3 lines of source text not declassified]" Bowdler recommended that "a variable of the Special Strike Force acceptable to the Country Team be established. It might be part of the new Ranger Battalion." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Guerrilla Problem in Latin America) The Country Team objections were transmitted in telegram 2291 from La Paz, May 24. The team stated that a strike force would be viewed by the Bolivians as a "magical solution" and a "substitute for hard work and needed reform." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23 BOL)

At 4:30 p.m. on July 5 Rostow, Bowdler, and Peter Jessup met in the Situation Room of the White House with representatives of the Department of State including Assistant Secretary of State Covey Oliver, Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Sayre, and Ambassador Hender-

son, with William Lang of the Department of Defense, and Desmond FitzGerald and William Broe of the Central Intelligence Agency. The group agreed that a special strike force was not advisable because of the Embassy’s objections. They decided that the United States should "concentrate on the training of the Second Ranger Battalion with the preparation of an intelligence unit to be part of the Battalion." They also agreed to look into expansion of the rural police program, prepare contingency plans to cover the possibility of the insurgency getting beyond the control of Barrientos and the Bolivian armed forces, and suggested that Barrientos might need $2-5 million in grant or supporting assistance in the next 2 months to meet budgetary problems resulting from the security situation. (Memorandum of meeting; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VI, June 1967-September 1967) The gist of these decisions was relayed to the President in the context of a broader policy for counterinsurgency in Latin America; see Document 61.

U.S. efforts to support the